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Abstract 
 
Government, Governance and the Development of the 
Innovation System: The example of the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies 
 
Chao-chen Chung 
 
The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 
 
This thesis focuses on the research of RTDI policies (research, technology, 
development and innovation), and the main theme of this thesis is to link the 
three variables together: RTDI policy-making process---the contents of 
RTDI policies---the appropriateness of RTDI policies on configuration of 
the national, the sectoral and the technological innovation systems. We 
assume the policy-making process of RTDI policies would shape the 
contents of the RTDI policies. Once the contents of RTDI policies are 
implemented, the RTDI policies would influence, whether appropriate or 
inappropriate, on configuration of the three innovation systems. We define 
the configuration of the three innovation systems as national, sectoral and 
technological innovation system (NSTIS).  
 
We use the Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectoral policies as the 
empirical examples. Biotechnology in Taiwan configures with three sectors, 
i.e. pharmaceuticals, agriculture and medical device. Between 2000 and 
2008, the Taiwanese government intensively promoted many policies in 
order to support the development of biotechnology and related sectors. 
Among the various policies, we choose the National Science and 
Technology Programs and the regulation policies (in terms of Law of 
Pharmaceutical Affairs and the Agro-pesticides Management Act) as our 
two empirical cases and set up the in-depth discussion for the policy-making 
process of the two policies. 
 
On the basis of the empirical cases of Taiwan, we explore the influence of 
the RTDI policy-making process on the contents of RTDI policies which 
further shapes the development of the NSTIS.           
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background and research rationale 
 
Why some policies appropriately support the national technological and 
industrial development but others fail? It is one of the frequently asked 
questions of the date but lacking unified answers. While the scholars of 
innovation systems focus on the influence of national institutions and RTDI 
(research, technology, development and innovation) policies, as a special 
part of national institutions, on the different levels of innovation systems, 
political scientists analyze RTDI policies through the approaches of political 
science.  
 
From the perspective of the scholars of innovation systems, different 
approaches not only use different criteria to draw the boundaries of 
innovation systems but also discuss the roles of national institutions and 
RTDI policies from different perspectives. From the perspective of national 
innovation system, Freeman (1987) has compared the empirical cases of 
Japan and Britain in order to explain how national policies shaped the 
national innovation systems of the two countries, and Nelson (1993) has 
compared the empirical cases of 15 countries to discuss the roles of 
governments played in the development of each nation’s industrial 
innovations. While Malerba (2004) use the framework of sectoral 
innovation systems to describe that national institutions should ‘match’ the 
development of the sectoral innovation system within the national border, 
Jacobsson and Bergek (1998) have used the framework of the system of 
technological innovation to compare the energy systems in Germany, 
Sweden and Netherlands and explained that national institutions do effect 
the development of technological innovation systems within each national 
border. Yet, even though Makard and Truffer (2008) already show the 
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configuration of the national, the sectoral and the technological innovation 
systems, until now, the influence of the national institutions and RTDI 
policies on the configuration of the three innovation systems remain unclear.  
 
From the perspective of the political scientists, RTDI policies are 
‘man-made’ and shaped by a series of policy-making process rather than 
‘born to have’. Through the network governance approach, Jensen (1991) 
and Biegelbauer (2003) point oiut that RTDI policies are made through the 
interactions between actors involving in the network of governance. 
Through analyzing the roles of business interest groups and scientists in the 
RTDI policies, Inzelt (2008) and Tournon (1993) show how business interest 
groups and scientists shape the RTDI policies. From the perspectives of 
public management, Braun (2008) describes how the relationships between 
the actors inside the government shape the coordination of RTDI policies. 
On the basis of the political science, RTDI policies are made through a 
series of policy-making process, and the interactions between actors in the 
process indeed shape these RTDI policies. Nevertheless, until now, since 
different political scientists analyze the policy-making process of RTDI 
policies from different perspectives and show the particular aspect of the 
policy-making process only, we have very limited understanding towards 
the whole policy-making process of the RTDI policies and the influence of 
the whole policy process on the RTDI policies. 
  
In this thesis, we search for the integrated perspective for the analysis of 
RTDI policies. On one hand, we tend to understand the policy-making 
process of RTDI policies which shapes the RTDI policies. On the other hand, 
we tend to understand the influence of RTDI policies, whether appropriate 
or inappropriate, on the development of the configuration of the three 
innovation systems. In fact, the main theme of the thesis is to link the three 
variables together: RTDI policy-making process---the contents of RTDI 
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policies---the appropriateness of RTDI policies on configuration of the three 
innovation systems. We assume the policy-making process of RTDI policies 
would shape the contents of the RTDI policies, in terms of policy objectives 
and policy instruments. Once the contents of RTDI policies are implemented, 
the RTDI policies would influence, whether appropriately or inappropriately, 
on development of the configuration of the three innovation systems. The 
main theme of the thesis is highlighted again in the dialog box below. As 
shown in the box, since we pay more attention to the linkage between RTDI 
policy-making process and the contents of RTDI policies, we use the thicker 
arrow for the linkage between the two variables.     
 
   
 
 
 
We choose the empirical examples according to the theme of the thesis. The 
policies of the Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectors are chosen 
because of two reasons. Each of the two reasons is discussed below.  
 
First, the development of biotechnology, from our point of view, is not fully 
explored. Biotechnology, as described by Brink at al (2004), intersects with 
plural sectors. Geseisk (2000) and Reiss et al (2004) also show that 
biotechnology in fact intersects with the national innovation systems of 
plural countries and is deeply shaped by the RTDI policies of different 
nations. Biotechnology, therefore, provides an interesting empirical example 
to show the configuration of the three innovation systems, as well as the 
appropriateness of the RTDI policies on the configuration of the three 
innovation systems.                  
 
Second, the country of Taiwan offers a fascinating example to discuss the 
 
RTDI policy-making 
process 
Contents of RTDI policies  Appropriateness of 
RTDI policies on the 
configuration of the 
three innovation 
systems 
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development of biotechnology, the policy-making process and the 
appropriateness of policies. Biotechnology in Taiwan was developed in the 
very unique modes. There were three sectors adopted biotechnology as their 
knowledge base, i.e. pharmaceuticals, agriculture and medical device. Each 
of the sectors offered contrasting opportunities for the development of 
biotechnology. In the pharmaceutical sector, local small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) were the main forces of the sector. The original 
knowledge base of the pharmaceutical sector was chemical engineering. 
Only after the late 1990s, the pharmaceutical companies gradually adopted 
biotechnology as one of their knowledge bases. In the agriculture sector, the 
main actors for innovation were the public research institutions and large 
public company. The private local SMEs only played minor roles in the 
agricultural innovation and production. The sector adopted biotechnology as 
its main knowledge base from the beginning of its development. In the 
medical device sector, local SMEs were the pillars in innovation and 
manufacturing. The major knowledge base of the sector was machinery and 
information and communication technologies (ICT). Only in the late 1990s, 
with the development of biochips, the sector started to adopt biotechnology 
as one of its minor knowledge bases. We also refer the three sectors to the 
‘biotechnology related sectors’. Through analyzing the history of the 
development of the Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectors from 1945 
to 2000, we tend to clearly discuss the configuration between biotechnology 
and the three sectors within the country’s national border and further 
recognize the configuration of the three innovation systems. Furthermore, 
the Taiwanese government, especially during 2000 to 2008, promoted lots of 
policies to support the development of biotechnology and all of the policies 
were made under the context that the Taiwanese government was the 
divided-government under the presidential polity, the ministers of the 
cabinet and administrators within the government faced serious problems 
for coordination, and interest groups and academics were not fully involved 
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in the policy-making process. Through analyzing the unique policy-making 
process of the Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectoral policies, we 
will discuss how such policy-making process shaped the contents of 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies in Taiwan and further shape the 
appropriateness on the configuration of the three innovation systems. 
               
1.2 Research questions 
 
The thesis focuses on the four research questions which contribute to our 
understanding to the theme of the thesis. Each of the four research questions 
is established upon a variable which we assume to influence the RTDI 
policy-making process, as well as the contents and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies. The four variables we assume to influence the RTDI policies are 
polity, the horizontal coordination, the vertical coordination and the 
involvement of external stakeholders. Moreover, from our perspective, the 
four variables will not only influence the appropriateness but also the 
consistencies of RTDI policies which refer to the condition that a set of 
RTDI policies are not contradictory and ideally complementary to each other. 
The consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies will be further 
discussed and defined in Chapter 3. Here, we only shortly introduce the four 
research questions of the thesis as below.   
 
Research question 1: How does a divided government under the presidential 
polity influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies?  
 
Research question 2: How does the horizontal coordination between actors 
influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies? The 
actors refer to both elected politicians and administrators. 
 
Research question3: How does vertical coordination between elected 
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politicians and administrators influence the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies?   
 
Research question 4: How does the involvement of external stakeholders 
influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies? The 
external stakeholders refer to both interest groups and scientists.   
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
Our empirical research is based on the qualitative methodology of case 
study and adopts the ‘two case design’; moreover, we choose the ‘policy’ as 
the analytical unit, and each of our cases refers to be a policy. As we have 
slightly mentioned in section 1.1, the Taiwanese government has promoted 
many biotechnology and related sectoral policies between 2000 and 2008. 
Instead of discussing the policy-making process of all these policies, we 
only emphasize the detailed policy-making process of two cases, the 
National Science and Technology Programs (typically shortened to be the 
National Programs) and the regulation policies, in terms of the Law of 
Pharmaceutical Affairs (typically shortened to be the Law) and the 
Agro-pesticides Management Act (typically shortened to be the 
Management Act). The two cases are chosen because they are considered to 
be the most suitable cases to observe the influence of the four variables on 
the RTDI policy-making process. We will further discuss the rationale to 
choose the two cases in Chapter 4.  
 
Interview is our main method to collect the first-hand empirical data. We 
have interviewed 36 interviewees in Taiwan, including the elected 
politicians, the congressmen of the opposition party, the administrators, the 
companies and academics who involved in the policy-making process of the 
two cases. The majority of the interviewees are the high level management 
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of public and private organizations. From our point of view, since it is 
usually the heads, the directors or the chief executives to involve in the core 
of the policy-making process, we consider that the interviews to the high 
level management of each organization will maximize our understanding 
towards the policy-making process of the two policies and minimize our 
bias to the standpoints of each actors in the policy-making process. The 
detailed name list and the positions of the interviewees are presented in 
Chapter 4.      
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
The whole thesis is structured according to the theme of the thesis. The first 
part of the thesis, from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, we focus on the 
establishment of the concepts of the thesis which provide the framework to 
link the three variables of the theme of the thesis together. The concept 
established in the first part include the concept of the intersections of the 
three innovation systems and the conceptual framework of the RTDI 
policy-making process which not only analyze the RTDI policy-making 
process but also analyze the influence of the policy-making process on the 
contents and the appropriateness of RTDI policies. In addition, in the second 
part of the thesis, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we will apply the concepts 
established in the first part for the analysis of the empirical examples of 
Taiwan and further explore the linkage of the three variables of the theme of 
the thesis empirically. In the third part of the thesis, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, 
we will reflect the concepts established in the first part by the empirical 
discussion described in the second part of the thesis. The main contents of 
each of the Chapters are summarized below.           
   
Chapter One outlines the background and the theme of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two reviews the existing literature related to this thesis. The 
contributions and the conceptual and empirical gaps of the existing literature 
which motivates the research of this thesis will be discussed in the Chapter. 
Moreover, in the Chapter, we will establish our concept of the configuration 
of the three innovation systems.    
 
Chapter Three discusses the four research questions in details and 
establishes the conceptual framework of the RTDI policy-making process 
which not only uncovers the black-box of the policy-making process of the 
RTDI policies but also analyzes the influence of the four variables. We 
assume the four variables would impact on the policy-making process, the 
contents and the appropriateness of RTDI policies which affect the 
development of the configuration of the three innovation systems. The 
conceptual framework will be applied for the empirical analysis of the two 
cases in Chapter 6.        
 
Chapter Four introduces the detailed methodology of the thesis. The 
rationale to adopt the methodology of the case study, the method to collect 
the empirical data and the name lists of the interviewees will be described in 
the Chapter.  
 
Chapter Five is the introduction for the history of the three Taiwanese 
biotechnology related innovation systems from 1945 to 2000. In the Chapter, 
we will apply the concept of the configuration of the three innovation 
systems for the analysis of the development of biotechnology and related 
sectors in Taiwan. The dynamics of the intersections between biotechnology 
and the three biotechnology sectors in Taiwan are the core of the Chapter. 
The national institutions of Taiwan which shape the configuration of the 
biotechnology and the three sectors will also be discussed in the Chapter.            
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Chapter Six emphasizes the policy-making process of the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies from 2000 to 2008. We will 
apply the conceptual framework established in Chapter 3 for the analysis of 
the policy-making process of the two cases, the National Programs and 
regulation policies. We will especially focus on the influence of the four 
variables on the different stages of the policy-making process of the two 
policies.  
 
Chapter Seven discusses the key findings of the thesis and the answers for 
our research questions. On the basis of the two empirical cases in Taiwan, 
we will identify the influence of each of the four variables on the RTDI 
policy-making process, on the contents and on the appropriateness of RTDI 
policies. Moreover, we will further explore the conceptual framework by the 
empirical cases in the Chapter.  
 
Chapter Eight is the conclusion of the thesis. We will summarize the key 
findings of the thesis, discuss the main contributions of the thesis to the 
literature, and the suggestions to the research in the future.                      
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter has two aims. The first aim is to identify existing literature 
which strengthens our analysis of RTDI policy - making process and the 
impact of RTDI policies on the development of innovation systems. The 
second aim is to define the conceptual and empirical gaps of contemporary 
literature and thus justify the contribution of this thesis.  
 
In this chapter we reviewed the literature which can be classified in three 
categories, all of which relate closely to our research, i.e. literature on 
innovation systems, political science literature on political structures and 
policy - making processes, and literature of empirical research of 
biotechnology and Taiwan. Each category of literature is discussed in terms 
of its contents, its contributions and its shortcomings.   
 
The whole chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 is the review of the 
literature of innovation systems. Section 2.3 discusses the contributions and 
the conceptual gaps of political science. Section 2.4 is the discussion of the 
empirical research of biotechnology and Taiwan. Section 2.5 is the 
conclusion of the chapter.  
 
2.2 The literature on innovation systems  
 
The approaches of innovation systems that relate to this thesis are national 
innovation system approaches, sectoral innovation system approach and 
technological innovation system approach. In the following sections, we 
will review each of the system approaches, as well as the critical reflections 
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towards the approaches of innovation systems.        
 
2.2.1 National innovation system approaches  
 
The literature on national innovation systems adopts the nation as the unit of 
analysis. The development of the nation is the central concern of the 
literature and according to the approaches the boundary of the innovation 
system is drawn by the spatial border of a nation.  
 
In Technology policy and economic performance (Freeman, 1987), Freeman 
has done one of the earliest research for the national system of innovation. 
In his book Freeman focuses mainly on the national innovation system of 
Japan. Besides the strategies of the Japanese companies which opened the 
technology gap by importing technologies and ‘reverse - engineering’, the 
Japanese government, especially the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), also played a critical role in promoting the most advanced 
technologies of the day. The most important roles of MITI, from Freeman’s 
perspective, were to forecast technological change and to develop a long - 
term vision to guide the directions for the Japanese national innovation 
system. Since the post – war period MITI has fully integrated the 
technology policies with the industrial policies. Furthermore, with the 
sophisticated vision, MITI effectively gave the Japanese companies 
sufficient confidence to make their own long - term investments in R&D, 
software and personnel training. However, as described by Freeman, Britain 
had a national innovation system which was quite different from the 
Japanese one. Compared to the Japanese government, which has possessed 
strong guidance, provided overall supportive technology policies and tended 
to shape the Japanese national innovations in the long - term, the British 
government has only started to promote relatively long - term technology 
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policies since the late 1980s. Despite the fact that British companies failed 
to take advantage of early work in the design and the development of 
equipments to occupy a leading position in manufacturing and export, the 
British government offered limited support to the British companies. Even 
though the British government also seemed to learn lessons from the 
Japanese model of technological development and to integrate technology 
policies with industrial policies, the majority of these policies only 
promoted fundamental research within the universities and neglected the 
need for the results of this research to be effectively commercialized by 
industry. According to Freeman, the policies of the British government were 
neither sufficient to guide the long - term development of Britain, nor 
sufficient to ‘fix’ the weaknesses of the British national innovation system.  
  
Moreover, in the famous book, National innovation systems (Nelson, 1993), 
Nelson and the co - authors of the book collected the experiences from 15 
countries in developing high - technology or R&D intensive industries. 
These 15 countries were sorted into 3 groups: the group with large high - 
income countries included the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, 
France and Italy; the group with smaller high - income countries contained 
Denmark, Sweden, Canada and Australia; the group with lower income 
countries included South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina and Israel. All 
countries were compared with each other according to the evolution of their 
high - tech industries, R&D expenditures, different types of networks within 
the high - tech sectors, as well as the actors (particularly firms and 
universities) involved in the activities of national innovations. Statistical 
data were used for showing each country’s macro economic performance 
and provide persuasive supplementary empirical evidences for the key 
points of the book. In fact, for Nelson, the comparisons of national 
innovation systems are equivalent to the comparisons of high - tech 
industrial developments in each nation. Nelson and other authors put 
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national industry as the centre of their analysis. They directed most of their 
efforts discussing firms’ strategies for innovation, companies’ relationships 
with their private and public partners and the performance of the industries. 
Under such context, governments are mainly analyzed by their economic 
and technological functions such as funding basic research, providing 
national education systems, building the infrastructures of research 
(especially universities’ technology transfer), supporting industrial 
technology development and so on. 
 
A book with a similar title as Nelson’s book is Lundvall’s ‘National systems 
of innovation’ (Lundvall, 1992). Despite the similarity of the titles the two 
books adopt different approaches for analyzing national innovation systems. 
Instead of case - by -case studies, Lundvall and the co - authors of the book 
emphasize the innovation process of the nations and tend to outline the 
general points of view of national innovations. From Lundvall’s point of 
view, national innovation systems are open systems which are embedded in 
the international society. Lundvall pays attention to the international 
economic interactions between nations, such as international trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Besides, Lundvall also puts emphasis on 
the active roles of public sectors in the process of national innovation.   
 
Indeed, different approaches of national innovation systems do provide great 
theoretical and empirical research to analyze the dynamics of national 
innovations; in addition, the approaches also clearly recognize the influence 
of the national institutions on the national innovation. While Freeman (1987) 
points out how the policies of the government shape and support the 
development of the national innovation system, Nelson (1993) focuses on 
the uniqueness of each nation and Lundvall (1992) tends to uncover the 
general principles which underlie the dynamics of national innovation 
systems shaped by national institutions. From our point of view the 
 21
approaches of the national innovation systems give us a very important 
entry point for the analysis of RTDI policies and the context of the policy - 
making processes which produce these policies.  
 
Nevertheless, there are three common insufficiencies of the approaches of 
national innovation systems. First, these approaches use the national 
boundary as the single boundary of innovation systems, and the sectoral and 
technological differences within the national border are ignored. Even 
though Freeman (1987) notices that Japan has been especially successful in 
semiconductor and computer industries, he does not fully discuss the 
reasons why Japan succeeded to become a leading power in these two 
industries. Nelson (1993) and Lundvall (1992) also do not take into account 
the uniqueness of each sectoral and technological innovation system within 
the national border. Second, the openness of a national innovation system is 
not fully discussed by the authors. Although Lundvall already discovers that 
national innovation systems are open systems, he and his co - authors limit 
their research on international economic factors (such as exporting) only . 
Even though international political factors (such as colonization and 
international organizations) also influence developments of the national 
innovation systems, Lundvall does not consider these factors in his book. 
Third, these approaches recognize the important roles of the government in 
the development of national innovation system, yet they do not analyze the 
factors which make the government promote particular policies. The policy 
- making process of the government is not discussed. The same 
insufficiency, as we are going to describe in the following sections, also 
appears in the approaches of sectoral innovation systems and technological 
innovation systems. 
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2.2.2 Critical reflections towards national innovation system approaches  
 
The approaches of national innovation systems, as an important entry point 
for our analysis of RTDI policies, however, are not without their critics. 
Compared with the scholars of national innovation systems (see above) who 
provide the theoretical and empirical analysis to strengthen the approaches 
of national systems of innovation, some other scholars possess critical 
perspectives and emphasize the historical process through which different 
approaches of national innovation systems were gradually formulated and 
used as political rhetoric in the policy-making process.  
 
The system approaches for national innovation, as analyzed by Godin 
(2009), was initially set up by OECD and further established by the scholars 
of national innovation systems. In the 1960s and the 1970s, OECD used the 
term ‘Research System’ in its early works to describe the national systems 
of knowledge production and diffusion. From the perspective of OECD, the 
research system’s ultimate goal was innovation, and the system was part of a 
larger system consisted of components, such as government, university, 
industry and environment. OECD’s concept of research system considerably 
influenced the authors of national innovation systems, i.e. Freeman, Nelson 
and Lundvall, in the late 1980s. Indeed since the 1980s, there were two 
groups of authors in the literature of national innovation systems: the ones 
centering on the analysis of national institutions (such as Nelson) and the 
ones focusing on the knowledge distribution and learning process (such as 
Lundvall). From the latter group of literature, the concept of 
Knowledge-Based Economy which firstly emerged in the late 1960s 
re-emerged in the 1990s. During the 1990s, Knowledge-Based Economy not 
only co-existed with national innovation systems in OECD but competed 
with the approaches of national innovation systems for the attendance of 
policy makers. Only after the mid 1990s, it was the approaches of national 
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systems of innovation which caught more attentions of policy makers than 
Knowledge-Based Economy became the mainstream approach to analyze 
national technological and industrial developments. In fact, Sharif (2006) 
shares the similar perspective with Godin. Through the perspective of social 
constructivist, he traces the origins of the concept of national innovation 
systems since the 1980s and analyzes how the different approaches of 
national innovation were socially constructed by different scholars. By 
interviewing the founders of the national innovation system approaches, 
Sharif speculates that the approaches of national innovation systems arose 
simultaneously in academic community and OECD policy-making and 
played the role as a refutation of the neoclassical economics. The epistemic 
community of innovation system approaches was gradually developed since 
the 1980s. Yet until recently several disagreements still embeds among the 
different approaches of national innovation systems, i.e. the flexible 
interpretation of the concept, the over-theorization of the concept, and the 
presence of national innovation systems in all countries1. Moreover, while 
Miettinen (2002) criticizes that the approaches of national innovation 
systems were used as a political rhetoric rather than a scientific concept in 
the policy-making process of the Finish government in the 1990s, Balzat 
and Hanusch (2004) review the three trends for the development of the 
approaches of national innovation systems and recognize that the national 
innovation system approaches themselves do evolve over time.   
 
The critical discussions for the national innovation systems provide a 
fundamental reflection towards these approaches. According to the critical 
reflections, we understand that the system approach for national innovation 
is socially constructed, and these approaches which according to Sharif 
(2006) and Balzat and Hanusch (2004) have their own underlying 
                                                 
1
 According to Sharif (2008), Jakobsson, Freeman and Malerba agree that every country 
has a system of diffusing technology, while Smith states that only under a certain social and 
economic condition, a country could claim to have an innovation system. Therefore there is 
in fact no unified consensus for the presence of national innovation systems in all countries.   
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disagreements and their own path of evolution are only one of the possible 
frameworks to explain national technological and industrial development in 
the real world. Furthermore, as described by Godin (2009) and Miettinen 
(2002), the development of national innovation system approaches is 
entangled with particular political background. The approaches become the 
mainstream because they are adopted by OECD and attract more attentions 
of policy makers than others. In other words, a national innovation system, 
as a socially constructed concept, does not actually exist in the objective 
world, and there are other alternative concepts, such as the knowledge-base 
economy, which may also be used to explain the reality. Moreover, the 
approaches of national systems of innovation are not yet perfectly 
established and continuously evolve over time.  
 
However, we still adopt the system approaches of national innovation 
because they provide a relatively comprehensive framework for the analysis 
of RTDI policies and the context of RTDI policy-making process. A system, 
according to the description of Godin (2009), is composed of a group of 
components which serve a common purpose, and the ultimate goal of an 
innovation system is innovation. The system approach for innovation which 
tends to map the overall blueprint for all the components and their 
relationships in the process of innovation in fact help us to map the broad 
context in which RTDI policies are made. In another words, while RTDI 
policy-making is a complex process which involves plural actors and 
dynamic interactions, the system approach which emphasizes the overall 
components and the evolution of their relationships effectively supports us 
to detect the actors and their relationships which may influence the RTDI 
policy-making process, as well as RTDI policies. However, as we already 
noticed in section 2.2.1, the national innovation system approaches ignore 
the technological and sectoral differences within the national border. 
Therefore the approaches of national systems of innovation are only able to 
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catch the general national context in which RTDI policies are made, yet 
these approaches are limited in precisely analyzing the RTDI policies which 
are directed towards a particular technology and a particular sector within 
the national border. To balance the limitations of national innovation system 
approaches, we tend to link the national innovation systems with the 
technological and the sectoral innovation system approaches which are 
reviewed in the following sections.             
 
2.2.3 The approach of technological innovation systems 
 
The approach of technological innovation system uses technology as the 
boundary of an innovation system. The dynamics of technological 
innovation and the economic competence of a system are the cores of 
analysis. 
  
Carlsson et al (2002) establishes the theoretical descriptions of technological 
innovation systems. From their perspective, technology, in the sense of a 
knowledge field, is the most important variable to draw the boundary of a 
technological innovation system. Within the particular knowledge field, the 
actors, including the buyers and sellers, of a dynamic network interact in a 
specific economic or industrial arena which is under specific institutional 
infrastructures. The interactions of actors in the network are both market and 
non - market ones. Knowledge flows within the network. Indeed, the 
technological system involves the technological generation, diffusion and 
utilization. In the context of technological innovation system, as described 
by Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991), national boundaries are not necessary 
the boundaries of the technological innovation system. Furthermore, 
Carlsson et al (2002) discuss the methods to determine actors and 
components of a technological innovation system, as well as the methods to 
measure the performance of the system. In addition, offering practical 
 26
guidelines to policy makers, Bergek et al (2008) describe a step-by-step 
manipulative process to analyze a technological innovation system.  
 
Besides the theoretical contribution, the scholars of technological innovation 
systems also apply the concepts of technological innovation systems for 
analyzing empirical cases. Carlsson (1995) applies the concepts of the 
technological innovation for analyzing the factory automation. Jacobsson 
and Bergek (1998) further use the concepts of technological innovation to 
compare the energy innovation systems of Germany, Sweden and 
Netherlands. The impacts of national institutions on the technological 
innovation system within each nation’s national border are discussed. For 
example, the German energy innovation system has better performance than 
the Swedish and the Dutch ones due to Germany’s relatively supportive 
national institutions. Moreover, Jaccobson and Launber (2004) also discuss 
the historical context of German energy policies in more detail. The policy - 
making process of the German government and the influence of the German 
government on the energy innovation system are mentioned briefly. For 
instance, the coordination problem between the Ministry of Economics and 
the Ministry of Research has been noted. 
 
The scholars of the approach of technological innovation system set up a 
persuasive framework to analyze an innovation system. This approach 
provides great insights into the dynamics of technological changes, as well 
as the process of technological generation, diffusion and utilization. The 
approach observes that the boundary of an innovation system does not 
coincide with the national border. The observation that the technological 
innovation system develops on a global base complements the 
disadvantages of the approaches of national innovation system which do not 
deal with transnational factors.  
 
 27
Yet, there are still two insufficiencies which are worth mentioning for the 
approach. First, the approach uses technology (or a particular knowledge 
field) as a single boundary of an innovation system. Although Jacobsson and 
Bergek (1998) introduce empirical cases to explain how a particular 
technological innovation system is influenced by different national 
institutions, they do not explicitly establish the concept of national 
technological innovation systems. Moreover, Bergek et al (2008) describe 
that a technological system may be a sub - system of a sectoral innovation 
system or may cut across several sectoral innovation systems, but they do 
not analyze the dynamics of the configuration of the technological 
innovation system and sectoral innovation systems. Second, the influence of 
politics on the development of the technological innovation system is not 
deeply discussed. Even though Jaccobson and Launber (2004) attempt to 
discuss the politics of technological policies through discussing the problem 
of coordination within the German government, they do not discuss how the 
problem of coordination influences the development of the technological 
innovation system within the national border. We will further discuss the 
issue in the following chapters of the thesis.  
 
2.2.4 The approach of sectoral innovation systems  
 
The approach of sectoral innovation systems adopts a sector as the boundary 
of an innovation system. An industry is the unit of analysis. 
 
Malerba (2002) establishes a theoretical approach for the study of sectoral 
innovation systems. From his point of view a sectoral innovation system is 
defined as a set of products, as well as a group of actors carrying out market 
and non - market actions for the creation, production and sale of the 
products. In other words, a set of products draws the boundary of the 
sectoral innovation system. The sectoral innovation system should have a 
 28
set of specific knowledge basis, inputs and demands. The actors of the 
system interact through communication, competition, cooperation and 
commands. These actors’ networks are shaped by institutions such as 
national institutions. Indeed, the knowledge and the technology, actors and 
networks, and the institutions are the three blocks of a sectoral innovation 
system. 
 
In his book ‘Sectoral innovation systems’ Malerba and his co - authors 
(2004) apply the theories of sectoral innovation systems for empirical case 
studies. Six European sectors chosen in the book and are pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, fixed internet and mobile communication, software, machine 
tools and services. The six sectors were chosen because technological 
changes in these sectors are rapid and innovation plays a major role in the 
growth of these sectors. In the book, Montobbio (2004) applies the concepts 
of sectoral innovation for transnational comparisons. Large sets of statistic 
data are used to compare the sectoral innovation systems in the United 
States with equivalent ones in European Union countries and Japan. 
Moreover, Coriat and Weinstein (2004) discuss the roles of national 
institutions in the development of a sectoral innovation system. From their 
points of view, national institutions should play complementary roles to 
support the sectoral innovation system. The most important national 
institutions related to the sectoral innovation system are intellectual property 
laws, banks and financial regulations, education systems and labour 
regulations.  
 
The scholars of the sectoral innovation system provide a different 
perspective to analyze an innovation system. The approach discovers that an 
innovation system is neither fixed to a particular national border, nor fixed 
to a particular technology. The particular set of products, which are 
composed of several technologies and innovated under a global context, 
 29
should be considered as the boundary of an innovation system.  
 
However, there are two weaknesses of the existing approach. First, the 
approach uses a set of products as the single boundary of an innovation 
system. Malerba and the other authors of ‘Sectoral innovation systems’ 
(2004) try to link the relationship between a sectoral innovation system to a 
country’s international performance. They also try to link the sector to the 
technological opportunities which can be mobilized to develop new 
products and processes of the sector. Yet, the intersections between a sector, 
a nation and a technology are not fully explored. Second, the authors of the 
approach, such as Coriat and Weinstein (2004), analyze the roles of national 
institutions from purely economic and technological perspective. The 
political factors which shape the national institutions are ignored.    
 
2.2.5 The configuration of the three innovation systems  
  
Even though the intersections 
of the three innovation systems 
have been more or less 
discussed by the scholars of 
innovation systems, it is 
Makard and Truffer (2008) 
who made one of the first 
attempts to concretely show the 
configuration of the three 
innovation systems within one picture. As shown in Figure 2.1, a national 
system is delineated on a spatial basis, while a sectoral system usually 
crosses a geographical boundary and a technological innovation system 
typically crosses geographical and sectoral boundaries. Even though the two 
authors focus on the theoretical comparisons between the technological 
Figure 2.1 Potential relationships between national (NSI) 
and sectoral (SSI) systems of innovation and a 
technological innovation systems (TS) 
 
 
＊Source: Markard and Truffer (2008) 
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innovation system and the multi - level perspective, the picture shown is 
indeed impressive and contributes extensively to our understanding of the 
intersections of the three innovation systems. Since the two authors provide 
only a limited discussion about the configuration of these three innovation 
systems, we will further define their configuration and add the empirical 
analysis which demonstrates their intersections. 
 
2.2.6 Brief conclusion of the section  
 
The literature on innovation systems contributes to our understanding 
towards the dynamics of innovation systems. Furthermore, some authors, 
such as Freeman (1987), extensively increased our understanding towards 
the roles of the government in shaping the development of an innovation 
system. Yet, we found two common shortcomings observed in all of the 
literature reviewed.  
 
First of all, there is not yet an explicit explanation for the configuration of 
national, sectoral and technological innovation systems. While a nation is 
fixed to the geographical border, a sector and a technology are developed on 
a global base. Even if Makard and Truffer (2008) have produced a nice 
picture to describe the 
relationships between the 
national, sectoral and 
technological innovation 
systems, the two authors 
have not provided an in - 
depth discussion about the 
configuration of these three 
innovation systems. In 
order to fulfil the academic 
Figure 2.2 Relationship of national, technological and sectoral 
innovation systems and NSTIS 
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gap, we concretely define the intersection of the three innovation systems as 
‘national sectoral and technological innovation systems’ (briefly written as 
NSTIS). The system is shown in Figure 2.2. We assume that the system 
exists within a particular national border and is influenced by international, 
political and economic factors. The political factors include colonization and 
international organizations and the economic factors include exporting, 
international technology transfer, international economic competition and so 
on. Indeed, every factor which influences the sectoral and technological 
innovation systems on a global level is able to influence the development of 
NSTIS. The actors within the system use the knowledge of a particular 
technological field to produce a set of particular products. The actors within 
the system carry out market and non - market interactions in order to 
generate, diffuse and utilize the knowledge of a particular technological 
field to create, produce and sell a particular set of products. The interactions 
and networks between the actors are shaped by national institutions. The 
national government plays the central role in the establishment of the 
national institutions.  
 
Second, until now the political nature of the government and the policy - 
making process of RTDI policies are seldom mentioned by the literature of 
innovation systems. All of the three innovation system approaches have 
considered the importance of national institutions. Yet, the government, as 
the most important actor to shape the national institutions, is considered as a 
unified entity, and government’s policies, in the majority of articles, are 
analyzed through pure economic or technological perspectives. The 
complex political nature of the government and the policy process behind 
the national policies are ignored. Solely analyzing the policies from 
economic and technological perspectives is indeed limited. What is the 
political nature of the government? How does the government’s policy - 
making process influence the development of NSTIS? The literature has not 
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provided sufficient answers for these questions yet. To gain deeper 
understanding towards the inner world of the government the contributions 
of political science are discussed in the next section.        
 
2.3 The literature of political science   
 
The government is the core of political science research. Among the 
multiple sub - disciplines of political science, comparative politics and 
public administration are the two sub - disciplines closely related to our 
research. Both of the sub -- disciplines are deeply influenced by two 
underlying theoretical foundations: the theory of political system, which 
considers the government as the core of a political system and 
institutionalism in which in its various forms focuses on political institutions. 
Before we discuss comparative politics and public administration we first 
introduce the theory of political system in the following section.        
 
2.3.1 The theory of political system  
 
In his book ‘A Framework of Political Analysis’ (1965) David Easton 
applies the concept of political system for analyzing the policy process. 
According to his model, which is shown in Figure 2.3, the government is the 
integral part of the 
political system 
which is embedded 
in the environment 
surrounding it. The 
environment 
contains both the 
intra - societal 
environment 
Figure 2.3 Easton’s model of political system 
 
＊Source: Easton (1965) 
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(almost equal to the domestic environment) and the extra - societal 
environment (almost equal to the international environment). The intra - 
societal environment is composed of several sub - systems including 
ecological systems, biological systems and personal systems. The 
extra-societal environment is composed of international political systems, 
international ecological systems and international social systems. The 
environment surrounding the political system gives the political system 
demands and supports as inputs to the political system. The political system 
converts the inputs of the environment into outputs, and these outputs of the 
political system have an impact on the environment. The environment then 
responds to the outputs of the political system and through the feedback 
loop, the response of the environment becomes inputs of the political system 
again.                    
 
Easton offers a very original framework to analyze a government. Unlike 
the traditional institutional research, which focuses on the constitution and 
the history of the government, Easton initiates that the government should 
be analyzed from a systematic perspective. He also notices that the political 
system is embedded in the surrounding environment, rather than exists alone. 
Furthermore, not only the intra - societal (domestic) environment, but also 
the extra - societal (international) environment has an impact on the 
operation of the political system. From Easton’s perspective, the political 
system is a semi - closed system. The environment only interacts with the 
political system through the inputs and outputs of the political system, and 
during the policy - making process the environment does not interact with 
the political system at all.  
 
Jenkins (1997) amends Easton’s model with the following two points. First 
of all, the environment surrounding the political system is structured, rather 
than without structure. The environment is made up of individuals, interest 
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groups and organizations with values and interests, operating alone or 
together over time. Second, from Jenkins’ point of view, the political system 
is an open system. Both the interactions across and within the system must 
be recognized. Therefore, he claims that policy analysts need to explore the 
nature of the political system and the relationship between decisions and 
outcomes in more detail.               
 
Since Easton has published his framework, the theory of political system 
has deeply influenced the development of political sciences. The concept 
that the government needs to be conceptualized as being an integral part of a 
political system is widely accepted by political scientists and is frequently 
combined with institutionalism to analyze comparative politics and public 
administration. For example, Almond et al (1996) consider the government 
as the core of the political system, and combine the theory of political 
system with institutionalism for the analysis of comparative politics. Such 
an approach, as we are going to discuss in section 2.3.2, has become one of 
the most influential streams of comparative politics. Moreover, the scholars 
of public administration are also influenced by the theory of political 
systems and parts of the scholars also combine the theory of the political 
system with institutionalism for the analysis of public administration. For 
example, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) combine the theory of political 
system and institutionalism for analyzing policy implementation. In order to 
manage the political system, in the process of implementation the policy 
makers need to identify a number of legal and political mechanisms to affect 
and constrain the behaviours of street - level administrators and target 
groups. In addition, Thurber (1991) and Rocci (1993) recognize the interest 
groups and scientists as actors ‘outside the political system’. This literature 
will be discussed further in section 2.3.3.  
           
The theory of the political system fundamentally contributes to our analysis 
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of the policy - making process. We fully adopt the key points of the theory 
of the political system that the policies are produced through the process 
inside the political system, which is embedded in the surrounding 
environment. We also agree that the government is an integral part of the 
political system.  
 
Nevertheless, we also discover that the theory of the political system has 
two significant weaknesses which need further discussion. First of all, the 
original theory of political system has a somewhat limited understanding of 
the interior of the political system. Neither Easton’s nor Jenkins’s model 
discussed the political mechanisms inside the political system which shape 
the policy - making process. Second, the concept of the political system has 
not been linked up to the approaches of innovation systems. When Easton’s 
book was published in 1965 the concepts of innovation systems had not 
been defined. Yet, even when Jenkins amended the Easton’s model in 1997, 
he has not bridged the linkage between the two approaches.  
 
2.3.2 Comparative politics 
 
Political institutions represent the main research topic of comparative 
politics. Political institutionalism assumes that political institutions 
decisively shape the behaviours of political actors. However, with the 
development of the theory of political system, some strands of the literature 
of comparative politics are influenced by both institutionalism and the 
theory of political system and tend to integrate the two theoretical 
foundations. Almond et al (1996) and Hague and Harrop (2008) are two 
representative examples in the literature.   
  
Almond et al (1996) and Hague and Harrop (2008) adopt very similar 
approaches to analyze the comparative politics. In the book ‘Comparative 
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politics’ (1996), Almond et al combine the theory of the political system 
with institutionalism for the analysis of comparative politics. From the 
authors’ perspective, a government is the core of a political system which 
has its own legitimacy and is structured by the components which have 
different functions. The constitution ‘contains a set of decision rules which 
govern the policy - making process within the political system’ (1996: 129). 
The three major kinds of constitutional design all over the world are: 
presidential polity, parliamentary polity and semi - presidential polity. The 
government, as the core of the political system, is composed of institutions 
and actors. The institutions, according to Almond et al, are referred to be 
political organizations such as the cabinet, the legislature and the 
bureaucracy. The functions of political institutions in the policy - making 
process are determined by the constitution. Moreover, the actors are referred 
to be the individuals who serve in the political institutions, such as the prime 
minister in the cabinet. From the perspective of Almond et al the 
interactions between actors inside the government are deeply shaped by the 
institutions. Furthermore, outside the government there are interest 
articulations. The interests outside the government are presented by interest 
groups and carried into the government via political parties. Government’s 
policies, which are decided inside the government, are influenced by and 
should response to the interests articulated outside the government. In 
addition, Hague and Harrop (2008) also consider that the government is 
composed of institutions and actors. The political institutions are referred to 
be the political organizations, and the actors are the individuals in the 
institutions. The constitution defines the structure of the government and the 
policy - making process. The two authors especially compare the different 
policy processes of presidential polity and parliamentary polity and explain 
how the two polities shape the policy process to be different.  
 
In addition, in the book ‘The new institutional politics’ (2000) Lane and 
 37
Ersson assume that the operation of the political system is shaped by 
political institutions. As described by the two authors, different political 
institutionalists have different definitions of political institutions, and the 
political institution, as defined by the neo - institutionalism is represented by 
the political organizations, political rules and political practice (2000:4-7). 
Indeed, on the basis of the literature (Almond et al, 1996; Hague and Harrop, 
2008; Lane and Ersson, 2000), we adopt the synthetic definitions for the 
terms constitution and political institutions. From our perspective, the 
constitution is the legal framework which shapes the structure of the 
government and the policy - making process of the political system, and the 
political institutions contain the political organizations, political rules and 
political practice.  
 
Besides the general conceptual discussions of comparative politics, some 
literature provides the perceptions for the constitution of presidential polity 
or the parliamentary polity. Since our empirical case, Taiwan, embedded in 
the presidential polity, we only review the literature which discusses the 
presidential polity. Burke (1992) describes that presidential polity is 
established upon the principle of the separation of powers. The president, 
who is the head of the executive branch, and the congress, which is the head 
of the legislative branch, are separately elected and independent from one 
another. Under the presidential polity, the divided government is especially 
discussed by some scholars. Elgie (2001:6) defines the divided government 
as the situation in which no single party simultaneously controls both the 
executive and legislative branches. Samuels (2007) also describes that once 
the president and the congress in the divided government cannot achieve 
consensus for particular policies, the ‘dead-lock’ relationship between the 
two branches happens and the presidential polity provides no institutional 
solution for the dead - lock between the two branches. While Cox and 
McCubbins (2000) express that the situation of the divided government 
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make the government as a whole unable to decide (indecisive) and unable to 
stick to a decision once made (irresolute), Weatherfold (1994) and Pfiffner 
(1994) discuss the solutions to manage the dead - lock of the divided 
government. From the perspective of the two authors, the president should 
use his / her leadership to persuade and bargain with the congress in order to 
achieve his / her legislative goals.  
 
Moreover, some scholars pay special attention to the roles of the executive 
branch or the legislative branch under the presidential polity. For the 
executive branch, Bennett (1996), Moe (2005) and Pfiffner (2005) focus on 
the discussion about the relationships between the president and the cabinet 
under the presidential polity. From their perspective, under the presidential 
polity even if the president is the head of the government, it is the cabinet 
which decides and implements the majority of policies. For the legislative 
branch, many scholars such as Blodel (1973), Aberbach (1990), Monsma 
(1969), Smith et al (2006), Weingast and Marshall (1988) and Cox and 
McCubbins (2005), analyze the operations of the congress in the 
presidential polity, such as the voting behaviours of the congressmen. From 
their perspective, the congress under the presidential polity has high 
autonomy to make or to influence the decisions of the policies.  
 
The literature of comparative politics does provide rich analysis of the 
political institutions. Based on the discussions of comparative politics we 
comprehensively understand that the government, as the core of the political 
system, is composed of institutions and actors. The constitution shapes the 
structure of the government, the policy process of the political system and 
the function of political institutions in the policy process. Furthermore, the 
actors’ relationships inside the government are shaped by the political 
institutions. We will review and exploit the literature of comparative politics, 
particularly the literature of presidential polity, in more detail when we 
 39
establish our research questions and conceptual framework in Chapter 3.  
 
In addition, we have considered three weak points of the literature. First, the 
scholars of comparative politics seldom link their work to the approaches of 
innovation systems. Second, the literature of comparative politics mainly 
focuses on the analysis of constitution and the institutions and the actors 
within the government, but there are only few discussions to describe ‘how’ 
the constitution, institutions and actors influence the policy - making 
process and the policy contents. Hague and Harrop (2008) offer the initial 
discussions to speculate how presidential and parliamentary polities 
influence the policy process. Yet, more comprehensive analysis are needed. 
Third, although some political scientists of comparative politics like 
Almond et al (1996) have noticed that there are interest accumulations 
outside the government, they have very limited discussions about the 
dynamic interactions between the government and interest groups. How do 
the interactions between the government and interest groups influence the 
policy - making process and policy contents? The literature of comparative 
politics has not focused on this question. 
 
2.3.3 Public administration: network governance and public policies    
 
Public administration, as described by Peters and Pierre (2003), concerns 
about governing and managing the public sector where public administrators 
play essential roles. As a sub - discipline of the political science, public 
administration is also deeply influenced by both the theory of political 
system and institutionalism. On one hand, many scholars accept the concept 
that a government is an integral part of a political system. On the other hand, 
unlike the sub - discipline of comparative politics which emphasizes the 
analysis of the ‘government’, public administration extensively focuses on 
the analysis of ‘governance’, which is defined by Rhodes (1997) as the ‘self 
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- organizing, inter - organizational networks’. The literature of this sub - 
discipline includes the approach of network governance, public management, 
the research of interest groups and scientists and the stagist approach for 
public policy analysis.         
 
2.3.3.1 The network governance approach  
 
In Marin and Mayntz’ book, ‘Policy networks’ (1991), the authors use the 
concept of policy networks to describe the interactions between the 
government and the society. From Marin and Mayntz’s point of view the 
policy network refers to the network which is consisted of autonomous but 
independent actors. Both the government and the social groups are the 
actors of the policy network. These actors of the policy network possess 
divergent and mutually contingent interests and they take collectively 
organized actions in the public policy - making process. In fact, the concept 
of policy network emphasizes the horizontal, informal and decentralized 
relationships between the government and the social groups. The two 
authors also note that the policy networks are distinct from sector to sector, 
from country to country, and from time to time. Within the book Jansen 
(1991) compares the policy network of the German superconductor 
technology in different periods of times. Laumann et al (1991) compare the 
policy network of interest groups in the United States in agricultural policies 
with the networks of interest groups in the United States’ energy, labour and 
health policies. 
     
Moreover, in his book ‘Modern governance’ (1993a) Kooiman and his co - 
authors use the concept of ‘interactive governance’ to explain the 
interactions between the government and other societal stakeholders. From 
Kooiman’s point of view, the traditional mode of governing which refers to 
the condition that the government is the only governor to govern the society 
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is no longer sufficient to manage the modern society. In order to fully 
govern the dynamic, complex and diverse problems of the modern society, 
the government interacts and forms new collaborative partnerships with 
social groups. The new mode of governing is called ‘modern governance’. 
In the book, the co-authors apply the concept of modern interactive 
governance for analyzing several social policies in different countries. For 
instance, Royall (1993) discusses the governance of labour policies in 
Ireland, and Stenvall (1993) analyzes the governance of educational policies 
in Finland. Duclaud and Williams (1993) make transnational comparisons 
for the educational governance in Britain and France. 
 
Besides Kooiman, Rhodes (1997) comprehensively enriches the concept of 
governance in her book, ‘Understanding governance’. By analyzing the 
theoretical background of the governance, Rhodes clearly points out how 
neo - institutionalism is applied for the analysis of governance. In addition, 
by describing the historical evolution of the British public administration 
from 1979 to 1997, Rhodes advocates how the British public administration 
is transformed from government to governance.  
 
In the field of RTDI policies, some scholars discuss the governance of RTDI 
policies. In the book, ‘New modes of governance’ (2005a) Lyall, Tait and 
their co-authors express the new modes of governance for science and 
technology. As perceived by Lyall and Tait (Lyall and Tait, 2005b; Tait and 
Lyall, 2005), to deal with the uncertainty and complexity of science and 
technology, the new modes of governance are needed. Indeed, the new 
modes of governance search for the integrated policy approaches to ‘remove 
contradictions, inconsistencies and inefficiencies caused when policies or 
regulations emerging from different government departments or different 
levels of government.’ The governance not only considers the role of 
government but also emphasize the increasing role of the non-governmental 
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actors and stakeholders in the policy-making process to mitigate public 
controversies over new technology development. Furthermore, Biegelbauer 
(2003) points out that RTDI policies are made through the interactions 
between the variety of actors, including multiple ministries, interest groups, 
and political parties. Through comparing the three European countries 
(Austria, Sweden and Netherlands), he concludes that the three countries 
searched for the different positions in the EU FP5 because of their different 
policy-making process.               
 
Even if different scholars use different phrases to describe the approach of 
policy networks and the approach of governance, these two approaches are 
in fact highly complementary to each other. While Kenis and Schneider 
(1991) state in the book of Marin and Mayntz (1991) that ‘policy networks 
should be seen as the integrated hybrid structures of political governance’, 
Rhodes (1997) also defines governance as ‘self - organizing, inter - 
organizational networks’. Therefore, we combine the two approaches and 
refer to the combination of the two approaches as ‘the network governance 
approach’. 
 
However, besides the literature on the network of governance we have 
mentioned above, many scholars also use the term governance to describe 
different levels of management in the public sector. For example, Six et al 
(2002) use the term governance to refer to inter - organizational 
management within the government. Robert and Nell (2008) use the term 
governance to refer to the intra - organizational management, while in their 
book ‘Changing governance of research and technology policy’ (2003) 
Edler, Kuhlman and Behrens use the term governance to discuss the 
transnational research and the technology policies on the European Union 
level and analyze the multi - level governance under the framework of 
European Union. According to the existing literature, we agree that 
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governance is indeed multi - level and operated on transnational, national, 
sub - governmental and intra - organizational levels. Yet, in order to clarify 
the utility of the term ‘governance’, we only use governance for describing 
the interactions between a national government and policy stakeholders on 
the national level. We refer to inter - organizational management within the 
government to be ‘public management’, while the governing mechanisms 
on the international level are described as the ‘international factors’. Since 
we do not discuss the intra - organizational management, we don’t provide 
further definition to the intra - organizational management.    
 
The network governance approach intensively contributes to our 
understanding towards the interactions between the government and policy 
stakeholders and how different actors are involved in the policy - making 
process. The assumption of the approach that the government is embedded 
in the network and interacts frequently with stakeholders is one of the most 
important theoretical assumptions underlying our own conceptual 
framework established in Chapter 3.  
 
However, we have noticed two insufficiencies of this approach. First of all, 
the approach does not systematically bridge the linkage between the policy - 
making process and policy contents. Even though some scholars of the 
approach, such as the authors of ‘Modern governance’ (1993a), discuss the 
actors’ interactions during the policy - making process of particular policies, 
the influence of the dynamic interactions between actors on the policy 
contents is still worth further discussion. Second, even if some authors, such 
as Jansen (1991), use empirical cases to analyze the governance of RTDI 
policies, the theoretical linkage between the governance approach and the 
approaches of innovation systems is still blurred. How does the RTDI policy 
- making process in the context of governance influence the development of 
NSTIS? Until now, there is no sufficient insight into the question.    
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2.3.3.2 Public management: coordination, implementation and evaluation of 
policies 
 
Public management, as defined by Lynn (2003), concerns about the effective 
management of the public sector. The literature is both influenced by the 
theory of political system and neo - institutionalism. The scholars of public 
management concentrate their efforts on searching for the most proper 
institutions which effectively increase the efficiency and the performance of 
the government with minimum public expenditures. Since different scholars 
frequently use different terms to refer to the same actors within the 
government, in order to keep our analysis clear, before we open the 
discussion of the public management, we think it would be useful to provide 
the definitions to each of the terms here. ‘Government officials’ are the ones 
who serve in the government. We use the term ‘elected politicians’ to refer 
to government officials who are elected by voters or by the higher level 
management of the government, while we use the term ‘administrators’ to 
refer to government officials who take the responsibilities to administrate 
the policies. Although some scholars use the term ‘bureaucrats’ to refer to 
the administrators, we tend to use the term ‘administrators’ because 
compared with bureaucrats, the term administrators is able to more 
accurately refer to the ones who administrate and implement policies. 
Moreover, the ‘policy makers’ refer to government officials who make the 
major decisions of policies. The policy makers are usually the elected 
politicians or the high level administrators who are asked to decide policies 
according to the commands of the elected politicians.  
 
The main topics of public management include the coordination of policies, 
policy implementation and evaluation. Each of the topics is discussed below.  
 
 45
The coordination of policies is recognized as one of most important issue 
related to increase the efficiency and the performance of the government. 
Six et al (2002) state that the ideal condition for a government is the 
‘holistic government’ in which not only the policy objectives, but also the 
policy means of a set of policies are mutually reinforcing each other. The 
authors of the book have revealed several principles to improve the 
institutions within the government in order to make the government holistic, 
including managing inter - organizational relationships within the 
government, as well as improving the information system, the accountability 
and the finance of the government.  
 
However, many scholars point out the difficulties for policy coordination. 
Peters (1998) discusses the political nature of policy coordination and 
claims that policy coordination may fail when two organizations perform the 
same tasks (redundancy), when no organization performs a necessary task 
(lacunae) and when policies with the same clients have different goals and 
requirements (incoherence). Peters (1995: 211-252) also notices that the 
competition between agencies limits the internal consistencies or coherence 
of governments. From the perspectives of the Laurence and O’Toole (2003), 
ministries or agencies are incentivised to concert action only under three 
conditions: authority, common interests and the exchanges of interests. The 
inter-organizational cooperation may be derived through building common 
interests and facilitating exchanges of interests. In addition, OECD (1998) 
applies the concept of policy coordination for analyzing RTDI policies. 
From OECD’s perspective, the governments should play the roles of 
integrating and coordinating the formulation and the implementation of 
innovation and technology policies in order to best ‘manage’ the national 
innovation systems. Yet, OECD also points out that many science and 
technology policies of OECD countries remain piecemeal rather than 
coordinated. Moreover, Braun (2008) expresses that the knowledge space 
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which is the ‘centre’ of the innovation system can be distinguished into four 
sectors, higher education, vocational training, technology innovation and 
basic research. Each of the four sectors of the knowledge space needs 
different resources to support its development and policies should be 
coordinated in order to integrate the resources to support each of the sectors. 
Braun further articulates five institutional options for policy coordination: 
external coordination, internal coordination, coordination at agency level, 
leadership at the cabinet level and the strategy intelligence. However, from 
his perspective each institutional option is only able to be practiced if the 
interests of actors are enlarged or secured.  
 
Policy implementation is another important issue related to the efficiency 
and the performance of the government. Sabatier and Jenkins - Smith 
(1993a) introduce the ‘advocacy coalition approach’ to discuss the policy 
change and learning and substantially contribute to the analysis of the 
implementation of policies. With the acknowledgement that the government 
is an integral part of a political system, they assume that various 
governmental and private organizations, which share a set of normative and 
causal beliefs, form an advocacy coalition and act together. Each advocacy 
coalition adopts a strategy to envisage institutional innovations to further its 
members’ policy objectives. The government programs are the end results of 
the competition and mediation of different advocacy coalitions. Once 
implemented, the government program produces policy outputs at 
operational level and has an impact on the problem which the program aims 
to resolve.  
 
However, scholars of public management debate whether implementation is 
a ‘top - down’ or a ‘bottom - up’ process. From the perspective of top - 
down, Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) start their analysis of 
implementation with a policy decision made by government officials and 
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concern the extent for the implementation to achieve the policy objectives. 
They assume government officials are the main actors to decide and 
implement policies. The implementation is the process from the top level 
policy makers to the down level implementing officials. To make sure that 
implementation of the policy is able to accomplish policy objectives the 
authors advocate five necessary conditions for ‘effective implementation’. 
These necessary conditions refer to clear and consistent objectives, the 
adequacy of jurisdiction given to implementation bodies, the compliance of 
implementation bodies and interest groups, committed and skilful 
implementation officials, support of interest groups and changes in social 
and economic conditions. Nevertheless, from the perspective of bottom - up, 
Hjern and Hull (1982) and Hjern and Porter (1997) are aware of the 
weakness of the top - down approach. Unlike the top - down approach 
which starts with the analysis of policy decisions, the bottom - up approach 
starts its analysis with the network of actors involved in the service delivery 
and concerns the actors’ goals rather than policy objectives. According to 
scholars of bottom - up, implementation is the process from the street - level 
administrators to the top level policy makers. Based on the key points of 
both top - down and bottom - up approaches, Sabatier (1997) provides a 
synthetic approach. While he still recognizes the ‘comparative advantage’ 
of top - down approach, because the approach is ‘more useful in making a 
preliminary assessment of government programs’ (1997:285), he also 
acknowledges that the network analysis used by the bottom - up approach 
contribute to the deeper understanding of advocacy coalitions. Indeed, 
according to the synthetic approaches provided by Sabatier, we agree that 
implementation is both a top - down and a bottom - up process. As the top - 
down approach we recognize that the implementation of a policy decision is 
mainly decided and implemented by administrators. Yet, as bottom - up 
approach, we also recognize that the actors involved in the network of 
service delivery, including both government officials and private actors, 
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play important roles in implementation. Moreover, during implementation, 
the implementation bodies not only implement the policies decided by the 
top level government officials, but also influence the policies from the 
bottom to the top. We will apply the synthetic concept of implementation in 
Chapter 3 when we analyze our own conceptual framework. 
 
Besides the discussions of top - down and bottom - up approaches, some 
scholars attempt to analyze implementation from other divergent 
perspectives. For example, Elmore (1997) introduces four models for 
analyzing implementation: the model of systems management, the model of 
bureaucratic process, the model of organizational development and the 
model of conflict of the bargaining. Lane (1997) also introduces different 
perspectives in analyzing implementation, such as policy management, 
evolution, learning and so on. The literature broadens our understanding of 
the policy implementation. We will further discuss the details of the two 
articles when we establish our research questions in Chapter 3.    
 
Furthermore, administrators, who are considered to be among the most 
important actors involved in implementation, are also discussed by some 
scholars. Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993) describe that administrators are 
active participants in the policy - making process through modifying and 
implementing policies. They are also infrequently instructed by the policy 
makers to make policies. Nevertheless, according to the two authors, during 
implementation, administrators tend to self - protectively cover up errors, 
instead of correcting them. Moreover, because policy makers are only able 
to devote very limited time and energy to supervise implementation, it is 
very difficult for the policy makers to monitor the implementation. The two 
authors then conclude that in practice it is very difficult to make 
administrators to loyally implement policies. Hogwood and Gunn (1997) are 
also pessimistic regarding the extent that administrators are able to 
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‘perfectly’ implement policies. As described by the two authors, the ‘perfect 
implementation’ which refers to the conditions that administrators’ 
implementation is able to fully achieve the policy objectives is unattainable, 
because the preconditions of the ‘perfect implementation’ are too difficult to 
be fulfilled. The preconditions include perfect communication and 
coordination between administrators, combination of resources across 
different bureaucratic department, and so on.  
 
The evaluation of public policies, as one of the stages of the policy - making 
process which is discussed in the next section, is also an important issue 
related to the efficiency and the performance of the government. Rossi et al 
(2004) introduce the general guidelines for the evaluation of public policies, 
while Fenwick (1995) and Flynn (2002) reveal the ‘3E’ model as the 
principles to evaluate a public policy. The ‘3E’ refers to economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness of a public policy or multiple public policies. Among the 
‘3E’ the policy effectiveness, which is judged by the percentage of the 
targeting groups positively affected by the policy, is the most important 
index. However, in the book ‘Politics of program evaluation’, Palumbo 
(1987a) is aware of the politics of evaluation. In this book, Palumbo (1987b: 
21-23) describes that the appropriate evaluation for academics is quite 
different from the appropriate evaluation for administrators. While 
academics tend to help administrators understand and improve their 
implementation, as well as uncover the negative aspects of the 
implementation, administrators usually tend to turn up the negative aspects 
of implementation. Therefore, administrators do not always welcome the 
academics to evaluate their implementation. Chelimsky (1987:76-80) also 
points out that evaluative information serves not only elected politicians and 
administrators in the executive branch, but also congressmen in the 
legislative branch.  
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Many scholars apply the concept of evaluation for analyzing RTDI policies. 
Some scholars such as Meyer-Krahmer (1988), Gibbons (1988), Hill and 
Hansen (1988), deLeon (1988) and Eveland and Hetzer (1988) suggest the 
methods, the principles and the tools for evaluating single RTDI policies on 
the program level. For example, Meyer-Krahmer (1988) recognizes five 
methods of evaluation: comparing the ‘before / after’ type, controlling group 
concept, econometric models, case study approach and monitoring. 
Nevertheless, Arnold (2004) advocates that the methods of traditional 
evaluation, which only focus on the performance of a single policy, are 
obsolete. The new methods of policy evaluation should evaluate the 
performance of RTDI policies by judging the extent for the RTDI policies to 
support the development of a national innovation system, especially when 
the national innovation system suffers ‘system failure’. Miles and 
Cunningham (2006) share a similar view with Arnold and describe that the 
evaluation of RTDI policies should identify the ‘innovation bottleneck’ of 
the system and evaluate the systematic effects of the RTDI policies through 
four standards: policy mismatch and policy synergies, level of aggregation, 
risk and dynamic effects. According to the literature presented above we 
agree with the perspective of Arnold (2004) and Miles and Cunningham 
(2006) and recognize that the evaluations of RTDI policies should consider 
the effects of policies on the development of the innovation system. This 
concept of evaluating RTDI policies on the system level is especially 
important for us to define the appropriateness of RTDI policies. We will 
further discuss this concept in Chapter 3. Furthermore, some scholars have 
carried out empirical research about the evaluation of specific RTDI policies. 
For example, Becher and Kuhlmann (1995) evaluate the German technology 
policy and programs, while Shapira, Kuhlmann and other authors (2003) 
evaluate the science and technology policies in the United States and 
Europe.  
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The scholars of public management provide rich analysis for us to 
understand the concept and practice of policy coordination, implementation 
and evaluation. They especially contribute to the establishment of our 
research questions and our conceptual framework in Chapter 3. However, 
we also recognize that the literature about public management has no 
systematic linkage to the approaches of innovation systems. OECD (1999), 
Braun (2008), Arnold (2004) and Miles and Cunningham (2006) only 
initiate the discussions that RTDI policies should be coordinated and 
evaluated to support national innovation systems. Yet, the scholars have not 
answered the question: ‘how’ the coordination, implementation and 
evaluation of policies influence the development of innovation systems. 
Furthermore, as we have described in section 2.2.5, a nation should not be 
the only dimension to draw the boundary of an innovation system. The 
configuration of the three innovation systems, NSTIS, is the most suitable 
boundary for an innovation system, because many RTDI policies in fact 
impact on the three dimensions of an innovation system. How RTDI policies 
need to be coordinated, implemented and evaluated in the context of NSTIS? 
Until now public management has not yet provided sufficient answers to the 
question. 
                  
2.3.3.3 The research of interest groups and scientists  
 
The political institutionalism and the theory of the political system also 
influence the research of interest groups and scientists. While some scholars, 
such as Steinmo and Watts (1995) and May et al (2005), describe the 
influence of the organizations of the political systems on the capabilities of 
interest groups, some scholars, such as Thurber (1991) and Rocci (1993), 
consider interest groups and scientists as actors outside the political system. 
In the following paragraphs we will first introduce the literature of interest 
groups and later review the research of scientists.  
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For the research of interest groups some literature emphasizes the capability 
and tactics used by interest groups, while other literature focuses on the 
interest groups of specific industries and regions. Different literature is 
introduced in the following paragraphs.    
 
Many scholars emphasize the capabilities of interest groups and the tactics 
used by interest groups to influence the decisions of the actors inside the 
government. Goldstein (1999), Greenwald (1977), Rotherberg (1991) and 
Scott (1997) analyze the factors which influence the capabilities of interest 
groups in the policy - making process. From their point of view the 
capabilities of interest groups are influenced by the size and characters of 
memberships of the groups, the financial resources, the capabilities of the 
groups to make coalitions with others, the length of the groups’ history and 
the access of the groups to the government. Furthermore, many scholars 
describe the tactics used by interest groups to access the actors inside the 
government. The congressmen of the government of the presidential polity 
may be one of the most important targets for lobbying. As described by 
Bennedsen and Feldmann (2002: 922), Steinmo and Watts (1995) and May 
et al (2005), the presidential polity in which high autonomy and powers are 
situated within the congress in fact encourages interest groups to link their 
interests to the policies through lobbying congressmen. Evans (1991:264), 
Zeigler and Baer (1969), Hayes (1981) and Scott and Cornelius (2004) 
describe the interactions between congressmen and interest groups, as well 
as the tactics used by the interest groups to access the congressmen, 
including writing letters, financing congressional elections, testifying in 
hearings and negotiating with congressmen. Besides the congressmen, Pika 
(1991) describes the possible access of interest groups to the president. 
Chubb (1983: 213) uses the empirical examples of the United States’ R&D 
agencies to explain the interactions between interest groups and bureaucracy. 
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From his perspective the individual companies which successfully get R&D 
subsidies from the government are likely to motivate other members of the 
interest groups to take further collective lobbying actions. In addition, 
Hrebenar and Scott (1982:164-165) also indicate that interest groups intend 
to aggressively lobby the administrators of the regulatory agencies to 
influence their decisions. The tactics for interest groups to contact 
administrators include giving advice to the implementation of policies, 
helping administrators to gather information, participating in administrative 
hearings and so on.  
 
Some literature focuses on the interest groups in particular industries or 
regions. For particular industries, the groups of pharmaceutical companies 
are one of the most influential business interest groups involved in the 
lobbying activities. For instance, Landers and Sehgal (2004), Harvey et al 
(2004) and Abraham (2002) portray the political impact of pharmaceutical 
business groups in the United States’ health care and trade policies. 
Furthermore, Inzelt (2008) has explained the involvement of private sectors 
in the RTDI policy - making process in Hungary. As for particular regions, 
the majority of empirical research focuses on the interest groups in the 
United States (Schier, 2000; Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Goldstein, 1999; 
Rozell and Wilcox, 1999; Wilcox et al, 1998; Heinz, 1993), European Union 
(Greenwood and Aspinwall, 1998; Coen, 2007; Pedler, 2002; Greenwood, 
2007) or individual European countries (Stewart, 1958; Marks and 
Steenberge, 2004).  
 
The roles of scientists in the policy - making process are also discussed by 
scholars. In Barker and Peters’s book, ‘The politics of expert advice’ (1993), 
the authors, such as Tournon (1993) and Barker and Peters (1993), discuss 
how scientific advisors involve in the policy - making process of nuclear 
and radiation policies. From their point of view, while the interests of 
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scientists are influenced by policies, they are in fact self - interested political 
actors who possess their own interests through influencing the policy - 
making process. A similar point of view is shared by Hove (2007), Guston 
(2000) and Gerrie (2006). The authors speculate that even though 
traditionally scientific activities are viewed as the activities which are 
neutral and above all social and political frays, in reality, science and 
politics are mutually intersected and co - evolve. Moreover, Schooler (1971), 
Rocci (1993) and Pollitt (2006) have described the interactions between 
academics and actors inside the government. For example, Schooler 
(1971:69,259) describes that scientists are able to influence the congressmen 
through the involvement of public hearings or the congressional 
investigations. Scientists are also able to influence the decisions of elected 
politicians and vest their interests through serving the particular positions in 
the cabinet. We will discuss the literature in more detail when we establish 
our research questions and conceptual framework in Chapter 3.     
 
The literature about interest groups and scientists describes the political 
participation of interest groups and scientists who are policy stakeholders 
outside the government. While the network governance approach analyzes 
the overall policy network from a relatively macro perspective, the literature 
about interest groups and scientists emphasizes the micro observations for 
the characters of the two policy stakeholders and their interactions with the 
government. The literature contributes a lot to our establishment of research 
questions of policy stakeholders, as well as our analysis for the interactions 
between the policy stakeholders and the government in Chapter 3.  
 
However, there are at least two weak points of the literature. First of all, the 
linkage between the stakeholders’ involvements in the policy - making 
process and policy contents remains unclear. Even though some scholars, 
such as Inzelt (2008) and Politt (2006), try to link the involvement of 
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stakeholders with the policy - making process, the relationship between the 
stakeholders’ participation and policy contents is not yet uncovered. 
Furthermore, the literature of interest groups’ and scientists’ political 
participations in the RTDI policy - making process is seldom linked to the 
approaches of innovation systems. Would the involvement of policy 
stakeholders in the policy - making process make the RTDI policies better 
support the development of NSTIS? The question has not been answered 
yet. 
 
2.3.3.4 The stagist approach for public policy analysis   
 
The stagist approach, as described by Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993a), is 
deeply influenced by the 
Easton’s model of political 
system. From the stagists’ point 
of view, the policy - making 
process within the political 
system could be divided into 
several stages. Since the RTDI 
policy - making process is the 
core of the thesis, we review 
the literature of the stage model below.  
 
Different stagists have divided the policy - making process into different 
stages. In Public Policy, Parsons (1995) divides the policy - making process 
into seven stages which form the policy cycle, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
According to Figure 2.4 the policy cycle starts from the stage of problem 
definition — identifying alternative responses / solution — evaluation of 
options — selection of policy option — implementation — evaluation — 
problem — problem definition. 
Figure 2.4 Parsons’ policy cycle 
 
＊Source: Parson (1995) 
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From Parsons’ perspective, in different stages of the policy - making process 
there are different obligations to be fulfilled. Moreover, different stages of 
the policy - making process could be analyzed from different perspectives 
and could be influenced by different factors. For instance, the stage of 
problem - definition and the stage of agenda - setting are both influenced by 
the internal triggers (such as natural catastrophes and technological and 
ecological change) and external triggers (such as act of war and 
international conflict). In addition, the policy - making process of the two 
stages could be analyzed from the perspectives of pluralism and / or neo - 
Marxism (Parsons, 1995:85-153). Nevertheless, in ‘Policy cycle’, May and 
Wildasky (1978) only divide the stages of policy - making process into five 
stages. The policy cycle starts from the stage of agenda - setting — issue 
analysis — service delivery — implementation utilization of policy 
evaluation — termination. From the authors’ point of view different stages 
have different missions and empirical examples are given in order to 
describe the missions of each stage.  
 
Besides the discussions of the overall policy cycle some scholars focus on 
one of the particular stages of the policy - making process only. We will 
introduce the literature of the stages of agenda - setting, the stages of 
implementation and the stages of evaluation in the following paragraphs.  
 
For the stage of agenda - setting, in ‘Agendas, alternatives and public 
policies’, Kingdon (2003) defines the stage as the process where 
government officials select a series of subjects to which they pay more 
serious attention than others (2003: 196). For Kingdon, the administration, 
including the president, the staff and the political appointees who are 
responsible for the president substantially influence the policy agendas. 
However, actors outside the government, including interest groups, 
academics, the media, the election - related participants and the public 
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opinion also interact with the administration in order to link their interests to 
the particular policy agendas. In the field of RTDI policies, Flanagan et al 
(2010) recognize that the stage of agenda - setting is the stage for policy 
makers to decide the policy rationale of RTDI policies and design the mixed 
policy instruments according to the policy rationale. However, the authors 
also describe that the mixed policy instruments are selected through the 
interactions of multiple actors on multiple levels. The selections of mixed 
policy instruments in reality is the results of trade - offs between different 
actors.   
 
Besides Kingdon (2003) and Flanagan et al (2010), some other authors 
consider different terms and meanings for ‘agenda - setting’. While Parsons 
(1995:245) uses the term ‘decision - making’ to refer to the stage in which 
the administration in the executive branch decides the agendas of policy 
proposals and bills, Cox and McCubbins (2005) use the term ‘setting the 
agenda’ to refer to the stage in which the congressmen formally authorize 
the agendas of policy proposals and bills. In order to clarify the terms we 
use, we consider the stage of agenda - setting as the stage for the elected 
politician to decide policy proposals, and we refer the stage of deciding as 
the stage in which congressmen authorize policy proposals and bills. 
 
The stage of the implementation, as described by Lane (1997:297-298), is 
the stage to execute policies and to accomplish the policy objectives; the 
stage of evaluation, as defined by Meyer-Krahmer (1988:121), is the stage 
that examines and assesses the mode of action and the effectiveness of 
government policies. However, since the literature of the two stages is 
highly overlapping with the literature of public management, in this section 
we will not review this part of the literature again.  
 
The stagist approach introduces a model for the analysis of the policy - 
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making process. Although the approach does not perfectly reflect the 
complexity of the policy - making process as criticized by some scholars2, 
the stagist approach offers a clear and useful tool for the empirical analysis 
of the policy - making process. Adopting the contributions of the stagists, in 
Chapter 3, our conceptual framework also divides the policy - making 
process into several stages. Since there is no consistent method to divide the 
stages, we only divide the policy - making process into four stages which 
are discussed by more scholars. The four stages are the stage of agenda - 
setting, the stage of deciding, the stage of implementation and the stage of 
evaluation.  
 
Yet, we are also aware of the two limitations of the stage approach. First, the 
stagist approach only focuses on the stages of the policy - making process. 
There is no linkage between stages of the policy - making process and 
policy contents. In addition, the stagist approach has seldom been linked to 
the approaches of innovation systems. The influence of each stage of the 
policy - making process on the development of the innovation systems is 
indeed worth of further analysis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 For example, Cohen et al (1972) have suggested the ‘garbage can model’ and Lindblom 
(1959) has established the ‘muddling through’ approach. Both of the two approaches don’t 
consider policy process as the linear process which could be clearly cut into several stages. 
Instead, the two approaches consider policy process as a ‘garbage can’ or ‘mud’ in which 
the problems, solutions, participants and opportunities all pool together immediately. 
Nevertheless, as John (1998:22) declaims, just ‘because the policy process is complex and 
apparently chaotic, there is a need to impose some conceptual order on the policy process in 
order to comprehend it.’ The stage approach, according to John (1998), thus serves as the 
attempt to simplify decision-making by cutting policy process into distinct stages and by 
distinguishing policy goals from policy outputs in order to enable policy researchers to 
analyze how powerful are certain groups, parties and institutions able to get their policies 
on the agenda. According to the articles above, we are aware that there are alternatives to 
analyze policy process, and in the reality, the policy process may not be able to be neatly 
cut into different stages. However, we agree with John (1998:36) that even though there are 
no clear divisions of policy process, the stage approach still shows the evolution of 
changing interests, ideas and problems through policy process. Since we are interested in 
the changes of actors and their interactions in the policy process, and the stagist provides a 
simplified but clear framework to explain the changes of governance structure in the policy 
process, we still adopt stage approach in our conceptual framework.  
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2.3.4 Brief conclusion of the section  
 
Political scientists have done extensive research which tends to understand 
the policy process from different perspectives. According to the 
contributions of political scientists, internal mechanisms of the government, 
interactions between the government and policy stakeholders and the 
different stages of the policy - making process are understood. The policy - 
making process is no longer the ‘black - box’, but the mechanisms which 
are able to be analyzed from divergent perspectives.  
 
Although the political scientists have formed many different complex 
approaches to analyze the policy – making process, one of the common 
shortcomings of the political science research is that political scientists have 
not yet provided a relatively integrated approach for the analysis of RTDI 
policies. Indeed, the RTDI policy, according to the description of 
Biegelbauer (2003), is a special kind of policy which is not only complex, 
but also needs the interactions between the government and stakeholders to 
make this complexity manageable. In the real world, through the stages of 
RTDI policy - making process, all internal institutions and actors of the 
government, as well as actors outside the government would shape the 
decisions of the government. The context of the government’s policy - 
making process is complex. How do the institutions and actors together 
shape the RTDI policies? There is no clear answer found within the political 
science literature yet.  
 
Another common shortcoming of the political science research is that 
political scientists seldom link their research to innovation system 
approaches. Although there has been a small group of political scientists 
starting to link political science to the RTDI policy research and to the 
approaches of innovation systems, political scientists should be able to 
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contribute much more to the innovation research than the current status. 
 
According to the common shortcomings of the political science research we 
recognize that a new integrated conceptual framework of RTDI policy - 
making process is needed. The conceptual framework should not only 
integrate different perspectives of the political science for the analysis of 
RTDI policies, but should also fully link the research of RTDI policies to the 
approaches of innovation systems. 
  
Based on the existing literature we get our initial understanding towards the 
RTDI policy - making process. A government is the integral part of the 
political system, which is the sub - system of a NSTIS. The governance of 
NSTIS can be best described as network governance. The government is 
embedded in the network of governance which governs the NSTIS. The 
government is composed of institutions and actors. The actors within the 
boundary of the government would interact with actors who are outside the 
government but involved in the network of governance. The policy - making 
process of RTDI policies is divided into several stages, and in each stage of 
the policy - making process different modes of interactions between actors 
inside and outside the government would shape the RTDI policies. 
Furthermore, different RTDI policies have different impacts on the 
development of NSTIS, including the knowledge accumulation in a 
particular technological field, the network of actors and the particular set of 
products carried out by the actors of the NSTIS. However, we will formally 
introduce the new conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making 
process in Chapter 3.  
 
2.4 The empirical literature of biotechnology and Taiwan  
 
2.4.1 The empirical literature of biotechnology  
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What is referred to as biotechnology in this thesis is distinguished from 
modern biotechnology and traditional biotechnology. Modern biotechnology, 
as defined by Laage-Hellman et al (2004), refers to the biotechnology which 
is developed in the post - genetic engineering era. Modern biotechnology is 
comprised of a broad range of knowledge fields, including DNA (the 
coding), proteins and molecules, cell and tissue culture and engineering, 
process biotechnology, and sub - cellular organisms. We fully agree with 
Laage-Hellman et al and adopt their definition of modern biotechnology as 
our definition in the thesis. Moreover, we further define the traditional 
biotechnology as the biotechnology which is developed before the post - 
genetic engineering era. The definition of modern and traditional 
biotechnology is especially important when we discuss the development of 
biotechnology in Taiwan, in Chapter 5. 
 
Modern biotechnology, as described by many scholars, is developed through 
the networks of actors. McKelvey et al (2004) have described that the 
development of modern biotechnology is closely related to the fundamental 
science research. Not only scientists, but also companies are involved in the 
scientific research. The formulation of cluster is important for the 
development of modern biotechnology. The network between scientists and 
companies and the network between different companies are both important 
for the knowledge distributions of modern biotechnology. The perspective 
of McKelvey et al is widely shared by many other scholars, such as Stuart et 
al (2008), Zucker et al (1998), Powell et al (2005) and Colyvas (2007). Not 
only the technology transfers from universities to companies, but also the 
alliances between companies are essential to the innovation of modern 
biotechnology. 
 
The development of modern biotechnology in fact intersects with several 
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sectors and with many countries. For the intersections of modern 
biotechnology and sectors, as described by Brink et al (2004) and Senker et 
al (2004), modern biotechnology is adopted by several sectors such as 
pharmaceuticals, agriculture, equipments and instruments and so on. The 
entanglement between the development of modern biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals is frequently discussed by many scholars. Indeed, through 
discussing the origins of modern biotechnology, McKelvey (1996) analyzes 
the tightly inter - linked evolution between modern biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical sector. From her perspective, the origin of modern 
biotechnology was the development of recombinant DNA and genetic 
engineering techniques in the early 1970s in universities in the United States, 
such as the University of California. The American pharmaceutical 
multinational company (MNC), Eli Illy, the new American bio - 
pharmaceutical company, Genetech, and the European pharmaceutical MNC, 
Kabi (Swedish), were the companies which commercialized the techniques 
of genetic engineering and applied the techniques for manufacturing 
pharmaceuticals. Since the appearance of modern biotechnology its 
development was tightly entangled with the development of the 
pharmaceutical sector. McKelvey et al (2004) further analyze the evolution 
of the pharmaceutical sector through the approach of sectoral innovation 
system. From their perspective, before the 1970s, the main knowledge base 
of the pharmaceutical sector was chemistry; only after the 1970s, modern 
biotechnology gradually became one of the knowledge bases of the 
pharmaceutical sector. In addition, Chataway et al (2004) also identify the 
intersection between biotechnology and agriculture and describe how 
agricultural MNCs re-orient their R&D strategies to incorporate the new 
biotechnology in their products. For the intersections between 
biotechnology and national innovation systems, Kaiser and Prange (2004) 
discussed the reconfiguration of the German national innovation system and 
the bio - pharmaceutical innovation within the national border of Germany.                  
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Indeed, many scholars notice that the development of biotechnology is 
deeply influenced by the governments’ policies. Geseisk (2000) compares 
the contrasting roles of the government of the United States and the 
government of Germany in the development of biotechnology. From her 
perspective, the triple helix between academia, state and industry is 
embedded in the innovation of biotechnology. Since biotechnology is a 
science - based technology and especially dependent on the cooperation and 
interactions among actors to transfer knowledge, national institutions and 
government policies play a critical role to provide the mechanisms of 
knowledge transfers. She further points out that start - ups are the motor of 
the innovation of biotechnology, and the role of the government in the 
development of biotechnology is to overcome the blockages of the national 
innovation system which are inappropriate to the development of 
biotechnology, and to establish the favourable ‘economic ecology’ which 
makes the start-ups develop and grow. The favourable ‘economic ecology’ 
includes the entrepreneurships of academics mobilizing knowledge flows, 
the mechanisms facilitating technology transfers (such as the patent system) 
and the financial market supporting the development of start - ups (such as 
the venture capital companies willing to invest in the new technologies). As 
she describes, the government of the United States has more positive 
support to the development of biotechnology than the German government, 
because the government of the United States establishes the favourable 
‘economic ecology’ for the development of biotechnology. Geseisk also 
notices that polity and politics of the biotechnology policies in the United 
States and Germany are very different. While the United States doesn’t have 
any central agency for coordinating biotechnology policies, the German 
government promotes all the biotechnology policies through the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. From her point of view, even though there is no 
central agency, the American approach is more effective because it supports 
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the institutional arrangement which is favourable to specific needs of 
biotechnology. On the contrary, even though the German government 
promotes all biotechnology through only one ministry, the policy process of 
the government is ‘locked’ by the actors of the ‘inner - circle’, such as a 
small group of scientists and experts. The German government then is not 
able to pursue a science and technology policy which effectively establishes 
the favourable ‘economic ecology’ and furthers technology transfers. 
Moreover, Reiss et al (2004) and Senker et al (2000) compare the 
development of biotechnology in different European countries. As 
concluded by Senker et al there are three lessons derived from the 
biotechnology policies of European countries: (1) the countries need to 
coordinate science and technology policies and seek for the view of industry 
while promoting public research; (2) different start - ups demand tailored 
mechanism for technology transfers; (3) academic entrepreneurships can be 
stimulated.  
 
The literature of biotechnology indeed provides us a very important 
understanding towards the dynamics of the innovation of biotechnology and 
the proper policies which are able to support the development of 
biotechnology. On the basis of the existing literature we understand that 
biotechnology is a technology which is adopted by plural sectors and 
intersects with the national innovation systems of many countries. The 
modern biotechnology is developed through the interactions of actors in the 
network which is composed by companies, scientists and government. 
Knowledge flow between actors is essential for the development of modern 
biotechnology, and the most important role of the government in the 
development of biotechnology is to facilitate the flows of knowledge 
between actors and remove the barriers which hamper the interactions 
between actors. The analysis of the existing literature is indeed very 
important for us to assess the appropriateness of the Taiwanese 
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biotechnology and related sectoral policies in Chapter 6.            
 
However, taking into account the discussions above, we find two 
insufficiencies of the empirical existing literature of biotechnology. First of 
all, the intersections of biotechnology, the different sectoral innovation 
systems and national innovation systems are not yet fully explored. 
McKelvey et al (2004) have analyzed the intersection between 
biotechnology and the pharmaceutical sector, and Chataway et al (2004) 
have discussed the intersection between biotechnology and agricultural 
sector. The authors, such as Geseisk (2000), Kaiser and Prange (2004), 
Reiss et al (2004) and Senker et al (2000), have discussed the intersections 
between biotechnology and different national innovation systems. However, 
how biotechnology intersects with different sectors within one country? 
There are no existing answers for this question yet. Second, the policy and 
politics of the biotechnology policies are not fully explored. Geseisk (2000) 
provides a very interesting initial discussion for the policy process of 
biotechnology policies in the United States and Germany. The ‘lock - in’ 
policy process of the German government didn’t enable the government to 
promote the policies which actually support the development of 
biotechnology in Germany. From the discussion we get the initial 
understanding that the policy process of biotechnology policies should not 
be locked - in and include the new incentives from outside the ‘inner - 
circle’. However, Geseisk does not fully discuss the importance of policy 
coordination in the biotechnology policies. While Geseisk shows that the 
government of United States, which has no central agency to coordinate 
policies, promotes more effectively the RTDI policies and the German 
government, which has only one ministry to promote biotechnology policies 
promotes policies ineffectively, she in fact doesn’t link the relationships 
between policy coordination with the effectiveness of biotechnology 
policies. It is Senker et al (2000) who mention the importance of policy 
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coordination in the biotechnology policies, as well as the importance of the 
consideration of the view of the industry. Yet, ‘how’ could government 
coordinate biotechnology policies with the consideration of the view of the 
industry? A clear answer for this question cannot be found in the existing 
literature.             
                                           
2.4.2 The empirical literature of Taiwan  
 
The Taiwanese experience in industrialization and innovation has attracted 
the attention of some scholars and has been analyzed by three strands of 
literature, i.e. literature on national innovation systems, literature on East 
Asian regional studies and some political science literature. Each sort of 
literature is introduced in the following sections.    
 
2.4.2.1 Taiwan and the literature of national innovation systems  
 
2.4.2.1.1 Taiwan and the approaches of national innovation systems 
 
In Nelson’s book, ‘National innovation systems’, Taiwan has been chosen as 
one of the empirical examples among 15 countries. According to Nelson, 
Hou and Gee (1993) have written a book chapter to analyze the Taiwanese 
national innovation system. The book chapter has focused on the Taiwanese 
history of industrial evolution from 1945 to 1993. The Taiwanese companies, 
including public enterprises, private SMEs and MNCs, played important 
roles in the acquisition and development of technologies. Furthermore, the 
Taiwanese government also played an essential role in the national 
innovation. Not only the public policies, such as education policies, fiscal / 
financial policies, but also the public sponsored research institutions have 
positively supported the development of the Taiwanese manufacturing and 
ICT related technologies and sectors. Besides, the Taiwanese universities 
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extensively contributed to the national technological innovation through the 
collaboration with public sponsored research institutions.       
 
Moreover, in the Edquist and Hommen’s book, ‘Small country innovation 
systems’ (2008), Taiwan is also selected to be one of the empirical examples 
among 10 small countries. Edquist and Hommen adopt a system approach 
within their volume which is similar to that of Nelson’s. In Edquist and 
Hommen’s book, Balaquer et al (2008) analyze the Taiwanese national 
innovation system. The history of the Taiwanese industrial development 
(from 1945 to 2008), the knowledge inputs to national innovation, the 
industrial structure constituted by SMEs and the evolution of the innovation 
policies promoted by the Taiwanese government are all described. 
Furthermore, the same chapter compares the performance of the Taiwanese 
manufacturing to the Taiwanese service industry. The special OEM / ODM 
mode (original equipment manufacturing / original design manufacturing) 
of the Taiwanese manufacturing industry gets special attention.  
    
The discussions of the Taiwanese national innovation system provided some 
empirical characters of the Taiwanese national innovation. On the basis of 
the empirical literature we understand that manufacturing industries are the 
pillars of the Taiwanese national innovation. The industrial structure of 
Taiwan is mainly constituted by SMEs and the Taiwanese government 
provides strong guidance in the industrial development.  
 
Yet, as discussed in section 2.2.1, the approach of national innovation 
system has several deficiencies. Such theoretical deficiencies influence the 
empirical analysis of the Taiwanese case in many aspects. First of all, both 
Hou and Gee (1993) and Balaquer et al (2008) have ignored the 
technological and sectoral differences within the Taiwanese national 
innovation system. Hou and Gee (1993) only discuss the evolution of the 
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overall industry in Taiwan. Even though Balaquer et al (2008) distinguish 
the Taiwanese manufacturing industry from the service industry, the book 
chapter doesn’t provide detailed discussion about the sectoral differences 
under the manufacturing industry. Second, even though the Taiwanese 
government played a significant role in the development of the Taiwanese 
national innovation system, the role of the Taiwanese government is only 
discussed from purely economic and technological perspectives. The 
Taiwanese government is considered as a unified entity and the policy - 
making process within the Taiwanese government is not uncovered.        
 
2.4.2.1.2 The evolution of the Taiwanese national innovation system   
 
In ‘The evolving nature of Taiwan's national innovation system’, Dogson et 
al (2008) discuss the evolving nature of the Taiwanese national innovation 
system. From the authors’ perspective, the national innovation system 
changes over time and the evolution of the national innovation system 
involves changing institutions and relationships within the system. By 
analyzing the new characters of the Taiwanese innovation network of 
biotechnology which do not exist in the Taiwanese innovation network of 
ICT, the authors tend to analyze the dynamics of the national innovation 
system in Taiwan. 
 
The evolving characters of the Taiwanese innovation network of 
biotechnology, according to Dogson et al, refer to the evolving institutions, 
the evolving finance / investment patterns and the evolving research - 
industry links. The evolving institutions include the public research 
institutions and science parks. The Industrial Technology Research Institute 
which contribute a lot to the Taiwanese ICT sector, are emphasized. Besides, 
the Development Centre of Biotechnology and the National Health Research 
Institute are also mentioned in the paper. Furthermore, the Hsinchu Science 
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Park which clusters the majority of ICT companies is highly focused in the 
paper. The Biotechnology Plaza of Nakang Software Park, which clusters a 
large group of pharmaceutical companies and the Southern Taiwan Science 
Park, which clusters a group of agricultural companies are also discussed. 
For the evolving finance / investment patterns, these patterns include the 
firms’ strategies and venture capital systems. On one hand, while the 
Taiwanese ICT companies use the downturn entry strategy to enter the 
market, the Taiwanese biotechnology related companies use new products to 
penetrate the market. On the other hand, while the venture capital system of 
the Taiwanese ICT sector is operated by private companies, the venture 
capital system of the Taiwanese biotechnology related sectors is driven by 
the government. For the evolving research - industry links, the links of 
Taiwanese biotechnology are different from the links of ICT. While the 
Taiwanese ICT companies transfer their technologies from MNCs, the 
Taiwanese biotechnology related companies usually transfer their 
technologies from universities. In summary, according to the new characters 
of the Taiwanese innovation network of biotechnology which do not exist in 
the Taiwanese innovation network of ICT, Dogson et al conclude that the 
Taiwanese national innovation system is under evolution. 
      
Dogson et al provide some interesting observations about the Taiwanese 
innovation network of biotechnology. The authors notice that the 
development of the Taiwanese biotechnology is very different from ICT 
mode. Plural government institutions are involved in the Taiwanese 
development of biotechnology, and biotechnology companies are usually 
invested by the government. Since the local companies usually transfer their 
technologies from universities, the universities play important roles in the 
innovation of biotechnology. Indeed, the concept for the evolving characters 
of the innovation system contributes to our understanding of the dynamics 
of the innovation system in Taiwan. However, the paper seems to have three 
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important weak points.  
 
First, out of the concept that there are technological and sectoral differences 
within a national innovation system, Dogson et al misunderstand the 
differences between the Taiwanese biotechnology and the Taiwanese ICT 
NSTIS as the characters of the evolving nature of the Taiwanese national 
innovation system. In fact, as we are going to show in Chapter 5, the 
developments of the Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectors have their 
own unique history. The Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectors do not 
evolve from the ICT sectors. Dogson et al use the Taiwanese biotechnology 
as an empirical case to explain the evolving nature of the Taiwanese national 
innovation system, which is not convincing.  
 
Second, Dogson et al treat the Taiwanese biotechnology as one sector. Yet, 
as we are going to show in Chapter 5, biotechnology in Taiwan is in fact one 
technology which is adopted by three sectors including pharmaceuticals, 
agriculture and medical devices. Each sector adopted biotechnology in a 
very different context. The evolution of biotechnology was different from 
sector to sector. Therefore, it is insufficient to discuss the evolution of 
biotechnology in Taiwan without recognizing the sectoral differences. We 
will have detailed discussions about the development of the three 
biotechnology related sectors and the evolution of biotechnology in each of 
the three sectors in Taiwan in Chapter 5.  
 
Third, Dogson et al look at the biotechnology in Taiwan through the lens of 
ICT. Some research organizations and science parks, such as the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute and the Hsinchu Science Park, which play 
important roles in the development of ICT but play very minor roles in 
biotechnology, are heavily emphasized. Yet, the important research 
organizations and science parks which never support ICT but play a key role 
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in the development of biotechnology are quite marginalized. This is the case 
of the Development Centre of Biotechnology, the National Health Research 
Institute, and the Biotechnology Plaza of Nakang Software Park. 
                        
2.4.2.2 Taiwan and the literature of East Asian regional studies   
 
Taiwan has been considered as one of the ‘East Asian Tigers’ due to its 
outstanding performance in the manufacturing and ICT industries. The 
literature of East Asian regional studies frequently compare Taiwan with 
other East Asian countries in terms of the historical progress in the high - 
tech industries, the industrial structures and the government’s policies. 
Unlike the approach of national innovation systems which search for the 
general principles among countries belonging to different continents, 
regional studies usually consider the experiences of East Asian countries to 
be unique and only focus on the East Asian region. Since the ICT sector is 
still the most outstanding sector of Taiwan and other East Asian countries, 
regional studies usually emphasize the performance of the Taiwanese ICT 
sector and compare the Taiwanese ICT sector with other East Asian 
countries.  
 
Mathews and Cho’s book ‘Tiger technology’ (2000) is the typical example 
of East Asian regional studies. In this book, the authors describe the 
historical progress of the Taiwanese semiconductor industries. Moreover, in 
Chu and Hill’s book ‘The East Asian high-tech drive’ (2006), Chu displays 
the statistical data of the Taiwanese manufacturing industries, the changing 
industrial structures of Taiwanese manufacturing industries, the Taiwanese 
government’s industrial policies and the roles of universities in the national 
innovation. The problem of policy coordination within the Taiwanese 
government is discussed briefly and there is no further analysis for such 
policy issues. 
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The East Asian regional studies have collected some empirical data of 
Taiwan for further analysis, especially the data of the ICT sector. 
Nevertheless, the development of biotechnology and related sectors in 
Taiwan has seldom been mentioned. Why Taiwan has relatively high 
performance in the ICT sector, but relatively low performance in 
biotechnology related sectors? Are there any special reasons for such 
phenomena? Regional studies have not answered these questions yet.  
 
2.4.2.3 Taiwan and the literature of political science 
 
The literature of political science which discusses the Taiwanese 
government belongs to two disciplines: comparative politics and public 
administration. Both disciplines are introduced below.      
 
For the disciplines of comparative politics, the polity of Taiwan has been 
discussed by many scholars. Many political scientists of comparative 
politics consider the Taiwanese polity to be semi - presidential polity (Wang, 
2002; Shih, 2004; Chen, 2005) because according to the Taiwanese 
Constitution, the President is the head of the state and the Prime Minister is 
the head of the Executive Yuan (the Cabinet). However, Wu (2000) has a 
very different point of view from other scholars. He claims that according to 
the Taiwanese Constitution the President is able to replace the Prime 
Minister any time without the permission from the Legislative Yuan (the 
Congress). Therefore, the Prime Minister is in fact the subordinate of the 
President and the President is the actual head of the executive branch. Wu 
then advocates that the Taiwanese polity is in fact presidential polity, rather 
than semi - presidential polity. According to the academic debates above, we 
adopt the opinion of Wu. From our point of view, since the President could 
replace the Prime Minister without the permission of the congress and treats 
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the Prime Minister as his / her subordinate, Taiwan should be considered a 
presidential polity rather than a semi - presidential polity. We will further 
analyze the impact of the Taiwanese presidential polity on the RTDI policy - 
making process in Chapter 6. 
 
For the sub - discipline 
of public administration, 
the issues of policy 
coordination and the 
governance of the 
Taiwanese 
biotechnology related 
policies have been 
discussed by a few 
scholars. Wong (2005) 
analyzes the governance of the biotechnology innovation in Taiwan. As 
shown in Figure 2.5, Wong recognizes Taiwan’s biotech innovation system. 
From his perspective, the Taiwanese government had once successfully 
directed the resources and the different actors of the state towards the 
development of ICT from top - down. However, in the development of 
biotechnology, the roles of the Taiwanese government were weakened 
considerably. The Taiwanese government tried to promote various policies 
to direct the development of biotechnology, such as increasing R&D 
expenditures, enhancing intellectual property protections, establishing the 
biotechnology cluster, investing biotechnology start - ups, refining 
regulations and so on. Yet, all the policies were promoted in the context of 
‘administrative decentralization’. In the Executive Yuan, there were four 
ministries which claimed to be the key players for the development of 
biotechnology, i.e. the National Science Council (NSC), the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MOEA), the Department of Health (DOH) and the 
Figure 2.5 The institutional organizations of Taiwan’s biotech innovation system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
＊Source: Wong (2005)  
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Council of Agriculture (COA). Although the Science and Technology 
Advisory Group (STAG), was institutionally in charge of the setting 
priorities, the ministerial leaderships in the biotechnology policies were 
shared by four ministries. Wong further explains that there were in fact three 
factors which made the Taiwanese government incapable to coordinate 
biotechnology policies: (1) Market ambiguity: Bio - industries were multi - 
disciplinary by their nature and the market for bio - industry was ambiguous. 
Therefore, the policy makers were unable to effectively target the market 
winner and coordinate resources around it. (2) Ministerial contestation: The 
four ministries had different priorities for the development of biotechnology 
and competed for scarce resources and policy authority. (3) Absence of 
institutional leaderships: Even though the Science and Technology Advisory 
Group was in charge of coordinating biotechnology policies in Taiwan, its 
function of coordination was in fact very limited. In addition, Liu et al (2005) 
analyzed the network of stakeholders of the National Health Insurance.  
 
Political scientists analyze the Taiwanese government and government 
policies from different perspectives. These strands of literature provide 
some initial discussions about the Taiwanese biotechnology related policies 
and help us to identify the institutions and actors which may influence the 
policy - making process of the Taiwanese government. For example, Wong 
(2005) provides a very interesting discussion about the governance of 
biotechnology in Taiwan. The institutional organizations of the Taiwanese 
biotech innovation system are identified. The problem of the coordination 
between the four ministries claimed to be responsible for the development 
of biotechnology is also interestingly discussed. Wong’s paper provides a 
very important initial understanding of inter - ministerial coordination of 
biotechnology policies in Taiwan.         
 
Yet, there are at least three limitations of the literature. First, different 
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strands of political science literature analyze the Taiwanese government and 
government policies from different perspectives; yet from our perspective 
different perspectives have to be integrated together in order to deepen the 
analysis of biotechnology and related sectoral policies in Taiwan. For 
example, besides the contestation of ministries, the congressmen under the 
presidential polity in Taiwan may also play important roles in shaping 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies. Yet, until now there is no 
literature to offer a synthetic discussion for the roles of both ministries and 
congressmen. Second, the policy - making process of the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies remain blurred and there is no 
clear linkage between the policy - making process and the policy contents of 
the Taiwanese biotechnology related policies. Even though Wong (2006) has 
noticed the problems of policy coordination within the Taiwanese 
government, he does not link the ministerial contestation with the policy 
contents of specific policies. Moreover, Liu et al (2005) analyze the network 
of governance of the National Health Insurance. However, the authors do 
not clarify how the network of governance influences the policy contents of 
the Taiwanese National Health Insurance. Third, the literature of political 
science of Taiwan has not been linked with the approaches of innovation 
system. How does the policy - making process of the Taiwanese government 
influences the development of the Taiwanese biotechnology related NSTIS? 
Do the factors, such as the ministerial contestation described by Wong 
(2005), influence the development of biotechnology NSTIS in Taiwan? Are 
there sectoral differences between different biotechnology NSTIS? A clear 
answer for these questions has not yet to be found.                   
 
2.4.2.4 Brief conclusion of the Taiwanese literature 
 
The literature about the Taiwanese research provides some empirical 
analysis of Taiwan which contribute to our understanding towards our 
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empirical example; yet, there are two common insufficiencies of the 
empirical studies. Above all, even though the Taiwanese national innovation 
system has been studied, the sectoral and technological differences within 
the Taiwanese national innovation system have not been fully discussed. 
While the majority of literature focuses on the progress of manufacturing or 
ICT related sectors, the development of biotechnology and related sectors in 
Taiwan has been marginalized. The deeper and more precise empirical 
analysis of the Taiwanese biotechnology is lacking. Second, the discussions 
about the political nature and policy - making process of the Taiwanese 
government remain limited. The available literature is only able to discuss 
the roles of the Taiwanese government from different perspectives, but there 
is no literature to provide the comprehensive insights into the policy - 
making process of Taiwan.  
 
Since both the discussions of the innovation systems of biotechnology in 
Taiwan and the policy - making process are limited, we choose the 
innovation systems and policies of the Taiwanese biotechnology and related 
sectors as our empirical examples. In Chapter 5, we will use the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral innovation systems as the empirical 
examples of NSTIS. Moreover, in Chapter 6, we choose the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies as our empirical cases to observe 
the RTDI policy - making process.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we reviewed three categories of literature which are related to 
the whole thesis, i.e. the approaches of innovation systems, the literature of 
political science and the empirical literature of biotechnology and Taiwan. 
The review of the existing literature helps us to discover the conceptual and 
empirical contributions of the existing literature. On the other hand, the 
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literature also helps us to establish our own conceptual framework and to 
analyze our empirical cases.  
 
Based on the discussions of this chapter we are going to apply the 
conclusions derived from the existing literature for our analysis in the 
following chapters. In Chapter 3, we will establish our own conceptual 
framework according to the conclusion of the literature of political science. 
In Chapter 5, we will apply the concept of NSTIS which is derived from the 
literature of innovation systems for the analysis of the three biotechnology 
related NSTIS in Taiwan.   
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Chapter 3 Research questions and the conceptual framework 
of RTDI policy - making process 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the research questions of the 
whole thesis and the conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making 
process which is shown in Figure 3.1. The research questions and the 
conceptual framework are developed on the basis of the literature discussed 
in Chapter 2, i.e. the literature on innovation systems and literature on 
political science. However, before opening the detailed discussion of this 
chapter, we first introduce four closely interrelated theoretical blocks 
underlying the research questions and the conceptual framework and 
provide an overview for our conceptual framework.     
 
The first theoretical block underlying the research questions and the 
conceptual framework is the approaches of innovation systems and the 
general roles of RTDI policies in the context of innovation systems. As 
discussed in section 2.2, Nelson (1993) and Lundvall (1992) contribute to 
the analysis of national innovation systems, while Freeman (1987) explains 
how governments promote technology and industrial policies to shape the 
national innovation systems through comparing the empirical cases of Japan 
and Britain; the OECD (1999) also describes how governments should 
positively support the development of the national innovation system 
through technology and innovation policies. Malerba (2004) looks at the 
dynamics of sectoral innovation systems and recommends that national 
institutions should match the specific characteristics of sectoral innovation 
systems and foster their further development. Furthermore, Carlsson (2004) 
and many other authors express the evolution of technological innovation 
systems, as well as the impact of national institutions on technological 
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innovation systems. Indeed, as described in section 2.2, national institutions 
shape the sectoral and technological innovation within the national border. 
Since we tend to look at how the national policies impact on a technology 
impinge upon sectors, we consider that the boundary of an innovation 
system which is drawn by a nation, a sector and a technology is the most 
suitable boundary for an innovation system. The configuration of a national, 
a sectoral and a technological innovation system is defined as the national, 
sectoral and technological innovation system (NSTIS). In fact, in the 
conceptual framework shown in Figure 3.1 we assume RTDI policies are 
made in the context of NSTIS. In addition, we adopt the concept of both 
Freeman and Malerba and assume that the dynamics of an innovation 
system is shaped by the government through the promotion of RTDI policies, 
as well as the provision of other framework conditions. From our point of 
view the government is responsible for making appropriate RTDI policies 
which not only match the specific dynamics and structures of an 
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innovation system, but also further shape and foster its development. The 
development of NSTIS includes the knowledge accumulation in a particular 
technological field, the network of actors and the particular set of products 
carried out by the NSTIS. RTDI policies that influence NSTIS can be 
characterized as being appropriate if they match the development of the 
NSTIS through supporting the underlying logic of knowledge accumulation 
and exploitation in a particular technological field, clustering the network of 
actors and encouraging the production and innovation of a particular set of 
products. We assume not only the policy objectives and policy instruments 
of RTDI policies, but once being implemented, these RTDI policies should 
generate appropriateness to the development of NSTIS. Appropriateness in 
this thesis refers to the ‘match’ between RTDI policies and the development 
of NSTIS which is able to be observed by some short-term effects caused by 
the RTDI policies3. Indeed, while some RTDI policies attend to the general 
national science and technology concerns, some others target the dynamics 
of specific sectors and technologies. We assume that the policies which 
                                                 
3
 In other words, the concept of appropriateness has two aspects with different priorities. 
First of all, the concept prioritizes the importance of ‘match’, or we could also say the 
‘fitness’, of RTDI policies towards the development of NSTIS. We recognize that a RTDI 
policy design should fit the general dynamics and the existing characteristics of a sector and 
a technology that shall be influenced. The policy should follow the principle processes that 
a sector and a technology demand and should not overwhelm the actors that are present in 
the given situation. For example, if there is no absorptive capacity in firms, the RTDI 
policy should consider to increase the absorptive capability of companies. Second, the 
concept of appropriateness treats the short-term effects, such as the quantitative economic 
indicators, caused by policies as a minor issue. The short-term effects are considered as an 
entry point for us to observe and analyze the match or fitness of RTDI policies. In another 
words, the short-term effects are considered as the attempts to assess if RTDI policies are 
promoted in a proposed direction.   
Indeed, in our conceptual framework, we use the concept of appropriateness instead of 
effectiveness, because we are aware that there is ‘time-lag’ for every RTDI policy to 
generate long-term effectiveness, and all RTDI policies are promoted in an ‘open 
environment’ where the attributing effects caused by the RTDI policies are difficult to judge. 
It is in fact very difficult to link RTDI policy-making process with policy effectiveness 
since all actors in the reality involve in the policy-making process of RTDI policies without 
knowing the long-term effectiveness of these policies in the future. Actors who actually 
decide RTDI policies and involve in the policy-making process at best know the historical 
evolution of NSTIS in the past and the short-term effects of these policies. Under the 
circumstances, we recognize the concept of appropriateness is more applicable than 
effectiveness. Only under the condition that the RTDI policies could appropriately match 
the development of NSTIS in a short-term, these RTDI policies could generate positive 
long-term effectiveness. We will further operation the concept of appropriateness in section 
6.3 when we analyze the appropriateness of our empirical cases, the National Programs and 
regulation policies.            
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match the general national concern may not necessarily match the specific 
requirements and development of a particular NSTIS, and the policies which 
match the development of a particular sector and technology do not 
necessarily match the development of others. Indeed, the appropriateness of 
policies is a relative term and has different meaning in different nations, in 
different sectors and in different technologies. Therefore, under the context 
of NSTIS, we assume it is the responsibility of the government for making 
appropriate RTDI policies which specifically match the requirements and 
development of a particular NSTIS.   
 
The second underlying theoretical block of our research questions and the 
conceptual framework has contributions by prominent scholars of public 
management. These scholars, such as Mogee (1988), Six et al (2002), Peters 
(1998) and Braun (2008), agree that in order to spend public money most 
effectively and efficiently and maximize the positive support of government 
towards national development, the government should responsibly 
coordinate policies of different subunits and maintain the policies to be 
consistent, rather than fragmented. The improvement of the institutions 
inside the government is the key for the improvement of the coordination of 
policies. We fully agree with the scholars mentioned above. In the real 
world, policy objectives of policies are not always explicit but implicit. 
Even though the policy objectives of different policies are in many 
occasions fundamentally contradictory to each other and very difficult to be 
entirely consistent with each other, the government should maximize the 
opportunities to integrate different policies and thus minimize the wastes of 
public expenditures. Therefore, in the conceptual framework shown in 
Figure 3.1, we assume that during the RTDI policy - making process, a 
government is responsible for coordinating RTDI policies and maintaining 
the consistencies of RTDI policies. To improve the coordination of policies, 
the government is responsible for improving the institutions inside the 
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government. The coordination of policies, according to Peters (1998:296), is 
defined as the process in which RTDI policies are characterized by minimal 
redundancy and incoherence. The institutions inside the government, as 
defined in Chapter 2, refer to political organizations, political rules and 
practice. Moreover, consistencies of RTDI policies are defined vertically 
and horizontally, as shown in Figure 3.2. The vertical consistencies of 
policies are defined from two aspects. First, vertical consistencies refer to 
the conditions that the policy objectives of every single RTDI policy are 
vertically, not contradictory, even ideally complementary with the general 
policy objectives of the whole government. Second, the vertical 
consistencies of policies also refer to the conditions that the direction for the 
implementation of every single RTDI policy is vertically complementary 
with the general policy objectives of the whole government. Moreover, the 
horizontal consistency of RTDI policies means that the policy objectives 
and policy instruments of a set of interrelated RTDI policies are horizontally 
not contradictory, even ideally complementary with each other and offer no 
contradicting incentive structures which feed the dynamic development of 
the innovation system. In short, we assume it is the responsibility of the 
government to improve the 
institutions inside the 
government to coordinate 
and maintain the vertical and 
horizontal consistencies of 
RTDI policies during the 
policy - making process.  
 
The third underlying 
theoretical block is 
established upon the 
literature of comparative 
Figure 3.2 Vertical and horizontal consistencies of interrelated RTDI policies  
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politics and governance. As we described in section 2.3.2, some scholars of 
comparative politics, such as Almond et al (1996), view a government as the 
core of a political system and focus on the internal institutions and actors 
which influence the government’s policy - making process. On the other 
hand, as we described in section 2.3.3, the scholars of governance, such as 
Rhodes (1997) and Kooiman (1993a), consider the policy - making process 
as the process in which the government constantly interacts with the policy 
stakeholders involved in the network of governance. Indeed, both of the 
approaches imply the existence of the boundary of the government which 
distinguishes the inside and the outside world of the government. Both 
approaches also imply the importance of institutions which not only shape 
the relationship between actors inside the government, but also the 
interactions between the government and the actors outside the government. 
Almond et al (1996), influenced by both institutionalism and Easton 
(1965)’s theory of political system, consider institutions and actors as the 
components of the ‘inside world’ of the government and considers the 
activities of interest groups as the interest accumulation ‘outside’ the 
government. While Rhodes (1997:53) proposes that the network of 
governance covers both government and non - governmental actors and 
defines governance as ‘self - organizing network’, she has unreservedly 
implied the existence of the boundary of the government which 
distinguishes the government from non - governmental actors. In addition, 
she has also implicitly implied the structures and institutions which shape 
the interactions of actors in the governance network. According to the 
discussions above, in our conceptual framework shown in Figure 3.1, we 
assume the government itself is the core of the political system which is 
consisted of institutions and actors and is embedded in the network of 
governance formed by both governmental and non - governmental actors. 
The boundary of the government exists and separates the institutions and 
actors inside the government from actors outside the government. The actors 
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inside and the actors outside the government interact between them at all 
stages of the RTDI policy - making process. As pointed out by Almond, 
polity is a constitutional framework which not only shapes the institutions 
inside the government, but also the structures through which stakeholders 
outside the government can enter the policy realm. In short, we assume 
RTDI policies are made through the interactions between the government 
and the stakeholders outside the government which are shaped by 
institutions.  
 
The fourth underlying theoretical block has contributions from the stagist 
approach. Stagists assume that the policy - making process can be divided 
into several stages, yet different proponents of this approach have different 
divisions for stages. For example, Parsons (1995:77) divides the policy - 
making process in seven stages, while May and Wildavsky (1978) only 
consider five stages of the policy - making process. However, as we 
discussed in section 2.3.3.4, we only discuss the stages which are considered 
to be important by more scholars. Therefore, our conceptual framework, as 
shown in Figure 3.1, only divides the RTDI policy - making process into 
four stages: agenda - setting, deciding, implementation and evaluation.  
 
Based on the four theoretical blocks discussed above, we form the details of 
our research questions and the conceptual framework which are described in 
the following sections. Section 3.2 introduces the research questions of the 
whole thesis, and section 3.3 contains the detailed discussion of the 
conceptual framework of RTDI policy - making process. Section 3.4 is the 
conclusion of this chapter.  
 
3.2 The research questions of the whole thesis 
 
In this section, we build up our research questions of the whole thesis. With 
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the acknowledgement that the boundary of the government exists, the 
research questions are established upon the variables inside and outside the 
government, which are supposed to influence the RTDI policy - making 
process. The variables inside the government are polity, horizontal 
coordination and vertical coordination, while the variable outside the 
government is the involvement of external stakeholders. 
  
3.2.1 The research questions for the variables inside the government  
 
Our research questions for the variables inside the government are built 
upon the literature of comparative politics and public management. The 
literature of comparative politics contributes to our research question of 
polity. Since our empirical example is situated within a presidential polity, 
we focus our discussion of polity on presidential polity only. Furthermore, 
the literature of public management contributes to our research questions of 
horizontal coordination and vertical coordination between actors inside the 
government.       
 
3.2.1.1 The research question for presidential polity 
 
Presidential polity is established upon the principle of separation of powers. 
As it is described by Almond et al (1996: 134) and Hague and Harrop 
(2008:309-317, 329), under the presidential polity both the executive branch 
and the legislative branch are separately elected and authorized by people. 
The president directs the government, while the congress plays the roles to 
legislate, authorize the expenditures, scrutinize and oversee the 
government’s policies. The president’s policies must get approvals of the 
congress before being implemented. However, the personnel of the two 
branches are totally separated. Since both the president and the congress are 
elected for a fixed - term and no one is able to bring down another, the 
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presidential polity gives each branch some autonomy to make decisions by 
each own will.            
 
The divided government under presidential polity is frequently discussed by 
the scholars of comparative politics. As we mentioned in section 2.3.2, the 
divided government, as defined by Elgie (2001:3), refers to the situation 
when ‘the president’s party fails to control a majority in at least one house 
of the legislature.’ While we refer to the president’s party to be the ruling 
party, the majority party controlling the congress is referred to be the 
opposition party.  
 
In the divided government, as described by Weatherford (1994), the 
president is difficult to keep his / her policies fully approved by the congress. 
The congress, which is controlled by the opposition party, usually changes 
the contents of policy proposals provided by the president and breaks the 
consistencies of policies. As described by Smith et al (2006:275), the 
congress controlled by the opposition party in most cases has different 
policy priorities and disagrees with the president’s policy preferences. Since 
the congressmen, according to Monsma’s investigation for the congress of 
the United States (1969:142), only vote for their own party, in a divided 
government the majority of congressmen in most cases vote for the policies 
which are against the president’s policy preferences. As depicted by 
Samuels (2007), the ‘dead - lock’ between the congress and the president is 
possible to emerge in the divided government. Indeed, once the dead - lock 
emerges, as described by Weatherford (1994), Cox and McCubbins (2000) 
and Pfiffner (1994), the president should use his / her own leadership to 
persuade and to bargain with the congress. 
    
However, the discussions of the divided government have seldom been 
applied for the analysis of RTDI policies. According to the existing 
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literature, such as Weatherford (1994), Cox and McCubbins (2000) and 
Pfiffner (1994), a divided government is hard to make consistent policies 
because the congress is supposed to break the policy consistencies. Yet, the 
available literature has not discussed how the divided government 
influences the consistencies of RTDI policies. Furthermore, once the 
contents of RTDI policies, in terms of policy objectives and policy 
instruments, are changed by the congressmen, the available literature does 
not express how the changes made by the congressmen influence the extent 
for the RTDI policies to appropriately match the development of NSTIS. 
Since the existing literature does not provide any answer for the 
relationships between the divided government and the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies, here we get our first research question: 
 
Research question 1: How does a divided government under 
presidential polity influence the consistencies and appropriateness of 
RTDI policies?  
 
On the basis of the existing literature we assume that the congress controlled 
by the opposition party may have different priorities for RTDI policies and 
have incentives to change the contents of RTDI policy proposals through 
legislation, authorization of the expenditures and oversight of the 
government’s policies. Once the contents of RTDI policy proposals are 
changed by the congress, the policy objectives of every single RTDI policy 
may be difficult to be vertically complementary with even contradictory to 
the general policy objectives and policy instruments of the whole 
government. The congress may also change the policy objectives of a set of 
interrelated RTDI policies not to be horizontally complementary and even 
be contradictory to each other and offer contradicting incentive structures to 
the innovation system. It is also possible that the congress has different 
policy preferences, policy priorities and may also have different judgment 
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for the appropriateness of RTDI policies. If such a situation occurs the 
president might need to extensively negotiate and if necessary compromise 
with the congress. Under such circumstances the judgment of policy 
appropriateness and the appropriateness of RTDI policies might become 
very difficult to be clearly defined, and the divided government can find it 
very hard to make appropriate RTDI policies which match the development 
of NSTIS.     
 
3.2.1.2 The research questions for actors’ coordination inside the 
government  
 
In the practice of presidential polity, although all policies are issued in the 
name of the president, it is in fact the cabinet which decides and implements 
the majority of policies. As it has been described by Moe (2005: 208) and 
Pfiffner (2005: 244), the practice in the United States is that the president 
only gives managerial directions in the broad sense to the cabinet, while it is 
the cabinet to implement policies towards the president’s directions. Since 
the existing literature has identified the importance of the cabinet under the 
presidential polity, the coordination between actors in the cabinet is 
discussed in this section.  
 
There are two levels of actors in the cabinet, elected politicians at cabinet 
level and the administrators on the agency level, and they have different 
impacts on RTDI policies. The coordination between actors is discussed in 
the following paragraphs.  
 
Elected politicians on the cabinet level play the roles to decide and to 
coordinate the policy objectives and the policy instruments of a set of 
interrelated policies. The elected politicians, as defined by Kingdon (2003: 
27), include the ministers of the cabinet and the heads of particular 
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departments who are directly or indirectly appointed by the president and 
are responsible for the president. 
 
Among the elected politicians, ministers are especially essential in 
coordinating policy objectives and policy instruments and in maintaining the 
consistencies of policies; yet, it is difficult for ministers to achieve 
consensus for coordinating policies. As it has been depicted by Laver and 
Shepsle (1996: 30-32), the departmental egoism of each minister is very 
hard to avoid. Institutionally, each minister is the head of a major 
government department which has formal jurisdiction over a particular set 
of policy area. It is indeed the mission of each minister to lead his / her own 
department promoting policies in the particular policy area. Furthermore, 
the heavy workload of each minister makes him / her only able to 
concentrate on his / her own ministerial business and have little time and 
energy to concern policies which are outside his / her own departments’ 
jurisdiction. In addition, since the resources in the majority of cases are 
allocated along the ministerial lines, the departmental egoism of each 
minister is even deepened due to resource allocation. In the field of RTDI 
policies, as Braun (2008:233) claims, the departmental egoism of ministers 
exists. From Braun’s perspective, even though there are five institutional 
options which may be able to improve the coordination of RTDI policies, 
each institutional option is only feasible if the self - interested ministers are 
able to achieve the inter - ministerial coordination through inter - ministerial 
bargaining. Coordination only occurs if the benefits are higher than costs, 
there is no loser in the game and the identity and organizational routines of 
each ministry are respected. Indeed, even if Six et al (2006:30-31) clearly 
point out that collaborative organizational relationship is the precondition 
for policies to be consistent with each other, and the OECD (1999) describes 
that the government is responsible for coordinating RTDI policies in order 
to maximize its support to the development of the innovation system, the 
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establishment of inter - ministerial coordination is in fact very difficult to be 
achieved. Unless each minister is able to secure their ministries’ benefits in 
the coordination, they have no incentives to coordinate. 
 
However, the existing literature which discusses the inter - ministerial 
coordination provides no clear linkage between the horizontal inter - 
ministerial coordination and the consistencies of RTDI policies, as well as 
the linkage between horizontal inter - ministerial coordination and the 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. Since there are no straight linkages found 
within the existing literature, we get the initial query of our second research 
question: how does the horizontal inter - ministerial coordination influence 
the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies? We assume if 
ministers are difficult to horizontally coordinate with each other, the general 
policy objectives of the whole government may be hard to be formulated, 
and it may also be difficult for the policy objectives of every single RTDI 
policy to be vertically complementary with the general policy objectives. 
Furthermore, if the ministers who decide the policies do not have sufficient 
consensus to coordinate a set of interrelated RTDI policies, the policy 
objectives and policy instruments of these RTDI policies may be difficult to 
be horizontally complementary with each other or may even contradict each 
other. In addition, we assume if ministers don’t form a unified judgment for 
the appropriateness of RTDI policies, one minister may promote some 
policies which might be considered to be inappropriate by other ministers. 
As a result, it might be difficult for the cabinet as a whole to make a set of 
policies which appropriately match the development of a specific NSTIS 
and maximize the government support to it. Nevertheless, according to the 
literature discussed below not only ministers, but also administrators at the 
agency level have difficulties to coordinate with each other. 
 
The administrators at the agency level play the role to implement the 
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contents of policies in order to realize policy objectives. Nevertheless, even 
if the horizontal coordination between administrators is essential for policies 
to be consistently and appropriately implemented, it is difficult for 
administrators to achieve the consensus to horizontally coordinate with each 
other. As it has been described by Elmore (1997:249, 261) when the 
institutions of bureaucracies become larger and more complex, the 
administrators in each agency only concentrate and specialize in the tasks of 
their agency. Departmental egoism of agencies is hard to avoid because 
departments tend to focus on their own sector only. Each agency with 
specific interests frequently competes for relative advantages in the exercise 
of power and the allocation of scarce resources. Six at al (2002) share the 
similar perspective, that within large bureaucracies most civil servants seek 
to maximize not only their budgets, but also the span of their control and 
influence. Indeed, administrators seek to shape the mode of the 
implementation of civil service in order to maximize their discretion. 
According to the analysis of Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993: 68), the 
effective coordination between agencies is only able to be achieved through 
agencies’ mutual adjustment and bargaining. Commands from elected 
politicians which ask agencies to coordinate usually fail. In the context of 
RTDI policies, Braun (2008:235) claims that even though the improvement 
of the coordination at the agency level is one of the possible institutional 
options to improve policy coordination, unless agencies gain benefits or at 
least secure their benefits in the coordination, they have no incentives to 
coordinate with each other to implement RTDI policies.    
 
However, the existing literature provides neither clear linkage between the 
horizontal inter - departmental coordination and the consistencies of RTDI 
policies, nor clear linkage between the horizontal inter - departmental 
coordination and the appropriateness of RTDI policies. Since there are not 
sufficient linkages found within the existing literature, according to the 
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discussions about administrators above, we get the advanced query for our 
second research question: how does the horizontal inter - departmental 
coordination influences the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies? According to the discussions of the existing literature, we assume 
that if the administrators have difficulties to coordinate with each other 
horizontally, RTDI policies are likely to be implemented towards the 
directions which maximize the interests of implementation bodies. Yet, 
these directions for implementation may be neither vertically 
complementary with the policy objectives of a single RTDI policy, nor 
vertically complementary with even contradictory to the general policy 
objectives of the whole government. Furthermore, the directions of the 
implementation of a set of interrelated RTDI policies would not be 
horizontally complementary or even contradictory to each other, because the 
administrators who implement the policies do not have consensus to 
coordinate with each other for the implementation of these policies. In 
addition, we assume if the horizontal inter - departmental coordination 
between administrators fails, the administrators would be difficult to form a 
consensus which clearly recognizes the appropriateness of RTDI policies 
and to implement RTDI policies towards the direction to appropriately 
match the development of NSTIS. Once RTDI policies are implemented 
without administrators’ clear recognition of appropriateness, after being 
implemented, the RTDI policies may be in fact difficult to appropriately 
match the development of NSTIS.  
 
On the basis of the initial and advanced queries of the second research 
question, we establish our second research question as the following:  
 
Research question 2: How does the horizontal coordination between 
actors influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies? 
The actors refer to both elected politicians and administrators.               
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Besides the horizontal coordination, the vertical coordination between 
elected politicians and administrators also deeply influences the 
consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies; yet, vertical 
coordination is difficult to be achieved. When policy objectives and policy 
instruments, which are decided by elected politicians, are delegated to 
administrators for implementation, according to Hogwood and Gunn (1997) 
these policy objectives and policy instruments are hard to be ‘perfectly’ 
executed by administrators.  
  
There are at least two reasons to explain why vertical coordination between 
the top and the down is difficult. First, as analyzed by Lindblom and 
Woodhouse (1993:69, 70), within the large bureaucracies, compared with 
the vast scope of administrators’ activities, elected politicians have only 
limited time which can be devoted to supervise the implementation of 
policies. While administrators, as observed by Almond et al (1996: 135), do 
many adjustments of policies, the majority of administrative adjustments are 
out of the scrutiny of elected politicians. Even if policy objectives and 
policy instruments are distorted when implemented, elected politicians are 
not able to fix the distortion spontaneously. Moreover, administrators have 
their own ‘organizational inertia’ which we define as the situation that 
administrators get used to the administrative routines too much and avoid to 
accept new changes. As described by Elmore (1997: 249), even if elected 
politicians intend to bring major changes in policies, these policies 
frequently suffer the implementation failure because the administrators keep 
doing what they did before. In the context of RTDI policies, we assume if 
elected politicians expect to make changes for RTDI policies, elected 
politicians must give administrators sufficient incentive to adjust and to 
implement these changes, or every new change of RTDI policies is likely to 
be implemented by bureaucratic routines and will most probably suffer 
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implementation failure.  
 
However, the existing literature which discusses the vertical coordination 
between elected politicians and administrators provides no clear linkage 
between the vertical coordination and the consistencies of RTDI policies and 
no clear linkage between the vertical coordination and the appropriateness 
of RTDI policies. Since there are no direct linkages found within the 
existing literature, we get our third research question:   
 
Research question 3: How does vertical coordination between elected 
politicians and administrators influence the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies?    
 
We assume if the vertical coordination between elected politicians and 
administrators is difficult to achieve, even if the policy objectives of every 
RTDI policy decided by elected politicians are vertically consistent with the 
general policy objectives of the whole government, the administrators may 
implement policies towards the directions which are not vertically 
complementary or may even be contradictory to the general policy 
objectives. Furthermore, even if the elected politicians have coordinated the 
policy objectives and the policy instruments of a set of interrelated RTDI 
policies to be horizontally complementary with each other, administrators 
may implement these policies towards the directions which are not 
horizontally complementary with even contradictory to other policy goals. 
In addition, we assume if vertical coordination is difficult to be achieved, 
even if the policy objectives and policy instruments decided by the elected 
politicians are appropriate, after being implemented by administrators the 
policies may be unable to match the development of NSTIS.      
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3.2.2 Research questions for the variable outside the government  
 
Our research question for variables outside the government is mainly 
established upon the research of interest groups and scientists. According to 
the analysis of Kingdon (2003:45), actors outside the government refer to 
the participants who are without formal government positions but look into 
and involve in the policy - making process. These participants include 
interest groups, researchers and academics, media, parties and so on. 
However, not all participants are involved in the network of governance. We 
assume only the participants who perceive that their interests are influenced 
by policies are policy stakeholders. Moreover, since these policy 
stakeholders are external to the government, we also refer them as external 
stakeholders. Since the existing literature discussed in Chapter 2 has 
recognized the interest groups and academics as the most important external 
stakeholders, in this section we only discuss the characters of these two 
stakeholder groups.  
 
Business interest groups which consist of companies are one of the most 
active external stakeholders involved in the policy - making process. The 
scholars of interest group research have high consensus that the incentives 
for interest groups to involve in the policy - making process is out of these 
groups’ self - interests. For example, Chubb (1983: 22) describes that 
interest groups participate in the policy - making process in order to secure 
their benefits from government policies. Bennedsen and Feldmann 
(2002:920) share similar opinions and describe that interest groups lobby 
the government in order to promote policies which fit their interests. Scott 
and Cornelius (2004: 36) also express that interest groups participate in the 
policy - making process in order to avoid policies which threaten and 
infringe their own interests.  
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The capabilities of interest groups to influence policies are different from 
one another. As depicted by Hrebenar and Scott (1982: 32), the potential 
lobbying strength of an interest group is influenced by its memberships. 
High respect, prestige and the status of memberships can be the key to the 
special access to policy makers. Scott (1997: 328-330) has more detailed 
description of the factors which influence the capabilities of interest groups. 
Not only the size of memberships, but also other characters of a group 
would increase its influence in the policy - making process. For example, a 
group with more financial resources, higher capabilities to build coalition 
with other groups, with longer history and better access to congressmen or 
policy makers is more influential to affect the policy preferences than others. 
Moreover, the ways the government is organized also influence the 
capabilities of interest groups to affect the policies. May et al (2005) 
compare the participation of interest groups in the policy - making process 
of Arctic policies in Canada with those in the United States. The authors 
conclude that the presidential polity of the United States in fact gives 
interest groups more opportunities to effect on the policies than the 
parliamentary polity of Canada. Steinmo and Watts (1995) share a similar 
perspective. Through analyzing the empirical case of the national health 
insurance in the United States, the two authors conclude that the presidential 
polity which allows interest groups to influence policies through lobbying 
the congress yields enormous power to interest groups. In short, the 
capabilities of interest groups to influence policies are different due to the 
unequal resources of each interest group and the different organizations of 
the government. Because of the divergent interests of the industry, the 
stronger voices among interest groups presented to the government do not 
always represent the general interests of the whole industry, but partial 
interests of particular larger and richer companies only.  
 
In the context of RTDI policies, according to May et al (2005) participations 
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of interest groups in the policy - making process are able to positively 
increase government’s understanding towards the interests of the whole 
sector and contribute to the coherence of policies or negatively affect 
policies in adverse. While Inzelt (2008) uses the empirical case of Hungary 
to explain how does the involvement of the private sector positively 
contribute to the government’s policy - learning process of STI policies, 
Mogee (1988: 41) uses the empirical experiences of the United States’ 
regulatory, tax and antitrust policies to argue that the diversity and the 
power of interest groups make it difficult to achieve the necessary consensus 
of establishing consistent innovation policies and stimulating innovations 
which are beneficial to all affected parties.  
 
Based on the discussions on interest groups presented above, here we get the 
initial query of our fourth research question: how does the involvement of 
interest groups influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies? We assume only the ‘suitable involvement’ of business interest 
groups should have positive influence on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. What we define as ‘suitable involvement’ 
of business interest groups refers to the situation that the involved interest 
groups are able to represent the general interests of the whole industry and 
help the government to promote consistent and appropriate RTDI policies 
which match the development of the whole industry, rather than particular 
companies only. If the interest groups involved in the policy - making 
process are able to present the general interests of the whole industry to all 
elected politicians, congressmen and administrators, the involvement of 
interest groups would positively help the government as a whole to promote 
vertically and horizontally consistent policies. In addition, we also assume if 
interest groups are able to push the government to link the interests of the 
whole industry to RTDI policies, the involvement of these interest groups 
would ensure that the RTDI policies are decided and implemented with the 
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full knowledge about the conditions of the whole industry. Therefore, the 
likelihood of the appropriateness of the RTDI policies may increase and the 
involvement of these interest groups would increase the appropriateness of 
RTDI policies which match the development of NSTIS.  
 
Besides interest groups, academics, who are also referred to be natural or 
social scientists, are other active external stakeholders involved in the RTDI 
policy - making process. As described by many scholars, scientists 
participate in RTDI policy - making process out of self - interests. For 
example, Tournon (1993: 91) depicts that scientists are heavily laced with 
professional self - interests. They are ambitious promoters and advisers of 
RTDI policies who seek to manipulate the decision - making process to get 
their projects approved and funded. Schooler (1971:218) and Hove (2007: 
813) share similar opinion with Tournon that scientists – just as firms – are 
self - interested actors.  
 
The capabilities of scientists to influence the RTDI policy - making process 
are different from one another. According to Schooler (1971:7-8), there are 
several factors to shape the influence of scientists in the policy - making 
process. The scientists who do not face the hostile competition of other 
scientists belong to a particular scientific field, have a higher degree of 
expertise in this field and therefore have higher influence than others. 
Schooler (1971:218) further points out that the scientific community is not 
unified but fragmented, pluralistic and constantly divided. In addition, the 
ways the government is organized also influence the capabilities of 
scientists to affect the policies. As depicted by Rich (2005:204-220), in the 
presidential polity the influence of scientists is high because they are able to 
affect policies from both sides of policy makers and the congress. In other 
words, as with industry, the capabilities of different scientists to influence 
the policies are different because of the unequal influence of each scientist 
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and the different ways for the government to be organized. Due to the 
fragmentation of the scientific community, the stronger voices among the 
scientific community do not necessarily represent the general interest of the 
whole scientific community, but the partial interests of particular scientists 
in a particular field only.  
 
The participations of scientists in the policy - making process are able to 
positively increase or negatively reduce the government’s understanding 
towards the interests of the whole scientific community. Pollitt 
(2006:260-261) considers scientists’ positive impacts on policies because 
scientists play the roles to provide innovative solutions to existing problems, 
to help policy makers to clarify policy issues and so on. On the other hand, 
Tournon (1993:91) and Barker and Peters (1993: 9) point out the negative 
impact of scientists on RTDI policies. Tournon uses the empirical examples 
of French and German governments’ policies of funding radiation facilities 
to explain how scientific advisors lead the states to be ‘blind investors’ in 
funding research. Barker and Peters also describe that if a government 
chooses to accept the status quo of advice too readily it harms the 
government’s policy at an earlier stage of scientific development.  
 
Based on the analysis about the role of scientists in the policy-making 
process as seen in the existing literature, here we get an advanced query of 
our fourth research question: how does the involvement of scientists 
influences the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies? We 
assume only the ‘suitable involvement’ of academics would positively 
influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. The 
‘suitable involvement’ of academics is defined as the situation that the 
involved academics are able to represent the general interests of the whole 
scientific community and help the government to promote consistent and 
appropriate RTDI policies which match the development of the whole 
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scientific community, rather than particular scientists only. From our point 
of view, if the scientists involved in the RTDI policy - making process could 
present the general interests of the whole scientific community to all related 
actors inside the government, the involvement of scientists would positively 
support the government and would promote the RTDI policies which are 
vertically and horizontally consistent. In addition, we also assume, if 
scientists could push the interests of the whole scientific community to link 
to RTDI policies, the involvement of these scientists could help the 
government to decide and implement RTDI policies with full knowledge of 
scientific community and therefore positively contribute to the 
appropriateness of RTDI policies.  
  
According to our initial and advanced queries of the fourth research 
question, here we establish our fourth research question: 
 
Research question 4: How does the involvement of external 
stakeholders influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies? The external stakeholders refer to both interest groups and 
scientists.     
 
3.2.3 Brief conclusion of the section 
 
In this section we set up four research questions for the variables which are 
assumed to influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. 
Among the four queried variables, three variables are inside the government, 
i.e. polity, horizontal and vertical coordination of actors, while one variable 
is outside the government, the involvement of external stakeholders. While 
we refer the four queried variables to be the independent variables, we refer 
the two variables, consistency and appropriateness of RTDI policies, to be 
dependent variables. However, in the next section, we are going to link the 
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four independent variables to different stages of the RTDI policy - making 
process.        
 
3.3 The conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making process  
 
The purpose of this section is to identify different stages of RTDI policy - 
making process and to conceptualize the idea that each stage is influenced 
by different independent variables established above. We assume different 
stages of RTDI policy - making process are influenced by different 
independent variables because the governance of each stage is different. As 
we have described in section 3.1 in the conceptual framework shown in 
Figure 3.1, we only divided the RTDI policy - making process into four 
stages. Each of the stages is discussed in the following sections.  
 
3.3.1 The stage of agenda - setting  
 
The stage of agenda - setting, according to Kingdon (2003:196), is the stage 
for elected politicians to decide the agendas of policy proposals and bills. As 
we discussed in section 3.2.1.2, among the elected politicians ministers play 
key roles for the selection of policy agendas.  
 
However, the different modes of interactions between elected politicians and 
external stakeholders have different impacts on the agendas of RTDI 
policies. As described by Smith et al (2006:284) and Kingdon (1993:49), the 
interactions between elected politicians and interest groups deeply influence 
the selection of RTDI policy agendas. On the other hand, as described by 
Pollitt (2006: 259, 262), Topf (1993:109) and Hove (2007:811), the 
interactions between elected politicians and academics also deeply influence 
the selection of RTDI policy agendas. Moreover, besides the direct 
interactions with external stakeholders, elected politicians, as described by 
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Chelimsky (1987), also indirectly learn the feedbacks and interests of 
external stakeholders through the evaluation of policies which have been 
previously promoted.  
 
Indeed, we assume the stage of agenda - setting is the process of mutual 
persuasion between elected politicians and external stakeholders. While 
elected politicians persuade external stakeholders to accept their agendas, 
adopt new changes of policies, even sacrifice parts of the interests of these 
external stakeholders, external stakeholders also persuade elected politicians 
to link their own interests to RTDI policy agendas to maximize their own 
interests. The different extent for the interests of external stakeholders to be 
suitably involved in the RTDI policy agendas affects the extent for RTDI 
policy proposals and bills to be consistent with each other and appropriately 
match the development of NSTIS. 
               
Furthermore, as discussed in section 3.2.1.2 different elected politicians 
belonging to different ministries, especially ministers, have different 
priorities for the selections of RTDI policy agendas, and it is important for 
different ministries to form a set of consistent RTDI policy proposals and 
bills through horizontal inter - ministerial coordination. The administrators, 
as described by Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993: 59), are frequently 
instructed by the elected politicians to draft up the policy agendas. However, 
since the administrators only draft up the agendas under the instructions of 
the elected politicians and it is the elected politicians who play the role to 
authorize the selections of the policy agendas, we consider that it is the 
elected politicians to play the most important role in deciding the agendas of 
RTDI policy proposals and bills. We assume that the different extent for the 
elected politicians of different ministries to horizontally coordinate with 
each other affects the extent for the cabinet as a whole to make consistent 
RTDI policy proposals and bills to appropriately match the development of 
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NSTIS.   
 
In sum, the stage of agenda - setting is influenced by the interactions 
between elected politicians and the interactions between elected politicians 
and external stakeholders. Since elected politicians and external 
stakeholders are the most important actors to influence the stage, among our 
four independent variables, the horizontal coordination and the suitable 
involvement of external stakeholders are assumed to be the main 
independent variables which influence the consistencies and appropriateness 
of RTDI policies in this stage. How do the horizontal inter - ministerial 
coordination between elected politicians and the involvement of external 
stakeholders influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies? We will discuss the question in Chapter 7 when we review our 
empirical cases of Taiwan.  
 
3.3.3 The stage of deciding  
  
The stage of deciding, according to our discussion in section 2.3.3.4, is the 
stage for congressmen to authorize RTDI policy proposals to become formal 
policies and to legislate bills to become laws. Since our empirical example 
belongs to the divided government, in this section we only discuss the stage 
of deciding of RTDI policies in the context of divided government. As 
described by Cox and McCubbins (2005: 1-16) and Weatherford (1994), 
under the divided government the schedules of the congress are controlled 
by the opposition party which has different policy preferences and in most 
cases disagrees with the president’s policy priorities. The more the president 
is able to persuade the congressmen of the opposition party, the more the 
president is able to get his / her policies approved by the congress and to 
maintain the consistencies of his / her policies. The more the president is 
able to form a consensus with the congress for the appropriateness of RTDI 
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policies, the higher the possibilities for the divided government as a whole 
to make appropriate RTDI policies which match the development of NSTIS.  
 
Furthermore, as we described in section 3.2.2 it is the interaction between 
the congressmen of the opposition party and external stakeholders that 
influence the judgment of the congressmen towards particular policy 
proposals and bills. According to Greenwald (1977: 194) and Goldstein 
(1999:36), the interactions between congressmen and interest groups deeply 
influence the judgment of congressmen towards particular policy proposals 
and bills. On the other hand, as described by Schooler (1971: 259-260) and 
Ricci (1993:165), the interactions between congressmen and academics also 
deeply influence the judgment of congressmen towards particular policy 
proposals and bills. In other words, as in the stage of agenda – setting, both 
interest groups and academics have access and influence the consistencies 
and appropriateness of RTDI policies.  
 
In sum, the stage of deciding is influenced by the interactions between the 
congressmen and the president, as well as the interactions between the 
congressmen and external stakeholders. Since congressmen and external 
stakeholders are the most important actors to influence the stage, among our 
four independent variables, divided government and the involvement of 
external stakeholders are assumed to be the main variables which influence 
the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies in this stage. How do 
the divided government and the suitable involvement of external 
stakeholders influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies? We will discuss this question in Chapter 7.  
 
3.3.4 The stage of implementation 
 
The stage of implementation, according to Lane (1997), is the stage for 
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administrators to implement policies and to realize the policy objectives. As 
we discussed in section 3.2.1.2, administrators are difficult to horizontally 
coordinate with each other and tend to implement RTDI policies towards the 
directions which maximize their own interests. Yet, the directions may be 
neither consistent nor appropriate to the development of NSTIS. Moreover, 
even if RTDI policies decided by elected politicians are consistent and 
appropriate, administrators are difficult to ‘perfectly’ implement these 
policies because of their difficulties to vertically coordinate with elected 
politicians. Although the elected politicians may be able to correct the 
distortion of implementation, in fact, as described by Lindblom and 
Woodhouse (1993: 69), compared with the vast scope of administrative 
activities, the elected politicians only have limited time to devote to monitor 
the implementation of policies. Therefore, we consider that the 
administrators play the most important role in the implementation of RTDI 
policies. However, we assume not all RTDI policies get the same degree of 
implementation. Besides the vertical and horizontal coordination, different 
modes of interactions between administrators and external stakeholders 
make some RTDI policies better implemented than others.  
 
Administrators interact with external stakeholders frequently during the 
implementation of policies. As depicted by Sabatier (1993) and Chubb 
(1983: 220), the interactions between administrators and interest groups 
deeply influence the extent for RTDI policies to be implemented. On the 
other hand, as described by Finegold (1995:30) and Pollitt (2006:262), the 
interactions between administrators and academics also deeply influence the 
extent for RTDI policies to be implemented. The involvement of external 
stakeholders in fact influences the directions of the implementation of RTDI 
policies.  
 
In summary, the stage of implementation is influenced by the interactions 
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between administrators and elected politicians, the interactions between 
administrators, as well as the interactions between administrators and 
external stakeholders. Since the administrators on the agency level and 
external stakeholders are the most important actors to influence the stage, 
among our four independent variables, horizontal coordination, vertical 
coordination and the involvement of external stakeholders are assumed to be 
the main variables which influence the consistencies and appropriateness of 
RTDI policies in this stage. How do the horizontally inter - departmental 
coordination between administrators, the vertical coordination between 
elected politicians and administrators and the involvement of external 
stakeholders influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies? We will discuss the question in Chapter 7.  
 
3.3.5 The stage of evaluation 
 
The stage of evaluation, according to Meyer-Krahmer (1988:121), Arnold 
(2004) and Miles and Cunningham (2006: 162), is the stage to examine and 
assess the effects of RTDI policies on the development of innovation 
systems. As depicted by Palumbo (1983b), the ideal evaluation should be 
done by neutral evaluators and as described by Parsons (1995:569), through 
the feedback loop, the results of evaluation become the new inputs of policy 
agendas in the new cycle. We assume if evaluations are able to be done 
properly and truly reflect the responses of external stakeholders towards 
policies, they contribute to the consistencies and appropriateness of new 
RTDI policies which are made in the new policy cycle.  
 
However, in the stage of evaluation, since all of the RTDI policies are 
already implemented, we assume none of our independent variables are able 
to change the contents of RTDI policies to be more consistent or 
appropriately match the development of NSTIS. Yet, the proper evaluation 
 107
of policies will contribute to the new RTDI policies which are expected to 
be more consistent and appropriately match the development of NSTIS.               
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, we established the research questions for the whole thesis 
and the conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making process. The 
research questions and the conceptual framework are established upon four 
independent variables and two dependent variables. The four independent 
variables are divided government, the horizontal coordination, the vertical 
coordination and the involvement of external stakeholders. The two 
dependent variables are consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. 
In different stages of the RTDI policy - making process, there are different 
independent variables which have different impacts on the two dependent 
variables. How do the four independent variables influence the two 
dependent variables in different stages of the RTDI policy - making process? 
In order to answer the question we are going to apply the conceptual 
framework for analyzing the empirical cases in Taiwan in Chapter 6. 
Nevertheless, before opening the discussions of the empirical cases we first 
introduce our methodology for collecting the empirical data in the next 
chapter, Chapter 4.    
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the research methodology chosen and the research 
techniques designed to collect the empirical data in order to answer our 
research questions. In Chapter 2 we have established the concept of NSTIS 
and have explained the reasons why we choose the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies as our empirical cases. Moreover, 
in Chapter 3 we have established the research questions and the conceptual 
framework of the whole thesis. Before we start to analyze the empirical 
cases of Taiwan through the perspectives of NSTIS and our conceptual 
framework in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, in this chapter we firstly introduce 
our research design and the methods used to collect the empirical data.   
 
Both the research methodology and research techniques intend to 
operationalize our definition of the two dependent variables of the 
conceptual framework, the consistencies and the appropriateness of RTDI 
policies. The consistencies of the RTDI policies, as defined in section 3.1, 
refer to both the vertical and horizontal consistencies. The vertical 
consistencies are defined by two aspects. The policy objectives of every 
RTDI policy are vertically complementary with the general policy 
objectives of the whole government; every RTDI policy is implemented 
towards the directions which are vertically complementary with these 
general policy objectives. The horizontal consistency refers to the conditions 
that the policy objectives and the policy instruments of a set of interrelated 
policies are not horizontally contradictory, even ideally complementary with 
each other. According to our definition of policy consistencies, empirical 
data are collected in order to identify the general policy objectives of the 
Taiwanese government, as well as the vertical and horizontal consistencies 
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between different policies. Moreover, the appropriate RTDI policies are 
defined as the policies which foster the development of a specific NSTIS in 
terms of supporting the underlying logic of knowledge accumulation and 
exploitation in a particular technological field, clustering actors’ networks, 
and encouraging the production and innovation of a particular set of 
products. On the basis of the definition of the appropriateness, our data are 
collected in order to understand the appropriateness of the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies on the development of the three 
biotechnology related NSTIS.     
 
The chapter is structured in the following way. Section 4.2 discusses the 
research design, including the rationale of case studies, the analytical units 
and the selection of the cases. Section 4.3 describes the methods for the 
collection of data. Section 4.4 introduces the presentation and analysis of the 
data. Section 4.5 is the conclusion of the chapter.                   
 
4.2 Research design   
 
4.2.1 The rationale for case studies and multiple case study design 
 
This thesis adopts the case study as the most important methodology 
because we consider that the case study is able to properly address our 
research questions. As described by Yin (2009: 8), the research methodology 
should be chosen according to the types of research questions. Although 
there are a number of methodologies used in the social science research 
such as surveys, experiments and case studies, for the research questions 
which query ‘how’ and ‘why’, the case study is one of the most suitable 
methodologies to use. Since all our four research questions focus on ‘how’ 
the four independent variables influence the consistencies and 
appropriateness of the RTDI policies, we consider the case study is the most 
 110
suitable methodology to be adopted. 
 
We adopt the research design of multiple case studies. As described by 
Herriot and Firestone (1983), the evidence derived from multiple case 
studies is usually recognized to be more persuasive than the single case 
study, and the overall research is thus regarded as more robust. We fully 
agree with Herriot and Firestone. In order to increase the persuasiveness of 
our thesis and fully explore the dynamics of the policy - making process, we 
adopt the ‘two case design’. The analytical unit is introduced in the next 
section.        
         
4.2.2 The analytical unit and the selection of cases  
 
The analytical unit used in the thesis is the policy. As described by Yin 
(2009: 29), the analytical units are selected according to the research topic. 
The possible analytical units include single individuals, programs, decision 
and so on. Among the possible analytical units, the policies are frequently 
chosen as analytical units for the comparisons with each other. For example, 
Ammons et al (2001) compare the performance of three programs 
implemented by the government of the United States, and Fernandez and 
Fabricant (2000) also compare two programs implemented by the 
government of Florida to support children. Since our focus is the policy - 
making process of RTDI policies, we consider the policies are the most 
suitable analytical units. Each policy is an analytical unit. In our ‘two case 
design’, each of the two cases refers to a specific policy.  
 
In our ‘two case design’, the two cases are the National Program and the 
regulation policies; however, each of the two cases contains two to three 
mini - cases. In the case of the National Program there are three mini-cases, 
i.e. two National Programs directed to support the development of the 
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pharmaceutical sector and one National Program directed to support the 
development of the agricultural sector. In addition, the case of the regulation 
policies contains two mini - cases, the Law and the Management Act. 
Indeed, as we are going to show in Chapter 6 there were many 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies promoted by the Taiwanese 
government between 2000 and 2008. Instead of discussing every single 
policy, we only choose two cases and discuss them deeply. The National 
Program and the regulation policies are chosen as the two cases because of 
two reasons. First, both of the policies were promoted across different 
sectors. The National Programs were promoted to support the 
pharmaceutical and the agricultural sectors, and the regulation policies were 
directed towards all the three biotechnology and related sectors. Since a part 
of the theme of our thesis is the linkage between the policy - making process 
and the contents of RTDI policies, through comparing the two cases we are 
able to observe how the policy - making process embedded in the different 
context of NSTIS is shaped and how the shaped policy - making process 
makes the contents of RTDI policies towards different sectors to be different 
from each other. Second, both of the two policies have been promoted from 
2000 to 2008. The appropriateness of each of the two policies has been 
continuously accumulated during the eight years. Since a part of the theme 
of our thesis is to analyze the appropriateness of RTDI policies, the two 
policies provide us excellent empirical examples to observe the accumulated 
appropriateness of both and to analyze it.   
 
Five kinds of actors involved in the policy - making process of the two 
policies were approached and asked to identify their roles in the different 
stages of the two policies. The five kinds of actors, according to our 
discussion in Chapter 3, are represented by: three kinds of actors inside the 
government (elected politicians, congressmen of the opposition party and 
administrators) and two kinds of actors external to the government 
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(companies and scientists). The majority of interviewees are the five kinds 
of actors who have involved in the policy - making process of our two cases. 
However, we don’t constrain ourselves in interviewing the actors involved 
in the two policies only. In order to explore the deeper underlying linkage 
between the two policies and other interrelated policies, we also interviewed 
several actors who were deeply involved in other interrelated policies but 
only indirectly involved in the policy - making process of the two policies, 
such as the actors involved in the business park policies which were the 
interrelated policies of the National Programs.  
  
4.3 The collection of data 
 
The case studies, as described by Yanow (2007:422) and Hakim (2000:61), 
are based on multiple sources of data, including qualitative in-depth 
interviews, the analysis of documents and the quantitative data. Our case 
studies on the two policies are also based on multiple sources. Our methods 
to collect the first - hand resources and the second - hand resources are 
introduced below.       
 
4.3.1 The methods to collect first - hand resources 
 
4.3.1.1 Interviews 
 
We adopt the qualitative methods to collect the first - hand resources. As 
described by Hakim (2000:34), the qualitative resources concern about 
actors’ accounts of their attitudes, motivations, and behaviours. Sadovnik 
(2007:433) also describes that qualitative research is useful for describing 
complex phenomena in the public policies. However, from Yang’s 
perspectives (2007: 349), the quantitative methods are used for 
demonstrating the relationships between the policy designs and policy 
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outcomes, for evaluating the magnitude of the effects of policies and for 
finding better alternatives. Since the focus of this thesis is about the actors’ 
interactions, motivations and their behaviours in the policy - making process, 
we consider that the qualitative research methods are the most suitable 
methods for us to collect the first - hand resources. We also concern with the 
appropriateness of policies which, as we have describe in section 3.1, is 
more suitable to be demonstrated by the quantitative methods. The 
quantitative economic indicators which show the short-term effects of 
policies would help us to judge the extent for the policies to appropriately 
match the development of NSTIS. However, since some first - hand 
resources, such as the government documents, already provide the reliable 
quantitative data, we adopt the quantitative data from these first - hand 
resources rather than gathering the data by ourselves.                 
 
In - depth personal interview is the qualitative method for us to collect data. 
As recognized by McNabb (2002:94, 294), the in - depth personal interview 
is used frequently by the researchers of public policies to probe the detailed 
information. We also consider two functional reasons to conduct the in - 
depth interviews. First of all, all the interviewees we tended to interview, 
such as the elected politicians, congressmen and the managers in companies, 
are usually extremely busy. Personal interviews are more feasible to fit 
interviewees’ busy schedules and to arrange a suitable time for interviews. 
Second, some information belonging to the interviewees may be sensitive, 
such as the interactions between the congressmen and companies. The 
personal interviews are the ideal conditions to secure the sensitive 
information of the interviewees. Under the conditions, the interviewees may 
be more willing to uncover their real intentions. Because of the two reasons 
in our thesis the in - depth personal interview is the main method to collect 
the qualitative data.  
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The identification of the interviewees is through two processes, the 
document based analysis and the snowballing sample survey. As suggested 
by Carlsson (2000), there are three methods to identify interviewees: (1) 
using proxy populations of a well defined sector, (2) document based 
analysis, and (3) snowballing sample survey. We adopt the document based 
analysis as our main method and adopt the snowballing sample survey as 
our minor method. The document based analysis is adopted as our main 
method to identify the interviewees. In the cases of both the National 
Programs and the regulation policies, many actors participated in the two 
policies are clearly listed on the official websites of these policies or on the 
official website of the implementation bodies of these policies. For example, 
each of the three National Programs has clearly listed the names of the 
elected politicians, the administrators, the academic representatives and the 
pharmaceutical and agricultural representatives who were involved in the 
policy - making process of the National Programs. Moreover, the meeting 
records of the Legislative Yuan also show the congressmen who have 
monitored the policy proposals of the National Programs and legislated the 
bills of the regulation policies. In fact, the official documents related to the 
two policies already help us to identify the majority of actors involved in the 
policy - making process of the two policies. Nevertheless, there are still 
some potential interviewees who are not listed on the documents. For these 
interviewees we use the snowballing sample survey to identify them. Since 
the network of governance of the two policies is relatively small and many 
interviewees know each other, the snowball technique is also effective. For 
example, the pharmaceutical and agricultural companies which transferred 
biotechnologies funded by the National Programs are not listed in the 
documents. Therefore, we ask the elected politicians and the administrators 
of the National Programs to help us identify these companies.  
 
We have in sum interviewed 36 interviewees, and Table 4.1 shows the name 
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lists of our interviewees and their positions. As shown in the table there are 
five kinds of interviewees, the elected politicians, the congressmen of the 
opposition party, the administrators, the companies and the academics. In 
fact, the elected politicians and the administrators are selected from the ones 
who have decided or implemented the two policies. Since there are four 
ministries involved in the policy - making process of the two policies (the 
National Science Council, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the 
Department of Health, the Council of Agriculture), we select our 
interviewees equally from the four ministries and make sure that the mission 
and attitudes of the actors of the four ministries are equally considered. 
Moreover, the congressmen of the opposition party, Kuomintang, are 
selected among the ones who have reviewed the policy proposals of the 
National Programs or authorized the bills of regulation policies from 2000 
to 2008. In addition, academics are selected from the ones who have 
participated in the policy - making process of the National Programs, and 
the companies are selected according to the ecology of the three 
biotechnology related sectors. For the pharmaceutical sector, since both 
MNCs and local SMEs were involved in the policy - making process of the 
National Programs or the regulation policies and there were more SMEs 
playing active roles in the two policies, we interviewed 4 SMEs and 2 
MNCs. For the agricultural sector, as long as the sector is composed of a 
large public company and local private SMEs, we interviewed 1 large public 
company and 5 SMEs. Moreover, for the medical device sector, since the 
sector is composed of local SMEs and the companies of Class II medical 
devices are especially active in the policy - making process of the regulation 
policies, we interviewed 3 local SMEs of Class II medical device.  
                             
All our interviews were semi - structured and guided by our conceptual 
framework. The semi - structured interviews were conducted because, as 
described by Legard et al  (2006), they provide sufficient flexibility to let  
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important issues to emerge while remain within the wild - range of 
parameters of the research boundary. In practice, we included a number of 
structured questions in each of the interviews and several additional 
questions which were tailored to the characters of the interviewees to make 
sure that each interview was able to add to the depth of our analysis. The 
initial questions asked the interviewees to provide a general overview of 
their roles in the two policies. The main part of the questions asked the 
interviewees to describe their interactions with other actors in the different 
stages of the policy - making process such as the occasions, the rationale 
and the modes of interactions. The interviewees were usually asked to 
illustrate some concrete examples. In addition, tailored questions were asked 
about each interviewee’s accounts of his / her attitudes, motivations and 
behaviours in the policy - making process of the two policies.  
 
All the interviews are recorded on MP3 players or computer software and 
typed to be transcripts. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes to 2 hours. 
The key information given by the interviewees was re-confirmed with the 
interviewees and analyzed together with other first - hand resources which 
are discussed in the next section.  
 
4.3.1.2 Government documents 
 
The documents published by the Taiwanese government are very important 
for our analysis of the two cases. As described by McNabb (2002: 295), the 
study of the documents is undertaken to supplement the information 
acquired from interviews. According to our research theme, there are four 
kinds of documents which were published by the Taiwanese government 
that are very important for our analysis.   
 
First of all, the official websites of the three National Programs and the ones 
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of the implementation bodies of the regulation policies are very important 
sources. Through these official websites we are able to find rich first - hand 
resources related to these two policies such as the name list of the actors 
involved in the two policies, the detailed contents of these two policies and 
the detailed clauses of the Law and the Management Act. These official 
websites not only support us to identify the proper interviewees, but also 
assist us to recognize the details of the two policies in terms of the concrete 
policy objectives and policy instruments.  
 
Second, the yearbooks of the biotechnology and related sectors, which are 
edited by different ministries, are essential. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs would publish three important yearbooks each year from 2000 to 
2008, i.e. ‘Year Book of Pharmaceutical Industry’, ‘Year Book of Medical 
Device’ and ‘Biotechnology Industry in Taiwan’. The three series of 
yearbooks have detailed records of the Taiwanese pharmaceutical and 
medical device sectoral development, as well as the technological 
achievements of the Taiwanese biotechnologies during 2000 to 2008. 
However, in the yearbooks edited by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the 
agricultural sector only weighted a minor part in the yearbooks. Moreover, 
the National Science Council has published a series of ‘Science and 
Technology Yearbook’ from 2001 to 2008. The Yearbook has recorded the 
overall development of science and technologies in Taiwan. Since 
biotechnology is a part of the science and technology development in 
Taiwan, the development of biotechnology is also recorded. The Yearbook 
edited by the National Science Council also records some of the 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies promoted by the National 
Science Council, such as the progress and achievements of the National 
Programs. Furthermore, the National Science Council also irregularly 
publishes documents to discuss the Taiwanese agricultural policies and 
technological achievements of agriculture, like the ‘Strategic planning on 
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the development of Taiwan agricultural biotechnology industry’ (STRIC, 
2006). However, there is not a yearbook especially edited for the agriculture 
sector. 
 
Third, the meeting records of Legislative Yuan from 2000 to 2008 are also 
important. They are usually published on the official website of the 
Legislative Yuan. Through the meeting records of Legislative Yuan, the 
interactions between the elected politicians and the congressmen of the 
opposition party are able to be clearly understood. Especially when we tend 
to analyze the process of deciding and the authorization of the two policies, 
the meeting records play an important role in our analysis.  
 
Fourth, the historical archives which were published by the Taiwanese 
government during the 1950s to the 1990s played an important role for us to 
understand the historical evolution of the three Taiwanese biotechnology 
related NSTIS. The historical archives are usually the pieces of policy 
proposals, the documents exchanged between the universities and the 
government, as well as the formally decided policies. These pieces of 
archives extensively contribute to our understanding towards the history of 
the three biotechnology related NSTIS, especially the historical evolution of 
the biotechnology and related sectoral policies, which is going to be further 
discussed in Chapter 5.          
 
4.3.2 The methods to collect second - hand resources   
 
The second - hand resources play relatively minor roles in our research. As 
we have shown in Chapter 2 the literature related to the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and sectoral policies is very limited. Besides a few journal 
articles which we have discussed in Chapter 2, the most important second - 
hand resource is the historical records related to the three biotechnology 
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related NSTIS, such as the ‘The history of pharmacology in Taiwan’, ‘The 
history of Medical College in National Taiwan University’ and so on. We 
will further discuss the literature in Chapter 5.    
 
4.4 Conclusion    
 
The data collected according to the research design will be further analyzed 
in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. While we use the historical archives to analyze 
the evolution of the three biotechnology related NSTIS in Chapter 5, in 
Chapter 6 we will intensively use the data collected from the interviews to 
analyze the policy - making process of the two policies.   
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Chapter 5 The history of the three biotechnology NSTIS in 
Taiwan 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
In Chapter 2, we reviewed the three approaches of innovation systems, i.e. 
the national, the sectoral and the technological innovation systems. While 
the approaches of the national innovation system adopt the national border 
as the boundary of an innovation system, the approach of technological 
innovation system draws the boundary of the innovation system by a 
particular knowledge field, and the approach of sectoral innovation system 
recognises the innovation system boundary as a set of products. The 
configuration of the three innovation systems, as defined in Chapter 2, is the 
national sectoral and technological innovation system (NSTIS).  
 
On the basis of our analysis of NSTIS in Chapter 2, in this chapter we will 
apply the concept of NSTIS for the analysis of the three biotechnology 
related NSTIS in Taiwan from 1945 to 2000. Biotechnology in Taiwan 
indeed co-evolved with different sectors in different modes. Each sector 
provided contrasting opportunities for the development of biotechnology 
and was supported by different types of policies. As we are going to show 
within this chapter, the governance of each of the three sectors was quite 
distinctive to each other. Through analyzing the history of the three 
biotechnology NSTIS, we expect to gain deeper understanding towards the 
different types of policies required by the different biotechnology related 
NSTIS. The historical background is especially important for us to judge the 
appropriateness of the biotechnology and related policies between 2000 and 
2008.      
 
We use the year 1945 and the year 1982 as the two milestones to divide the 
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history of each three NSTIS into two periods: from 1945 to 1982 and from 
1982 to 2000. 1945 was the year for the Japanese government to officially 
return Taiwan to the government of the Republic of China (ROC). After 
1945, Taiwan started to have its own independent history. The Taiwanese 
government announced its biotechnology related policies for the first time in 
1982. After 1982, Taiwan started to have biotechnology related policies. 
Since the general history of Taiwan is essential for us to understand the 
evolution of the three NSTIS, we briefly discuss the general historical 
background of Taiwan below.    
 
The formal name of Taiwan internationally is the Republic of China. From 
1890 to 1945, Taiwan was colonised by Japan. After World War II, in 1945, 
as a defeated nation, Japan was forced to return Taiwan to the government 
of the Republic of China, led by Kuomintang. According to the international 
laws, Taiwan became a part of the Republic of China after 1945. However, 
soon after Taiwan was returned, Kuomintang lost its battles with the 
Chinese Communist Party in mainland China. In 1949, the Chinese 
Communist Party successfully set up the central government of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing, and in the same year, Kuomintang 
moved the central government of the Republic of China to Taipei, Taiwan. 
During 1949 to 1996, Taiwan was ruled by Kuomintang with one-party and 
a semi-autocratic system. In 1996, Taiwan had the first general presidential 
election and the first general congressional election. Since Kuomintang won 
both of the elections in 1996, Taiwan was continuously ruled by the 
one-party system until 2000.  
  
This chapter discusses the history of the three biotechnology related NSTIS 
in turn. Section 5.2 portrays the development of the pharmaceutical NSTIS, 
and section 5.3 focuses on the agricultural NSTIS. The development of 
medical device NSTIS is discussed in section 5.4. Section 5.5 is the 
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conclusion of the chapter.       
 
5.2 The evolution of the pharmaceutical sector  
 
5.2.1 From pre-1945 to 1982 
 
5.2.1.1 Ecology of firms  
 
The pharmaceutical technology of Taiwan was originally introduced by 
Japan. Since 1931, some Japanese pharmaceutical companies set up 
factories in Taiwan to produce pharmaceutical intermediaries and supply the 
demands of the Japanese army. When Taiwan was returned to the Republic 
of China in 1945, there were 312 factories all over the island (Zheng, 2001: 
195). The government of the Republic of China then unified the 312 
factories to be one national pharmaceutical company, Taiwan 
Pharmaceutical Company (台灣省醫療物品公司). Later, because of the 
financial deficits, the Taiwan Pharmaceutical Company gradually sold all of 
its factories to different private firms (DCB, 2003: 208). The sector, which 
was once institutionally unified by the public sector, was then split by the 
private companies.   
 
Local private companies were gradually developed, and some small local 
private pharmacies used the rough facilities to synthesise simple 
pharmaceutical intermediaries in their backyards since the colonisation of 
Japan (Zheng, 2001: 196). These small local pharmacies were gradually 
developed to be small family-operated factories. Moreover, since the 
government of the Republic of China moved its central government from 
China to Taiwan, some Chinese pharmaceutical companies also followed 
the government and relocated their factories in Taiwan around 1950. Both 
the original Taiwanese companies and the newly immigrated Chinese 
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companies were limited in employees and capitals. Some firms with higher 
capabilities were able to get technology transfers from the Japanese or 
German companies and manufactured the pharmaceutical intermediaries 
with higher qualities (Ding, 2001: 232). Yet, the majority of local 
companies had very limited capital and technological capabilities to develop 
complex products but manufactured low-end intermediaries that had high 
similarities. Besides manufacturing intermediaries, some local firms 
imported higher end intermediaries from abroad and processed them as 
generic medicines. However, whether it was the companies of 
pharmaceutical intermediaries or those of generic medicines, their products 
overlapped. The knowledge base of all these firms was chemical 
engineering, as biotechnology was not introduced to the pharmaceutical 
sector. In addition, because of the small size of these companies, they were 
unable to innovate or to export their products but competed with each other 
in the domestic market on a price-base. Knowledge transfer and 
collaboration between companies was minimal. Competition was the 
mainstream for the interactions of these companies.  
 
Only after 1960, multinational pharmaceutical giants who were attracted by 
the government’s policies and the low cost of manufacturing began to invest 
in Taiwan. Most of these MNCs were from Japan and the United States, 
such as Takeda Pharmaceuticals (from Japan) and Pfizer (from the United 
States). The MNCs brought advantageous manufacturing technologies to 
Taiwan, particularly the technologies of chemical engineering for 
pharmaceuticals. With the advantages of technologies and marketing 
capabilities, MNCs shared more than 50% of the domestic market (Zheng, 
2001: 203). 
 
A very minor sub-sector of the pharmaceutical sector was Chinese herbal 
medicine; the local SMEs that were moved from China were the pillars of 
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this sub-sector. In fact, during the colonisation of Japan, due to political 
reasons, the development of Chinese herbal medicines was strictly 
constrained. Only after 1949, when some Chinese herbal pharmacies 
followed the government of the Republic of China and moved their 
pharmacies from China to Taiwan, Taiwan started to use Chinese herbal 
medicines. Later, these Chinese herbal pharmacies gradually set up herbal 
factories (DCB, 2003: 219)4.   
 
The main business of the herbal factories was to use modern machinery 
facilities to process the herbs to create customised Chinese herbal medicines. 
Herbs were decocted, pounded and kneaded by modern machinery facilities. 
Multiple herbs were mixed together by a fixed proportion and became one 
medicine. Because of lacking the technologies of extraction, these herbs 
were usually used by their whole entities. Biotechnology was not yet 
applied for the manufacturing of Chinese herbal medicines. Furthermore, 
the functions of each herb were not surveyed in detail by the scientific 
methods. The knowledge accumulated for the functions of each herb was 
based on the records of traditional Chinese pharmacopoeias. The products 
produced by the herbal factories were the herbal medicines, which were 
well recorded in the pharmacopoeias rather than the newly innovative ones. 
The quality controls in these herbal factories were not stable. The majority 
of these factories targeted the domestic market and rarely exported their 
products overseas.    
 
                                                 
4
 Chinese have used herbs as medicines and health food for five thousand years. The 
knowledge accumulation through the history was rich. The knowledge also widely spread 
to adjacent countries, including Japan and Korea. Compared with herbal medicine, Chinese 
have only used Western pharmacology for a hundred years. The traditional Chinese herbal 
medicines were usually compound prescriptions. In other words, the doctor would use 
multiple herbs for one disease. The portion of each herb depended on the conditions of each 
patient. So the traditional Chinese herbal medicine was very personal. Ways to take the 
Chinese herbal medicine include decocting medicinal herbs, pounding the herbs to powder 
and kneading the herbal powders to make pills. Only under the scientific trends from 
Westerners, the Chinese herbal medicine factories started to produce customised herbal 
medicines, including powders and pills.  
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5.2.1.2 Knowledge accumulation and the academic community 
 
The Taiwanese branch of Imperial University, which was changed to be 
National Taiwan University after 1945, was the first university of Taiwan 
and the medical college of the university was the first academic institution 
doing pharmaceutical research. The university was set up by the Japanese 
government, yet, during the colonisation of Japan, there was no 
pharmaceutical college in Taiwan. Also there was no academic institution to 
train the pharmaceutical experts. Indeed, the first generation of pharmacists 
was the Taiwanese students trained in Japan. These Taiwanese pharmacists 
introduced the pharmaceutical knowledge from Japan to Taiwan (Zheng, 
2001).  
 
After 1949, some Chinese universities followed the government of the 
Republic of China to Taiwan and rebuilt their campuses in the island; some 
Taiwanese universities also set up locally. The Chinese universities included 
the National Defense Medical Centre. The Taiwanese universities included 
the Taipei Medical University, the Kaohsiung Medical University and the 
China Medical University.  
 
During 1949 to 1966, there were six pharmaceutical colleges built within 
these universities (Zheng, 2001: 3). However, during this period, the main 
purpose of pharmaceutical education was to train qualified pharmacists. The 
research within the universities was rare. Only some particular universities, 
such as the National Taiwan University, did some initial research about 
pharmaceuticals, including the chemical medicines and Chinese herbal 
medicines (NTU, 2000: 49). Biotechnology was not formally introduced to 
the universities that were doing pharmaceutical research. Moreover, while 
the universities gradually accumulated fundamental knowledge related to 
chemical pharmaceuticals and Chinese herbal medicines, the knowledge 
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was not transferred to the pharmaceutical companies that emphasised 
manufacturing. Indeed, the only occasion for the scholars in the universities 
to practice their knowledge was to help the government sett up regulation 
policies in order to control the qualities of pharmaceuticals (Zheng, 
2001:203), especially the qualities of medicines.  
 
5.2.1.3 National institutions and related policies  
 
During this period, the Taiwanese government was led by Kuomintang and 
operated the one-party and semi-autocratic system. There was no historical 
evidence showing that the government consulted related stakeholders before 
making any decisions. The main purpose of policies was to encourage and 
to control the manufacturing activities of pharmaceutical sector. The main 
policies promoted by the government were the regulation policies and 
policies attracting FDI. The minor policies promoted by the government 
were the R&D policies. Each policy is discussed below.  
   
The regulation policies were especially promoted to control the 
manufacturing of medicines. To upgrade the manufacturing technologies of 
local SMEs, in 1960, the government committee led by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs formally announced the ‘Taiwanese Standard for 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing’ (台灣省製藥工廠設廠標準). This standard 
classified the pharmaceutical factories into three classes. The ones that fall 
into the lower two classes were told to improve their manufacturing 
facilities or close down. Such policies forced the factories to upgrade their 
manufacturing facilities (Zheng, 2001: 201). Ten years after the promotion 
of the Standard, in 1970, the Law was legislated to control the 
manufacturing activities of pharmaceutical factories and the quality of 
medicines, especially the ones manufactured by the local SMEs. Yet, the 
regulations for Chinese herbal medicines were quite marginalised. In 1971, 
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the Department of Health formed the Committee on Chinese Medicine and 
Pharmacy under the Department. But the committee was formed only to 
answer the queries related to Chinese herbal medicines (Zheng, 2001: 240). 
There was, in fact, no regulation for the product of Chinese herbs.      
 
The FDI policies were extensively promoted to attract the foreign 
investments in the pharmaceutical sector. To increase the manufacturing 
capabilities of the pharmaceutical sector, in 1950 the government launched 
the ‘Statute for Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment ‘(獎勵外人投資條
例, abolished in 1990). In 1961, the government further announced the 
‘Clause for Foreign Investment in Pharmaceutical Intermediaries’ (國外廠
商來台設廠或與我國藥廠技術合作製造維他命等四類藥品注意事項). 
Thus, multinational pharmaceutical companies would receive a tax 
reduction if they manufactured intermediaries in Taiwan or transferred 
technologies to local pharmaceutical firms. Moreover, as long as the MNCs 
manufactured their products in Taiwan, their products would be considered 
to be domestic products. Yet, if the MNCs imported the foreign produced 
pharmaceuticals to Taiwan, these imported products were rigorously 
regulated (Zheng, 2001: 202). 
 
The R&D policies at the time were quite marginalised compared with the 
regulation and FDI policies. In 1973, the National Science Council and the 
Department of Health funded some firms to synthesise several 
pharmaceutical intermediaries to be new intermediaries. But only a few of 
these new intermediaries were produced on a large scale (DCB, 2003: 201).  
 
 
To sum up, during this period, while the production of pharmaceutical 
intermediaries and generic medicines was the main business of the 
pharmaceutical sector, the policies also focused on regulating or supporting 
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the manufacturing of the pharmaceutical companies, especially on the 
manufacturing of medicines. The main knowledge base of the 
pharmaceutical sector was chemical engineering. The development of 
Chinese herbal medicines at the time was quite marginalised both by the 
pharmaceutical companies and by the government’s policies.                      
 
5.2.2 From 1982 to 2000 
 
The pharmaceutical sector gradually used the knowledge base of Chinese 
herbal medicines to develop new herbaceous medicines during this period. 
Modern biotechnology was used by the pharmaceutical sector to extract 
herbal compositions.    
 
5.2.2.1 Ecology of firms 
 
From 1982 to 2000, the ecology of the pharmaceutical sector had radical 
change. With the rising cost of manufacturing in Taiwan and the free trade 
of pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical MNCs gradually sold their 
manufacturing facilities to local companies in the 1990s (DCB, 2003: 209). 
After these sales, MNCs kept only their marketing divisions in Taiwan to 
deal with the issue of importing of medicines and local SMEs gradually 
became the main force of manufacturing.  
 
The main business of local firms did not change so much. Most of the local 
SMEs manufactured pharmaceutical intermediaries or generic medicines. 
To fit the new regulation of ‘Good Manufacturing Practice’ (GMP), the 
manufacturing technologies of local SMEs have been upgraded. Yet, the 
manufacturing technology used by local SMEs was chemical engineering 
rather than biotechnology. Because of their lack of capability to innovate or 
to export, most of the firms still targeted the domestic market and competed 
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with each other on a price base. According to the statistical data in 1995, the 
sales of local SMEs shared 31% of the domestic market, while MNCs 
shared 38%, and the imported medicines shared 31% (Zheng, 2001: 194). 
 
The development of Chinese herbal medicines was relatively quick 
compared with medicines. With the trend to manufacture Chinese herbal 
medicines by scientific methods, the companies of Chinese herbal 
medicines gradually followed the rules of the Good Manufacturing Practice 
to manufacture their products and sold these products in the domestic 
market. Moreover, some companies of Chinese herbal medicines have 
started to establish the networks with academics to develop new herbaceous 
medicines (DCB, 2003: 226). At the time, the strict regulation for clinical 
trials was gradually applied for developing new herbal medicines. Since the 
Taiwanese government had no regulations to review the license of the new 
medicines, all the companies of Chinese herbal medicines followed the 
regulations of the United States’ Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
Each traditional Chinese herbal medicine was made by multiple 
compositions of different herbs. Yet, to fit the regulation of the United 
States’ FDA, each new herbaceous medicine was made by a single 
composition extracted from a particular herb. Indeed, the companies that 
invested in the innovation of Chinese herbal medicines only did detailed 
research related to these single herbal extracts. Modern biotechnology was 
applied for extracting the functional ingredients of the herbs. Furthermore, 
modern biochemistry, which was introduced by the scientists trained in the 
United States, was applied for the deeper analysis of the medical functions 
of single herbal extracts, such as the chemical activities of the herbal 
extracts. Yet, there was no new herbaceous medicine successfully developed 
during this period.    
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5.2.2.2 Knowledge accumulation and the academic community 
 
Since the 1980s, the pharmaceutical research within the academic 
community was developed more and more. Unlike the old generation of 
pharmaceutical researchers, who were trained by the Japanese system, the 
younger generation was trained by the United States’ system and transferred 
pharmaceutical related knowledge (such as molecular biotechnology and 
biochemistry) from the United States to Taiwan. These scholars trained by 
the United States gradually became the pillars of academic community in 
pharmaceutical schools. In 1980s, the main function of the pharmaceutical 
school was still training qualified pharmacists. With the gradually matured 
environment for the pharmaceutical research, some universities, like 
National Taiwan University, started to provide postgraduate degrees in the 
early 1990s and trained local pharmaceutical researchers (Zheng, 2001: 80, 
81).  
 
There has been initial research for small molecular medicines and Chinese 
herbal medicines within the academic community since the 1980s. For the 
research of small molecular medicines, the National Science Council 
usually funded this research and the research interests of individual scholars 
chose the research topics. Collaborations between different academics were 
rare. Even though the scientists had related research interests, they had very 
limited cooperation with each other. For the research of Chinese herbal 
medicines, out of the demand of regulation, the Department of Health 
funded Kaohsiung Medical University and Taipei Medical University to 
survey the herbs of Taiwan (Zheng, 2001: 242). But such surveys were just 
to serve the policy expectations and were not considered to be 
commercialized. 
 
During 1980s, universities had limited interactions with the industry, and it 
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was public funded research organizations under the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs who played the roles as intermediary organizations between the 
universities and industry. Due to the regulation policy of the human 
resources of academics, the interactions between the universities and 
pharmaceutical firms were forbidden. The Taiwanese government in fact set 
up major institutional constraints in the commercialisation of university 
research. Since universities were not supposed to directly interact with firms, 
the Development Centre of Biotechnology of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs was set up in 1984 to apply the small molecular research from the 
universities for developing new medicines and then transfer such 
technologies to local firms. However, because the majority of 
pharmaceutical companies that manufactured pharmaceutical intermediaries 
or generic medicines were unable or unwilling to develop new medicines, 
the Development Centre of Biotechnology gradually became the research 
centre for developing pharmaceutical intermediaries (Ding, 2001: 229). The 
condition only changed after the late 1990s when more firms tried to 
develop new herbaceous medicines. Besides, the Industrial Technology 
Research Institute under the Ministry of Economic Affairs has helped local 
SMEs upgrade their manufacturing facilities in order to fit the regulation of 
Good Manufacturing Practice.             
 
5.2.2.3 National institutions and related policies  
 
During 1980s and the early 1990s, the Taiwanese government still operated 
the one-party and semi-autocratic system led by Kuomintang. But with the 
trend of democratisation and the participation in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the Taiwanese government gradually needed to 
involve the interests of external stakeholders and the game rules of 
international institutions within the policies. Taiwan had the first general 
presidential and congressional elections in 1996. Since Kuomintang won 
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both of the elections, the Taiwanese government was able to continue all the 
policies promoted before. The legislative branch, the Legislative Yuan, 
remained stable and the executive branch was still the main body making 
decisions. The policies gradually encouraged the innovation within the 
pharmaceutical sector. The main policies promoted during this period 
included the ‘Eight Key Industries’, the R&D policies, regulation policies 
and the National Health Insurance. Each of the policies is discussed below. 
 
The ‘Eight Key Industries’ announced in 1982 was the first biotechnology 
policy promoted by the Taiwanese government. The Taiwanese government 
for the first time recognized biotechnology as one of the eight key industries 
in which government should invest more resources. However, according to 
the contents of the Eight Key Industries, the development of biotechnology 
was almost equal to the development of pharmaceutical sector whose 
knowledge base was chemical engineering rather than biotechnology. 
Moreover, besides announcing they would invest more in biotechnology, the 
government in fact didn’t promote any concrete policies under the 
framework of the Eight Key Industries5.  
 
The R&D policies were also extensively promoted during this period. Two 
years after the announcement of the Eight Key Industries, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs set up the Development Centre of Biotechnology in 19846. 
The Ministry allocated the majority of its R&D resources to the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute and the Development Centre of 
Biotechnology to play the intermediary roles between universities and 
pharmaceutical companies. However, the majority of technologies 
transferred were chemical engineering rather than biotechnology. Moreover, 
the National Science Council continued funding fundamental biological 
                                                 
5
 See Taiwan’s Biotechnology Policy and Promotion Status: 
http://www.bpipo.org.tw/en/policy.html 
6
 See the mission of the Development Centre of Biotechnology: http://www.dcb.org.tw/  
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research in the universities. In practice, the universities funded by the 
National Science Council did not necessarily have connections with the 
research organizations under the Ministry of Economic Affairs since the 
knowledge base of the two kinds of institutions was different. Only after 
1998, with the initiation of the National Programs, the Taiwanese 
government started to integrate the pieces of research dispersed in different 
universities and research organizations together. Furthermore, the focus of 
R&D policies was also changed. Originally the government only 
encouraged the production of pharmaceutical intermediaries. But after 1998, 
the government started to recognise Chinese herbal medicine as the pillar of 
the pharmaceutical sector and encouraged the development of new 
herbaceous medicines. From the perspective of the government at the time, 
the knowledge accumulation of bio-pharmaceuticals in Taiwan was too 
weak to compete with developed countries. But the Taiwanese had strong 
knowledge base of Chinese herbal medicines7. As such, Taiwan should fully 
use the advantages of Chinese herbs to develop the pharmaceutical sector. 
We will further discuss the policies related to Chinese herbal medicines in 
Chapter 6.   
 
The regulation policies were also extensively promoted. In 1982, the 
Department of Health and the Ministry of Economic Affairs formally 
launched the regulations of Good Manufacturing Practice and forced the 
local SMEs to upgrade the manufacturing capabilities. The pharmaceutical 
firms originally objected to the policy. Later since the government has 
persuaded the representatives of the pharmaceutical associations, the 
associations became the assistant of the government to urge their members 
to accept the policy of the government (Zheng, 2001: 193, 229). The 
majority of local SMEs finally accepted the regulation of Good 
                                                 
7
 See the introduction to the background of The National Science and Technology Program 
for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals: 
http://npbp.m-w.com.tw/tw/pageContent.php?id=11&catalog_id=0 
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Manufacturing Practice. In addition, the Patent Act was amended in 1985 
and 1994 under the pressure of the United States’ ‘Trade Act of 1974’ and 
the pressures of the pharmaceutical MNCs from the United States. The 
Taiwanese Patent Act, which only offered protections to the patents of 
pharmaceutical process, was forced to extend its protection to the patents of 
pharmaceutical products (Ding, 2001: 228). 
 
The National Health Insurance was promoted in 1996 under the Department 
of Health. More than 90% of the medical institutions were covered by the 
health insurance system8. Because of the reimbursement of medicines, the 
government became the largest buyer of medicines in the domestic market. 
The policy brought major change in the domestic market. The National 
Health Insurance reimbursed higher prices for the new or patented 
medicines than the generic medicines. The policy in fact seriously squeezed 
the interests of domestic pharmaceutical companies.  
 
The policies of international trade were also promoted. Tariff was used as 
the policy instrument in the early 1980s to develop pharmaceutical 
intermediaries. In 1981, the Ministry of Economic Affairs consulted the 
Department of Health, the National Science Council, pharmaceutical 
companies and academics and announced the ‘Administrative Rules of 
Encouraging Production of Pharmaceutical Intermediaries’ (促進國內原料
藥實施要點). These rules temperately upgraded the tariff of pharmaceutical 
intermediaries to 10% and adopted the fast routes for the approvals of 
manufacturing. The policy was promoted from 1982 until 1994. After 1994, 
because of preparing for the application of WTO, the policy was suspended 
(Zheng, 2001: 213). 
 
As such, during this period, the development of the pharmaceutical sector in 
                                                 
8
 See the National Health Insurance Profile 
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1980s and 1990s had dramatic differences. In the 1980s, the knowledge 
accumulation within the sector was in the manufacturing of pharmaceutical 
intermediaries and generic medicines. Even though the Taiwanese 
government announced to support biotechnology in 1982 in the Eight Key 
Industries, the government indeed tended to encourage pharmaceutical 
sector to adopt more chemical engineering rather than biotechnology. Only 
after late 1990s, the sector gradually started to discover new herbaceous 
medicines and configure the Western-based knowledge of biology and 
biochemistry with the traditional Chinese knowledge of herbs. The policy 
focus also turned from pharmaceutical intermediaries to new medicines. The 
government’s policies gradually turned to encourage the development of 
new herbal medicines rather than merely the manufacturing of 
pharmaceutical intermediaries and generic medicines.        
                         
5.3 The evolution of agricultural sector 
 
The agricultural innovation system in Taiwan could be categorized into four 
sorts: seed, food industry, pesticide industry and fertilizer industry.     
 
5.3.1 From pre-1945 to 1982 
 
During this period, rice and sugar were the two most important agricultural 
products for exporting. Traditional biotechnology of hybridization was 
applied for the seed innovation, while the industries of food, pesticide and 
fertilizer remained to use the knowledge base of machinery processing.   
 
5.3.1.1 Agricultural innovation system 
     
The Taiwanese innovation system of seeds was originally set up by the 
Japanese government and further developed by the government of the 
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Republic of China in 1945. The research organizations within the 
Agricultural Experiments Station system, including the Agriculture 
Research Institute and the Agricultural Experiments Stations, were the most 
important organizations for seed innovation. These research organizations 
were fully funded by the Japanese government before 1945 and by the 
government of the Republic of China after 1945. Indeed, since the Japanese 
colonization, to feed the population of Japan, the Japanese government has 
introduced the seeds of the Japanese rice to Taiwan. To plant the Japanese 
rice under the subtropical climate of Taiwan, the research organizations of 
the Agricultural Experiments Station system (typically shortened to be the 
Agricultural Stations) used the traditional biotechnology of hybridization to 
improve the genes of Japanese rice by the genes of the Taiwanese rice. 
Japonica which looked and tasted like Japanese rice but grew well under the 
subtropical climate of Taiwan was the representative of the new rice. 
Moreover, not only rice, the experts of Agricultural Stations also did genetic 
research of subtropical fruits and vegetables, such as sugar cane and tea. In 
addition, besides doing research, the Agricultural Stations also trained some 
of the Taiwanese students within these organizations (Lin, 1995:2). After 
Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China in 1945, the government of 
the Republic of China replaced the Japanese government to fully fund the 
Agricultural Stations. After 1949, except the original Taiwanese experts, 
some Chinese experts who followed the government of the Republic of 
China and migrated from China to Taiwan also became the pillars of the 
researchers in the Agricultural Stations. The knowledge of hybridization 
which was accumulated by the Japanese scientists was further developed by 
the Taiwanese experts (Su, 2004:18), especially in the rice research. 
 
After the seeds were innovated by the Agricultural Stations, the Agricultural 
Stations should pass the seeds to the Farmers’ Association. The Farmers’ 
Association was founded by the Japanese government to control the 
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production activities of farmers. One of the main responsibilities of the 
Farmers’ Association was to disseminate the seeds of the Agricultural 
Stations to individual farmers. After 1945, the government of the Republic 
of China substituted the Japanese government to govern the Farmers’ 
Association (Liu, 1996:188). While every farmer held a small farm and did 
intensive cultivation within the small area, these farmers got the seeds 
through the Farmers’ Association for free. Indeed, in the innovation system 
of seeds, farmers were treated as the pure producers who had only limited 
knowledge accumulation related to cultivation. The experiences of farmers 
seldom fed back to the Agricultural Stations. It was the constraint of the 
innovation system of seeds to let the experts of the Agricultural Stations to 
understand the experiences of the cultivation and to improve the next 
generation of seeds. Furthermore, most of the crops, especially rice, were 
exported to foreign markets. Farmers who cultivated to serve the overseas 
demands got rewards only from the sales of their harvests. However, the 
rewards for farmers were only sufficient for their survivals but not sufficient 
for them to reinvest in the seed innovation.  
 
There were some small local private seed companies which played 
supplementary roles in the innovation of seeds. These companies usually 
aimed at innovating the specific kinds of seeds and sold these seeds to 
farmers. For example, Known-You Seed Cooperation was the company 
which particularly innovated the seeds of watermelons (Cai, 2007). The 
technology used by the private companies to improve the genes of seeds 
was the traditional biotechnology of hybridization which was also used by 
the Agricultural Stations. However, compared with the public funded 
Agricultural Stations, the private SMEs were only able to play minor roles 
in the seed innovation. Moreover, through the Taiwanese agricultural history, 
multinational companies, such as Monsanto, played no role in the seed 
innovation.  
 139
 
Besides seeds, the industries of food, pesticide and fertilizer also developed 
(Chang, 1982:237, 255). The market of each industry was different. 
Plantation white sugar was central to the food processing industry. Taiwan 
Sugar Corporation which was set up by the Japanese government in 1900 
and later fully invested by the government of the Republic of China was not 
only the public but also the first and the largest agricultural company in 
Taiwan. The company’s original business was to process sugar cane by 
modern machinery facilities and exported to foreign markets. Later, the 
company expanded its business to the production of chemical pesticides and 
fertilizers (TSC, 2006), and the majority of its products of chemical 
pesticides and fertilizers served with the domestic demands. Furthermore, 
there were also some local small and medium companies of food, pesticide 
and fertilizer surrounded Taiwan Sugar Corporation. They usually target the 
domestic markets which were not yet dominated by Taiwan Sugar 
Corporation, and a few of the private companies started to use 
biotechnology to improve their products. For example, Wei-chuan has used 
the technology of fermentation to produce monosodium glutamate (Lee and 
Hua, 2004:114) and exported to overseas markets. Yet, compared with 
Taiwan Sugar Corporation, these private companies only played auxiliary 
roles in the innovation of food, pesticides and fertilizers.                          
                 
5.3.1.2 Knowledge accumulation and the academic community 
 
The Agricultural College of Imperial University which was changed to be 
National Taiwan University after 1945 was built up by the Japanese 
government and was the most important academic institution doing 
fundamental agricultural research; and the Agricultural Stations were the 
most important research institutions doing applied agricultural research. The 
headquarters of the Agricultural Stations was first built up next to National 
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Taiwan University. The traditional biotechnology of hybridization was 
frequently applied for the agricultural research. The innovation network was 
established between the university and the Agricultural Stations. Through 
the flow of personnel, knowledge was transferred between the university 
and the Agricultural Stations. In fact, many graduates trained by National 
Taiwan University took important positions in the Agricultural Stations. 
Moreover, some graduates from National Taiwan University also worked in 
Taiwan Sugar Corporation and supported the industry of plantation sugar 
(Su, 2004:18). 
 
In the early 1970s, the headquarters of the Agricultural Stations were moved 
from the north to the middle of Taiwan, and the new headquarters was next 
to the Agricultural College of Chung-hsing University. The Agricultural 
College of Chung-hsing University which was once an agricultural 
vocational school became another important academic institution for 
agricultural research (Lin, 1995:3; Su, 2004:18).                          
 
5.3.1.3 Government and governance during this period 
 
The Taiwanese government was the one-party and the semi-autocratic 
system during this period. The agricultural policies were promoted totally 
from top-down, and there was no evidence to show that there were private 
organizations involved in the governance of agricultural policies. In fact, all 
the main organizations involved in the governance of the agricultural sector 
and the agricultural innovation were the public organizations. The public 
Agricultural Stations mainly did the agricultural research and the Farmers’ 
Association, who were managed by the government, managed the 
production of the farmers. Even the industry of agricultural processing was 
dominated by the publicly-owned company, Taiwan Sugar Corporation. 
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The main purpose of the agricultural policies at the time was to produce 
agricultural products as much as possible within the limited areas of 
cultivation. The majority of the agricultural products were exported to earn 
the foreign exchanges to support the development of the manufacturing 
industries, such as electronic engineering. Only after 1970, when the 
manufacturing industries were well developed, the policy objectives of the 
agricultural policies were turned to upgrade the living standard of farmers 
(Chang, 1982: 238-239). Indeed, even though biotechnology was heavily 
used in the agricultural sector, there was no policy to particularly encourage 
the development of agricultural biotechnology. The main policies promoted 
by the Taiwanese government included R&D and regulation policies. The 
two policies are discussed below.  
 
The R&D policies for the agriculture were promoted by multiple ministries 
to increase the production of crops. The agricultural research within the 
universities was mainly funded by the National Science Council, and the 
research within the Agricultural Stations was at the time co-funded by the 
National Science Council and the Council of Agriculture. The Farmers’ 
Association was managed by the Ministry of Domestic, and the farms were 
managed by the Council of Agriculture. In fact, the agricultural sector was 
governed by multiple ministries since the very early stage of its 
development.  
 
Multiple ministries also promoted the regulation of agriculture, especially 
the regulation of food, chemical pesticides and chemical fertilizers. The 
Ministry of Economic Affairs promoted the Factory Rules (legislated in 
1969) to control the manufacturing and quality of food, pesticides and 
fertilizers. The Council of Agriculture also regulated the production of 
pesticide through the Management Act (legislated in 1972). The regulation 
for the manufacturing of pesticides and fertilizers in fact overlapped to each 
 142
other.  
 
 
In sum, during this period, agricultural sector was highly dominated by the 
public sector. The innovation system of seeds extensively used the 
traditional biotechnology of hybridization to improve the genes of seeds and 
produced the seeds to serve the foreign markets. The industries of food, 
pesticide and fertilizer had limited adoption of biotechnology and targeted 
the domestic demands.  
 
5.3.2 From 1982 to 2000 
 
The modern biotechnology of generic modification was used in the 
innovation of seeds during this period. The traditional biotechnology of 
hybridization continued being applied for the innovation of both seeds and 
livestock. The companies of food, pesticide and fertilizer have gradually 
adopted modern biotechnology for processing their products.  
 
5.3.2.1Agricultural innovation system during this period 
 
The institutions for the innovation system of seeds didn’t have much change 
during 1980 to 2000; and these institutions were expanded for the 
innovation of new species of livestock, including farm animals and 
aquaculture. The Agricultural Stations were still the most important 
organizations doing applied agricultural research and transferred the 
innovated seeds and younglings to farmers. Besides using the traditional 
biotechnology of hybridization to innovate the new kinds of subtropical 
crops and new species of livestock, with the development of molecular 
biology after 1980s, the Agricultural Stations also started to do the 
experiments of genetic modification to improve the genes of seeds, 
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especially the seeds of rice and subtropical fruits. The modern 
biotechnology of genetic modification was transmitted from the United 
States to Taiwan through the Taiwanese scientists trained in the United 
States. In 1997, the genetic modified papayas which were innovated by the 
Taiwanese scientists and were successfully grown in the trial fields were the 
milestones of the development of genetic modification. Indeed, all papayas 
were cultivated in the south of Taiwan under the subtropical climate. Since 
the old kinds of papayas were easy to be infected by parasites, their genes 
were modified to make the crop parasite-resistant. However, because of the 
regulations of the Taiwanese government, even though the genetic modified 
papayas were successfully innovated, they were not allowed to be cultivated 
in the normal farms. Moreover, besides the innovation of seeds and 
livestock, the Agricultural Stations have expanded their research to the 
modern biotechnology of fermentation and applied the research for the 
development of bio-pesticides and bio-fertilizers. Since 1987, bio-fertilizer 
has been formally used in the farms (STRIC, 2005:31, 33). Yet, all the 
technologies innovated by the Agricultural Stations were not 
commercialized but transferred to the Farmers’ Association. Through the 
Farmers’ Association, these technologies were passed to farmers for free.  
 
The small private companies also started to invest in the innovation of 
genetic modification products. Since the 1990s, some local SMEs 
transferred the modern biotechnology of genetic modification from the 
academic institutions and started to produce genetic modification organism 
(GMO), especially the non-edible GMO. For example, Taikong which was a 
trade company selling ornamental fish has coordinated with National 
Taiwan University to develop GM ornamental fish since 1990s9. However, 
there was not yet any new GM product successfully innovated by the private 
companies.   
                                                 
9
 See the statement of Taikong: http://www.azoo.com.tw/azoo_tw/instruction/004.php. 
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For industries of food, pesticide and fertilizer, the main change was the 
market. The sugar industry which traditionally targeted overseas demand 
turned to focus on the domestic market, while the industries of pesticide and 
fertilizer remained to target the domestic demands. On one hand, since sugar 
was no longer the main products for exporting, Taiwan Sugar Corporation 
started to transform itself to be a multi-faceted agricultural company and 
adopted biotechnology in its multiple divisions, such as food-processing, the 
cultivation of orchids and fermentation products (Su, 2004:17). Yet, the 
company kept manufacturing chemical pesticides and fertilizers rather than 
bio-pesticides and bio-fertilizers. On the other hand, after 1990s, some local 
food companies also began to cooperate with academic institutions and 
adopted biotechnology in food-processing. For example, Grape King set up 
its own research center for biotechnology in 1992. United and President has 
collaborated with the Academic Sinica to develop the biotechnology of 
microscopic fermentation (Lee and Hua, 2004:98,116,130). However, the 
knowledge spill-over from academic community to the industry was still 
limited, and technology transfer was not institutionalized.   
                           
5.3.2.2 Knowledge accumulation and academic community  
 
During 1980 to 2000, the Taiwanese scientists who were trained in the 
universities of the United States introduced the concept and technologies of 
molecular biotechnology from the United States to the Taiwanese 
universities. The introduction of molecular biotechnology greatly increased 
the depth of basic agricultural research in the universities. The majority of 
the research of genetic modification done within the universities was funded 
by the National Science Council. Once the universities had done the basic 
research, the results of the basic research were further developed by the 
scientists in the Agricultural Stations (Su, 2004:18, 20). Since the 
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universities were not supposed to directly interact with the agricultural 
companies during this period, the technology transfers from the universities 
to the agricultural sector was rare. Moreover, the research topics were 
chosen according to the research interests of individual scholars. The 
overlapping topics were done by different universities spontaneously, and 
different scientific teams had very little coordination with each other. 
 
Besides universities, the personnel and labs of the Agricultural Stations were 
expanded since 1980s. As long as agricultural products were no longer 
export-oriented, the mission of the Agricultural Stations was changed to 
upgrade the quality rather than the quantity of primary production to fit the 
domestic demands. In 1990s, with the preparation for the participation of 
WTO and the free trade of agricultural products, the Agricultural Stations 
was further pushed to develop the agricultural technologies which were able 
to increase the competitiveness of the primary domestic products in the 
domestic market (Wong, 1998:96-98). Within this context, the Agricultural 
Stations have set up the Agriculture Gene Resources Center to create a 
microbial gene bank, including the genes of both hybrid and GM seeds. All 
the seeds were not commercialized. While the hybrid seeds were 
disseminated to farmers for free, the GM seeds were stored in the storage 
device of the Agricultural Stations and not allowed to be formally planted in 
the normal farms. Even if holding the rich database of gene resources, the 
services of the Agricultural Stations merely charged the cost of handling and 
shipping (Su, 2004:18).                           
 
5.3.2.3 Government and governance during this period  
 
Since 1980s, with the trend of political democratization and economic free 
trade, the Taiwanese government gradually included the interests of external 
stakeholders. Yet, the agriculture sector which was highly controlled by the 
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government was still dominated by the policies, and the interests of external 
stakeholders stayed weak during this period. The main policies promoted by 
the government included R&D and regulation policies. Each policy is 
discussed below. 
 
The R&D policies of agriculture were considered to be a part of the 
agricultural policies rather than a part of the innovation policies of 
biotechnology during 1982 to 2000. In 1982, even though the government 
announced the Eight Key Industries to further support the development of 
biotechnology, the meaning of biotechnology was equal to the 
pharmaceutical sector, and agricultural biotechnology was not included. 
Indeed, since 1980s, as long as agricultural products were no longer 
export-oriented and served the domestic demands only, the agricultural 
sector was gradually recognized as the sector with low productivity. While 
the government’s resources were intensively allocated to the development of 
ICT, resources allocated to the agricultural sector were relatively limited. 
Although the government continued supporting R&D in bio-agriculture, the 
main policy purpose was merely to increase the welfare of farmers (Chang, 
2004:151). The R&D funding of the Council of Agriculture even decreased 
in 1990s (Wong, 1998:115), and the same time, the Farmers’ Insurance was 
promoted. Moreover, because the R&D policies of agriculture were treated 
as a kind of welfare policy, the agricultural biotechnologies innovated by the 
public universities and research organizations were transferred to farmers on 
a non-profit base. Only until late 1990s, the issue of the commercialization 
of bio-agricultural technologies was raised. With the promotion of the 
National Science and Technology Program for Bio-agriculture, the 
commercialization of bio-agriculture gradually became the core of the 
policy. 
 
Another important policy promoted by the government was regulation. 
 147
Since 1980, ‘GM Safety Rules’ 10have been implemented in the labs. Yet, 
besides field trials, none of the GM seeds were allowed to be traded in the 
domestic market.  
 
 
To sum up, before 2000, the Taiwanese government only encouraged the 
development of bio-agriculture through agricultural policies. What was 
labeled as the biotechnology policies didn’t cover the agricultural sector. 
The traditional biotechnology of hybridization was highly developed, and 
the modern biotechnology of GM was widely applied in the agricultural 
academic institutions. Yet, even though the technological level of the 
agricultural sector was very high, due to the policies, these technologies 
were commercialized to a limited extent. Such conditions only started to 
change after late 1990s.                             
 
5.4 The evolution of the medical device sector 
 
The technologies used by the medical device sector were the same as the 
technologies used by the industries of textile, plastic, machinery and 
electronic engineering. Before late 1990s, medical device was not 
recognized as an independent sector but the supplementary sub-sectors of 
the industries of textile, plastic, machinery and electronic engineering. Only 
after 1990s, medical device was gradually recognized as an independent 
sector and thus gained more attentions of firms and the government.       
 
5.4.1 From 1945 to 1982 
 
The main business of the medical device sector during this period was the 
                                                 
10
 See the Official website of Council of Agriculture: 
http://www.coa.gov.tw/view.php?catid=7661.  
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production of Class I medical device on the bases of textile and plastic 
technologies.   
 
5.4.1.1 Knowledge base and the development of the sector  
 
The initial development of the Taiwanese medical device sector was 
embedded in the development of textile and plastic industries. Medical 
cotton and swab were the most important medical devices produced by the 
textile industry. Under the context of the Cold War, to back up the Republic 
of China (at the time ‘Free China’) as the frontline to defend the expansion 
of the People’s Republic of China (at the time ‘Communists China’), the 
government of the United States aided the government of the Republic of 
China lots of American cottons to develop economy. Since swab was one of 
the textiles which Taiwan was lacking, local SMEs were encouraged by the 
government to import textile machines to process cottons given by the 
government to be swabs (Zheng and Xu, 2005:108-109). Originally these 
SMEs only aimed at the domestic market. However, with the improvement 
of textile machines, the products of medical cottons and swabs were 
gradually exported (CCRA, 1983:1-2). In addition, the plastic industry 
which intensively used the technologies of chemical engineering was also 
rapidly developed during this period. The plastic medical devices, like 
surgical dressings, plastic catheters and syringes, were manufactured by the 
local SMEs and exported to the foreign markets (Shen, 1996:5). However, 
all the textile and plastic products were just the applications of existing 
technologies for medical utilities. These products which were usually 
categorized as the Class I medical devices which were the low value-added 
products and competed with similar products in the international market on 
a price-base. Most of the firms only focused on manufacturing. They only 
accumulated some knowledge related to manufacturing but had limited 
capabilities for innovation. Competition was the ma
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between companies, and there was no record to show that these firms started 
to form R&D alliance during this period. 
  
Besides the technologies of textile and plastic, the technologies of 
machinery were also used by the medical device sector. The Taiwanese 
machinery industry was established by the Japanese government before 
1945. After Taiwan was returned to the government of the Republic of 
China in 1945, the government unified all the large factories of Japan to be 
two public companies, Taiwan Machinery Company (台灣機械公司) and 
Taiwan Shipping Company. Besides the large factories, some small Japanese 
factories were sold to the local Taiwanese private SMEs. In addition, after 
1949, some Chinese machinery companies also followed the government of 
the Republic of China and moved their factories to Taiwan. However, 
compared with the private companies, the public companies actually held 
more resources and had higher technologies. The knowledge of the 
machinery technologies was spilled over from the public to the private 
companies through technology transfers (Zheng and Xu, 2005:104-105). 
The main products related to medical devices which were produced by these 
companies were metal-processing and machinery components. Although 
during this period, the machinery industry didn’t produce any medical 
devices, the industry set up the bases of the development of medical device 
sector later.                   
 
The development of the electronic engineering industry also contributed to 
the development of medical devices. Since 1960, attracted by the 
government’s policies, some multinational giants of electronic engineering 
started to invest in the manufacturing facilities in Taiwan. These MNCs 
included Philips (from Netherlands), General Engine (from the United 
States), Motorola (from the United States) and Hitachi (from Japan). At the 
same time, some local SMEs also set up their factories to process electronic 
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components or assembled electronic components to be end products. The 
majority of the electronic products were exported to overseas market. The 
main products at the time were the voice recorders, television and 
calculating machines (MOEA, 1977). Although electronic engineering 
should be one of the technological bases of medical devices, especially the 
Class II electronic medical devices, there was no evidence to show that 
some firms already applied the technologies of electronic engineering for 
medical devices.  
           
5.4.1.2 The role of the universities and public research institute 
 
For the textile and plastic industries, since the knowledge for manufacturing 
was accumulated within the industries, the universities only played roles to 
supply well educated human resources; however, the universities and public 
research institutes played much more significant roles in machinery and 
electronic engineering industries. The Metal Industries Research and 
Development was set up by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1977 with 
the funding of United Nation. The Center was responsible for upgrading the 
technologies of metal machines and for transferring the technologies to the 
local firms (Zheng and Xu, 2005:115). Moreover, National Chiao-tung 
University which had strong research capabilities in electronic engineering 
played important roles in understanding the technologies through ‘reverse 
engineering’, in helping local companies develop new products, and lending 
firms expensive instruments (Lee, 1998:315-318). The Industrial 
Technology Research Institute which was built up by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs was responsible for transforming the basic research in the 
universities to be applied technologies and transferred these technologies to 
the firms. However, during this period, the technologies of electronic 
engineering were only applied for the electronic equipments, such as 
television, rather than electronic medical devices.                    
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5.4.1.3 Government and policies during this period 
 
Since 1945, the Taiwanese government which was the one-party and 
semi-autocratic system applied top-down approach for the development of 
the industries of textile, plastic, machinery and electronic engineering; the 
main policies promoted were R&D policies, regulation and the policies 
attracting FDI. For the R&D policies, the Development Center of Metal 
Industry and the Industrial Technology Research Institute were set up by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs to do research related to manufacturing 
process and to help the firms to upgrade their manufacturing technologies in 
order to increase their international competitiveness. For the regulation 
policies, the Law which was legislated in 1970 also regulated the 
manufacturing of medical devices. For the policies attracting FDI, the 
‘Statute for Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment’ promoted by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs were to encourage FDI, especially FDI in 
electronic engineering. Yet, the main target of this policy was the daily-used 
electronic equipments rather than electronic medical device.  
 
 
As such, from 1945 to 1980, the products of medical device sector were 
medical cotton, swab, surgical dressings, plastic catheters and syringes. The 
majority of these products were only belonging to Class I products. The 
market and demand was from overseas. In fact there were no policies 
specifically to support the development medical devices. The technologies 
of machinery or electronic engineering were gradually developed, but the 
applications of these two technologies for medical devices were at the time 
limited.       
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5.4.2 From 1982 to 2000 
 
The medical device sector adopted more advanced technology from 
machinery and electronic engineering industries during this period.    
  
5.4.2.1 Knowledge base and the development of the sector 
 
After 1980, the companies of Class I medical devices, such as medical 
cotton, swab, and surgical dressings continued improving their 
manufacturing technologies in such products. Their knowledge base was 
still textile and plastic technologies. The demand was from overseas market. 
Since these firms were all small and rarely cooperated for the innovation of 
more advanced technologies, their investments in R&D were just able to do 
innovation on the manufacturing process. Until as late as 1996, the Class I 
products still shared a portion of the overall national production of medical 
devices (Shen, 1995:6). 
 
The greater technological achievements in the medical device sector were 
the progress of machinery and electronic engineering. The local SMEs in the 
machinery industry were encouraged by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to 
form the Precision Machinery Research Center with the government in 1993. 
The main mission of the Research Center was to help machinery firms to 
upgrade their technological level in precision machines (Zheng and Xu, 
2005:193). Yet, the development of medical precision machine was only the 
minor part of the mission of the center. Furthermore, on the basis of the 
technological progress from 1960 to 1980, the industry of electronic 
engineering had great advancement after 1980s. However, the technology of 
electronic engineering was strongly encouraged by the government to be 
further developed to be semiconductors, personal computers, and notebooks. 
In other words, the knowledge accumulation of electronic engineering was 
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developed into ICT rather than electronic medical devices. Both local firms 
and multinational companies heavily invested in the R&D and 
manufacturing facilities of integrated circuit (IC), semiconductors and so on. 
Even if ICT and electronic medical devices had related technological base, 
compared with the competitive and matured ICT cluster, the sector of 
electronic medical device was only treated as the marginal sub-sector of ICT. 
On the one hand, the large competitive local ICT companies, such as Acer, 
Asus and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation, never 
invested in electronic medical device between 1980 and 200011. On the 
other hand, the multinational ICT giants which were also the giants of 
electronic medical device (such as Philips) didn’t invest in the electronic 
medical device in Taiwan but kept their investments in the ICT industries 
only.  
 
In fact, from 1980 to 2000, Class II electronic medical devices Class II 
medical devices were developed peripherally to the ICT cluster. At the time, 
the companies producing electronic medical devices were the local SMEs 
which were set up around late 1980s and 1990s (DIT, 2009). After 2000, 
these local SMEs became the pillars and most competitive companies in the 
whole medical device sector. The main business of these local medical 
device SMEs was to fabricate developed machinery and/or electronic 
engineering technologies and applied these technologies for medical devices. 
The knowledge accumulation of the firms of electronic medical devices was 
mainly in the technology field of ICT. Biotechnology was not used by these 
firms. With the trend that multinational large manufacturers of electronic 
medical device gradually concentrated on higher value added products and 
outsourced manufacturing of lower profit products, the Taiwanese local 
SMEs then cooperated with the multinational manufactures to manufacture 
                                                 
11
 Only after the financial tsunami in the end of 2008, some local ICT companies which 
suffered the bottleneck in the sales of personal computers and notebooks started to invest in 
electronic medical device.         
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the lower profit products. The main products included electronic 
wheelchairs and beds, electronic blood pressure meters, dentists’ 
apparatuses, X-ray machines and so on (Shen, 1995:6). The majority of such 
products were exported to foreign markets. Besides doing outsourced 
manufacturing, some local SMEs also started to sell the products by their 
own brands. Moreover, the development of biochips led to the beginning of 
the medical device sector starting to combine ICT with biotechnology. The 
companies of biochips were all new SMEs set up around 1990s. For 
example, DR. Chip used molecular biotechnology to extract, amplify and 
hybrid nucleic acid on a DNA microarray chip. Such microchip was used for 
DNA sequencing to detect food bacteria, agricultural pathogens and human 
papillomavirus (HPV)12.                                          
     
5.4.2.2 The roles of universities and public research institutes 
 
Universities didn’t play significant roles in the innovation of medical 
devices. Since the medical device companies which adopted the 
technologies of textile and plastic mainly accumulated their technologies 
through the experiences of manufacturing, and the academics who focused 
on the basic research had relatively very limited supports to these companies. 
Furthermore, for the companies of electronic medical device, as long as the 
main business of these companies was only to fabricate relatively mature 
technologies, not all the companies of electronic medical device needed or 
expected the technology transfers from universities. In addition, the 
universities also concentrated the majority of their resources on the 
technologies of ICT rather than on the medical devices. Therefore, the 
innovation network between universities and the medical device companies 
was not well established. Only after 1990s, when more start-ups in the 
                                                 
12
 See the Official website of Dr. Chip: 
http://www.bio-drchip.com.tw/HOME2ENG/06index.asp. 
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medical device sector tried to promote higher value-added products and 
searched for the development of advanced technologies, the universities 
played more important roles in technology transfers.  
 
In fact, it was the public research organizations that started to play more 
significant roles in technology transfers. The Metal Industries Research and 
Development Center which helped machinery firms to fit the standard of 
ISO 9000 and to gain CE certification indirectly helped the companies of 
electronic medical devices to link with the international standard (Zheng 
and Xu, 2005:193). Moreover, the Industrial Technology Research Institute 
supported by the Ministry of Economic Affairs also increased its roles in 
transferring technologies to medical device companies. The Institute even 
helped local SMEs to form the R&D consortiums to innovate the advanced 
technologies of medical devices. In 1998, the Institute assembled six SMEs 
to form the R&D consortium of biochips. The consortium which was called 
Clinical Biochips Industrialization Consortium was to explore the potential 
of microarray technology and was the most successful consortium supported 
by the Institute13.  
  
5.4.2.3 Government and policies during this period  
 
Even though the Taiwanese government was relatively open after 1980s, 
without influential association and outstanding performance, the 
participation of the companies of medical devices in the policy-making was 
limited. Indeed, until 1990, there were no clear policies specifically 
developed for medical device companies. The main roles of the government 
were to subsidize the R&D expenditures of the companies and to regulate 
the manufacturing of medical devices. Each role of the government is 
introduced as the following.     
                                                 
13
 See the Official website of the Consortium: http://www.bel-series.org.tw/cbic/About/  
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The main role of the government was to subsidize the R&D expenditures of 
the medical device companies. Since the Taiwanese government recognized 
biotechnology as one of the key industries for future development in 1982, 
the medical device sector was not considered to be a part of biotechnology 
industries. The development of the medical device sector was considered to 
be the business which may add value to the products of the ‘traditional 
industrial sectors’, including textile, plastic, machinery and low end 
electronic engineering. Therefore, the innovation activities of local medical 
device SMEs were mainly funded by the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
through the projects which encouraged the traditional industries to upgrade 
their technologies. Only after 1990, medical device was gradually 
considered to be a part of the development of biotechnology in Taiwan. Yet, 
besides the R&D subsidies provided by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
the Taiwanese government as a whole didn’t promote more sophisticated 
policies which particularly encouraged the development of medical device 
sector.  
 
The minor role of the government was regulation. The Law which was 
executed by the Department of Health was amended to follow the standard 
of the United States’ FDA and European Unions’ CE and announced that the 
medical devices should fit the standard of ISO.  
 
 
In sum, while the development of the medical device sector was mainly 
based on the technologies of textile, plastic, machinery and electronic 
engineering, there was no government’s policies to encourage the medical 
device sector to adopt biotechnology. Indeed, the medical device sector was 
not seriously considered by the government to be a part of the development 
of biotechnology. Only after 2000, the production of the medical device 
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sector was formally calculated as a part of the biotechnology related 
industries. Yet, besides biochips which combined the technology of 
electronic engineering with biotechnology, the majority of the Taiwanese 
medical devices didn’t apply biotechnology for their products.  
 
5.5 Conclusion          
 
In this chapter, through analyzing the historical evolution of the three 
NSTIS, we clearly identify how biotechnology intersected with the three 
sectors within the national boundary of Taiwan. Indeed, the three sectors 
were very different from one another and possessed contrasting modes for 
absorbing biotechnology. Furthermore, the development of each of the three 
sectors and biotechnology was heavily shaped by the Taiwanese national 
institutions.         
 
For the pharmaceutical sector, local SMEs have been the pillars for 
innovation and manufacturing. Multinational companies were only once 
involved in the manufacturing activities of the sector. After multinational 
companies extensively withdrew their investments, there were almost no 
large firms involved in the manufacturing and innovation of the 
pharmaceutical sector. Furthermore, for both local SMEs and MNCs in 
Taiwan, the main knowledge base was chemical engineering. Modern 
biotechnology was only introduced to the pharmaceutical sector after 1980s 
and used to analyze the extracts and the medical functions of herbs. Yet, the 
main knowledge base for the development of the new herbaceous medicines 
was the traditional knowledge of Chinese herbal medicines. Originally the 
Taiwanese government only purposed to encourage and to control the 
manufacturing of medicines. Later after 1990s, the policies gradually turned 
to encourage the innovation of new pharmaceuticals, especially new herbal 
medicines.     
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For the agricultural sector, the public sector, including public research 
institutions and public owned company, has been the most important 
participant in innovation. Local private companies only played minor roles 
in the agricultural innovations, and MNCs played no role. In addition, rice 
and subtropical species (including fruits, vegetables and ornamental fish) 
have been chosen as the targets of genetic modification. These targets 
reflected the climate and species of Taiwan. Taiwan introduced the 
traditional biotechnology of hybridization and the modern biotechnology of 
genetic modification in the early stages of the development of these two 
technologies. Yet, even if the agricultural sector accumulated rich 
knowledge of modern and traditional biotechnology, the Taiwanese 
government mainly supported the agricultural sector through agricultural 
policies. The government only started to encourage the commercialization 
of agricultural biotechnology in the late 1990s.   
  
For the medical device sector, the main pillars of innovation have been local 
SMEs. The most competitive companies belonged to the companies of Class 
II electronic medical devices. Knowledge accumulation of these companies 
was based on the Taiwanese ICT industries. Biochips, which integrated 
biotechnology and electronic engineering, reflected the Taiwanese national 
strength in ICT. Until the 1990s, the Taiwanese government in fact had no 
specific policies to support the development of the medical device sector 
and to encourage the sector to absorb biotechnology.  
  
In fact, the different evolution of the three biotechnology NSTIS offers us a 
very different context for thinking about policies. Different NSTIS was 
developed by different modes and shaped by different types of 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies. Indeed, as the dynamics of each 
biotechnology related NSTIS was different, each NSTIS needed different 
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appropriate policies to support its development. However, in this chapter, 
we have not discussed the different types of policies required by each of the 
three NSTIS. On the basis of the discussions in this chapter, in the next 
chapter, Chapter 6, we will further judge the appropriateness of the 
Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectoral policies, as well as the 
policy-making process which shapes the consistencies and appropriateness 
of these policies.                   
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Chapter 6 The policy - making process of the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies (2000 - 2008) 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter we propose to open the ‘black – box’ of the policy - making 
process of the Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectoral policies. On the 
basis of our discussion about the evolution of the three biotechnology 
related NSTIS in Taiwan from 1945 to 2000, this chapter will focus on the 
period from 2000 to 2008 and describes the influence of the policy - making 
process on the consistencies and appropriateness of the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies. However, as described in 
Chapter 4, there were many policies promoted by the Taiwanese government 
between 2000 and 2008. For the reasons described in Chapter 4, we only 
selected the National Programs and the regulation policies - in terms of the 
Law and the Management Act - as our empirical cases and discuss these two 
cases deeply.  
 
In order to open the black - box of the policy - making process of the two 
policies, in this chapter, we will apply the conceptual framework established 
in Chapter 3 for our empirical discussions. As we have already described in 
Chapter 3, our research questions and conceptual framework are built upon 
four independent variables and two dependent variables. The four 
independent variables are divided government, horizontal coordination, 
vertical coordination and the involvement of external stakeholders. The two 
dependent variables are the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies. As we have assumed in Chapter 3, during the policy - making 
process the four independent variables would influence the two dependent 
variables. Moreover, we assume that the policy - making process can be 
divided into four stages. Each stage of the policy - making process is 
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influenced by different independent variables and shapes the two dependent 
variables in different ways. In this chapter we will frequently refer to the 
definitions of the key concepts defined in Chapter 3. In addition, since the 
data collected through the fieldwork is essential to the analysis, in this 
chapter we will frequently quote the codes of our interviewees, which are 
shown in Table 4.1.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: in section 6.2 we will provide an 
overview for the contents of the National Programs and the regulation 
policies and emphasize the vertical and horizontal consistencies of these two 
policies. Section 6.3 continues the historical discussion in Chapter 5 and 
focuses on the appropriateness of the two policies. Section 6.4 emphasizes 
the policy - making process of the two policies. Section 6.5 is the conclusion 
of the chapter. 
 
6.2 Overview of the contents of the National Programs and regulation 
policies   
 
The section gives an overview of the policy contents of the three National 
Programs and the regulation policies, in terms of the Law and the 
Management Act, and discusses the consistencies of the two policies. The 
consistencies of policies, as we have defined in section 3.1, refer to both 
vertical and horizontal consistencies. Besides, the Promotion Plan for the 
Biotechnology Industry (hereafter referred to as the Promotion Plan), which 
revealed the general policy objectives of the whole government and other 
policies which were closely interrelated to the two cases, such as the 
Mid-term R&D Plans (typically shortened to be the Mid-term Plans), are 
very important for us to judge the consistencies of the two policies. 
Therefore, we also review the Promotion Plan and the interrelated policies.  
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The structure of the Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectoral policies, 
the contents of the policies and the ministries responsible for these policies 
are displayed in Figure 6.1, Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2. Figure 6.1 shows the 
structure of the Taiwanese biotechnology and related sectoral policies and 
reveals the positions of the two cases in the structure of the biotechnology 
polices. As shown in the figure, the Promotion Plan was the framework 
which was above the four types of policies, i.e. R&D policies, part of the 
regulation policies, part of the business park policies and the ‘Statute for the 
Development Biotechnology New Drug Industry’. However, another four 
types of policies (i.e. part of the regulation policies, part of the business park 
policies, national health insurance and international trade policies) were 
outside the framework of the Promotion Plan. Among our two cases, the 
three National Programs and the new clauses of the Law were under the 
framework of the Promotion Plan, while the majority of the clauses of the 
Law and the Management Act were not. The contents of the two policies, 
the Promotion Plan and some closely related policies are summarized in 
Table 6.1. In addition, the two cases and all other interrelated biotechnology 
and related sectoral policies were decided and implemented by four 
ministries (i.e. the National Science Council, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, the Department of Health, and the Council of Agriculture). Since 
the institutional structure of the four ministries is very important for us to 
understand the contents and the policy - making process of the two cases, 
we also show in Figure 6.2 the institutional structure of the four ministries 
and their positions in the executive branch. As shown in the figure, the 
National Science Council was the coordinator to collaborate the other three 
ministries for promoting the National Programs, while the Department of 
Health was the only ministry to execute the Law and the Council of 
Agriculture was the only ministry to execute the Management Act. The roles 
of each ministry and their subordinate implementation bodies in the policy - 
making process will be further discussed in section 6.4. In the following 
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paragraphs we only emphasize the discussion of the contents of the 
Promotion Plan and the two cases.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.1: Six main biotech policy contents in Taiwan 
Policy Names  Policy Type Policy contents 
Figure 6.2 The institutions of the four ministries of the executive branch in Taiwan 
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Abbreviation: NSC= the National Science Council, MOEA= the Ministry of Economic Affairs, COA= the Council of Agriculture, DOH= the 
Department of Health 
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The Promotion Plan 
for the 
Biotechnology 
Industry 
Overall 
Highest 
Principal of 
biotech 
policies 
＊ Ministries: NSC, MOEA, DOH, COA 
＊ Year of promotion: 1995 (revised in 2003) 
＊ Policy objectives: to establish Taiwan to be the leading Asian center for 
biotechnology innovation, manufacturing and operations 
＊ Policy instruments: (1) funding biotechnology research, (2) facilitating technology 
transfer and commercialization, (3) developing and refining regulations and laws, 
(4) training talents, (5) attracting domestic and foreign investments (6) offering 
marketing services 
National Research 
Program for 
Genomic Medicine  
R&D ＊ Ministries: NSC (coordinator), MOEA, DOH  
＊ Year of promotion: 2002  
＊ Policy objectives: to ‘integrate limited resources, to capitalize the knowledge 
embodied in the human genome in order to promote medical research in Taiwan and 
also to act as an initiator for the local biomedical industry’  
＊ Policy instruments: funding  
＊ Targets: the research of genetic therapies for cancers, infectious diseases and highly 
heritable diseases 
National Science 
and Technology 
Program for 
Biotechnology and 
Pharmaceuticals 
R&D ＊ Ministries: NSC (coordinator), COA, MOEA 
＊ Year of promotion: 2000 
＊ Policy objectives: to ‘fully utilize all existing R&D resources to develop 
cutting-edge agricultural biotechnology in the Asian-Pacific regions, to develop 
value-added agricultural products and to direct academic/industrial interaction and 
cooperation’  
＊ Policy instruments: funding  
＊ Targets: 15 bio-agricultural products, such as genetic modified orchids, animal 
vaccines etc. 
National Science 
and Technology 
Program for 
Bio-agriculture 
R&D ＊ Ministries: NSC (coordinator), MOEA, DOH  
＊ Year of promotion: 2001 
＊ Policy objectives: to ‘gather all the allocated funding related to biotechnology and 
drug R&D of the National Science Council, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
the Department of Health to integrate the co-operation among industry, government, 
academics and the institutes’  
＊ Policy instruments: funding  
＊ Targets: the research of new chemical medicines, new protein of pharmaceutical 
intermediaries, and new Chinese herbal medicines which may be able to heal the 
four diseases among Taiwanese citizens, including cancer, diabetes, cardiovascular, 
and neurological diseases 
Mid-term R&D 
Plans  
R&D ＊ Ministries: NSC, MOEA, DOH, COA  
＊ Year of promotion: 1960 
＊ Policy objectives:  
※ NSC: ‘support advanced fundamental biological research in the academic 
community, to develop outstanding researchers and to improve the 
infrastructure of research in universities’ 
14
 
※ MOEA: to ‘encourage domestic SMEs to invest in biotechnology, to 
build up competitive biotechnology clusters and to support advanced 
applied biotechnological research’ (National Applied Research 
Laboratories, 2008: 463,464). 
※ COA: to ‘enhance the competitiveness of domestic agricultural products 
in the domestic and international markets’ (National Applied Research 
Laboratories, 2008: 463,464). 
※ DOH: ‘to support the bio-pharmaceutical research in the research 
organizations and companies which were searching for the therapies for 
the common diseases of citizens’ (National Applied Research 
Laboratories, 2008: 463,464). 
＊ Policy instruments: funding  
The Law of 
Pharmaceutical 
Affairs 
Regulation ＊ Ministries: DOH (Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs) 
＊ Year of promotion: 1970 
＊ Policy objectives: to ‘regulate the safeties of pharmaceutical affairs’  
＊ Policy instruments: penalties  
＊ Policy purpose of the new clauses: encourage innovation of new medicines 
＊ Policy instruments of the new clauses: license and protection  
Agro-pesticides 
Management Act 
Regulation ＊ Ministries: COA (Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine) 
＊ Year of promotion: 1972 
＊ Policy objectives: to ‘strengthen the management of pesticides’ 
＊ Policy instruments: penalties and license  
Factory Rules  Regulation ＊ Ministries: MOEA (Bureau of Industrial Development) 
＊ Year of promotion: 1969 
＊ Policy objectives: to regulate manufacturing activities of factories  
＊ Policy instruments: license 
Abbreviation: NSC= the National Science Council, MOEA= the Ministry of Economic Affairs, COA= the Council of Agriculture, 
DOH= the Department of Health 
                                                 
14
 See National Science Council Mid-term R&D Plans: 
http://210.241.21.133/DOC/2406/PLAN_10_20051103162406193.htm. 
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The Promotion Plan 15  defined the general policy objectives of the 
Taiwanese government. It was first decided by the Executive Yuan in 1995 
and was further revised in 2003. According to the Promotion Plan the 
Taiwanese government recognized that the ‘global biotechnology industry 
would quickly grow in the future and would essentially contribute to the 
Taiwanese national competitiveness’. Therefore, the general policy 
objective of the government was to establish Taiwan as ‘the leading Asian 
center for biotechnology innovation, manufacturing and operations’. All the 
policies under the framework of the Promotion Plan were promoted as the 
policy instruments to fulfil the general policy objectives of the Promotion 
Plan. However, as already shown in Figure 6.1, the Promotion Plan was 
only over a part of the biotechnology and related sectoral policies in Taiwan. 
For the policies outside the Promotion Plan, such as the Management Act 
and the majority of the clauses of the Law, the Taiwanese government in 
fact had no institution to direct them to be consistent with the Promotion 
Plan. 
 
The National Programs, as shown in Figure 6.1, were the policy framework 
over 15 % of the Mid-term Plans of the four ministries. As shown in Table 
6.1 each of the four ministries promoted its own Mid-term Plan. Since the 
Mid-term Plan of each of the four ministries had different policy objectives 
and had limited connection with the other (see below, section 6.4.), the 
National Programs were promoted during 2000 to 2002 to make the policy 
objectives and policy instruments of the 15 % Mid-term Plans of the four 
ministries to be horizontally complementary to each other. Moreover, the 
policy objectives of the National Programs were vertically consistent with 
the general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan. Indeed, two National 
Programs were directed towards the pharmaceutical sector (also referred to 
                                                 
15
 See the Promotion Plan for the Biotechnology Industry: 
http://www.biopharm.org.tw/promoption_program/promoption_program.html. 
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be the ‘two pharmaceutical National Programs’) and only one National 
Program was directed towards the agricultural sector (also referred to be the 
‘agricultural National Program’). As shown in Table 6.1 the ‘National 
Research Program for Genetic Medicine’ and the ‘National Science and 
Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals’ were the two 
National Programs funding bio - pharmaceutical research and supporting the 
growth of local pharmaceutical SMEs. The detailed policy objectives of the 
two National Programs are shown in Table 6.116 and the policy instruments 
of both of the two National Programs were funding. While the National 
Science Council was responsible for funding the fundamental bio - 
pharmaceutical research in the universities, the Department of Health should 
fund clinical trials, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs should fund local 
pharmaceutical companies to transfer the results from the projects funded by 
the National Programs. In addition, the ‘National Science and Technology 
Program for Bio agriculture’ was the only National Program funding bio - 
agricultural research and supporting the development of local agricultural 
SMEs17. The policy objectives of the National Program are shown in Table 
6.1 and the policy instruments of the National Program were also funding. 
The National Science Council was responsible for funding bio - agricultural 
research in universities, the Council of Agriculture and the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs should fund local agricultural SMEs to transfer the bio - 
agricultural research from universities.  
 
Furthermore, the Law and the Management Act were promoted to regulate 
the safety of pharmaceuticals, medical devices and food. The policy 
objective of the Law18 is shown in Table 6.1, and the policy instruments 
were penalties. These initial policy objectives and the policy instruments, 
                                                 
16
 See the goal of National Research Program for Genomic Medicine: 
http://nrpgm.sinica.edu.tw/en/content.php?cat=agtc. See the Official website of the 
Program: http://npbp.m-w.com.tw/en/index.php. 
17
 See the Official website of the Program: http://nstpab.sinica.edu.tw/english.php. 
18
 See the Law of Pharmaceutical Affairs: 
http://dohlaw.doh.gov.tw/Chi/FLAW/FLAWDAT01.asp?lsid=FL013783 
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which, as described in section 5.2.1.3, were promoted in 1970 before the 
announcement of the Promotion Plan, remained outside the framework of 
the Promotion Plan. Only after 2000 in order to achieve the general policy 
objectives of the Promotion Plan and to encourage the innovation of new 
pharmaceuticals, the Department of Health executed new clauses of the Law, 
such as the licenses of new medicines and pharmaceutical data exclusivity19. 
The policy instruments of the new clauses were license and protection. Only 
the new clauses of the Law were promoted under the framework of the 
Promotion Plan. In addition, the policy objective of the Management Act is 
shown in Table 6.1 and the policy instruments of penalties and license. The 
Management Act, which, as described in section 5.3.1.3, was legislated in 
1972, remained outside the framework of the Promotion Plan after 2000. 
According to the Management Act, the pesticide factories should get the 
first manufacturing license through the ‘Factory Rules’ executed by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and should get the second licenses from the 
Council of Agriculture, through the Management Act. 
 
In fact, the National Programs and the two regulation policies under 
consideration here (the Law and the Management Act) were not consistent 
with each other. While the policy objectives of the National Programs 
tended to encourage the innovation of pharmaceuticals and agricultural 
products and to realize the general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan, 
the policy objectives of the regulation policies did not prioritize the 
development of biotechnology and were not vertically complementary to the 
Promotion Plan. In addition, the policy instruments of the two policies also 
had potential inconsistencies. While the National Programs used the policy 
instruments of funding to support the development of pharmaceutical and 
agricultural sectors, the policy instruments of the regulation policies, license 
                                                 
19
 See the Official website of the Council for Economic Planning and Development:  
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/m1.aspx?sNo=0004392 
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and penalties may increase the difficulties of innovation and made the 
obstacles for the development of biotechnology related sectors. Once the 
policy instruments of the two policies were promoted together, the 
appropriateness of the two policies is the central topic of section 6.3.                  
 
6.3 The evolution of the three biotechnology related sectors and the 
appropriateness of the National Programs and regulation policies from 
2000 to 2008 
 
In this section we will discuss the evolution of the three Taiwanese 
biotechnology related NSTIS and the appropriateness of the National 
Programs and the regulation policies. As we have described in section 3.1 
the appropriateness of the RTDI policies is a relative term and different from 
sectors, technologies and nations. The three biotechnology related NSTIS, 
as we have briefly mentioned in the end of Chapter 5, in fact needed 
different appropriate policies. In the following sections, we will first discuss 
the evolution of the pharmaceutical sector and the appropriateness of the 
two policies, and afterwards discuss that of the agricultural sector and the 
medical device sector. 
 
6.3.1 The pharmaceutical sector    
 
6.3.1.1 The ecology of firms   
 
Between 2000 and 2008, local SMEs were the pillars of innovation and 
manufacturing activities in the pharmaceutical sector. The pharmaceutical 
MNCs, which had started to sell their manufacturing facilities to local SMEs 
since the 1990s, sold out their manufacturing facilities. In the beginning of 
the 2000s the MNCs only operated their marketing divisions in Taiwan (Cho, 
2001).  
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The main business of local pharmaceutical companies was still 
manufacturing pharmaceutical intermediaries and generic medicines. The 
knowledge base of these firms was chemical engineering rather than 
biotechnology. The knowledge accumulation of these companies was in 
manufacturing activities. However, the majority of firms still lacked 
resources to do innovation. They mainly targeted the domestic market and 
competed with each other on a price - base. With limited technological 
capabilities, these firms’ pharmaceutical products were hard to export to 
foreign markets (Development Center of Biotechnology, 2007: 585-586).  
 
The most significant ecological change of the pharmaceutical sector was the 
emergence of new bio - pharmaceutical companies. Compared with the local 
companies which focused on manufacturing pharmaceutical intermediaries 
and genetic medicines, the new bio - pharmaceutical companies had much 
stronger research capabilities for biotechnology and pharmaceuticals and 
concentrated on the innovation of new bio – pharmaceuticals. Since the 
knowledge accumulation of these new bio - pharmaceutical SMEs was still 
too weak to compete with MNCs, they usually focused on the innovation of 
Me-Too medicines, rather than new medicines. Furthermore, due to the 
smallness and limited marketing capabilities of these new companies they 
usually targeted the sales of the domestic market (Ho, 2004: 28, 63).  
 
The companies of Chinese herbal medicines also made obvious progress 
during this period. While the majority of companies of Chinese herbal 
medicines still emphasized the manufacturing activities of traditional herbal 
medicines (Development Center of Biotechnology, 2004: 184), some larger 
companies started to invest in the innovation of new herbaceous medicines. 
In addition, a group of new companies of Chinese herbal medicines were set 
up in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s (Ho, 2004: 220). 
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Since these new companies were established, they emphasized the 
innovation of new herbaceous medicines. In fact, new companies and also 
larger ones, of Chinese herbal medicines, had frequent interactions with 
academics. The main knowledge base of all these companies was the 
historical records of Chinese herbs. Modern biotechnology was mainly used 
by the companies to test the reliability of the historical records, to analyze 
the functional genes of herbs and to discover the effects of herbal genes on 
human cells. The new herbaceous medicines usually used a single extract of 
a specific herb. Strict clinical trials were widely adopted in the innovation of 
new herbal medicines (Department of Biotechnology, 2005: 244-246). 
However, due to the smallness and limited marketing capabilities of these 
companies, they usually targeted the demands of domestic market only. 
                                    
While biotechnology gradually spilled over in the pharmaceutical sector, the 
two pharmaceutical related National Programs also tended to facilitate 
pharmaceutical companies to absorb biotechnology and to develop new 
medicines; yet, most of the pharmaceutical companies were quite indifferent 
to the two National Programs (see below, section 6.3.1.3). In fact, the two 
National Programs which targeted the new biotechnological or chemical 
pharmaceuticals didn’t fit the manufacturing business of the firms of 
intermediaries and generic medicine whose knowledge base was the 
chemical engineering. While the majority of these companies were not 
incentivized by the two National Programs to do pharmaceutical innovation, 
only few larger companies of intermediaries and generic medicines, which 
were willing to invest in the innovation of new or Me-too medicines, 
transferred biotechnologies from the two National Programs (National 
Science Council, 2004). For example, Taiwan Tong Yang, which was one of 
the largest companies of generic medicine in Taiwan, transferred 
Thalidomide (a new chemical medicine for anti - liver cancer) from the 
National Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and 
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Pharmaceuticals and continued doing Phase III clinical trials (National 
Science Council, 2004). Besides, it was in fact the new bio - pharmaceutical 
companies and the companies of Chinese herbal medicines to benefit most 
from the two National Programs. With stronger research capabilities these 
companies were more willing to transfer the biotechnologies from the two 
National Programs. For instance, PhytoHealth and SunTen Phototech have 
cooperated in the innovation of PDC-748 (a new herbal medicine of tussis) 
and received full funding from the National Science and Technology 
Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals to continue Phase II 
clinical trials20.  
 
We have interviewed three pharmaceutical companies which transferred 
biotechnologies funded by the National Science and Technology Program 
for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, including one larger (SunTen 
Phototech) and one new company of Chinese herbal medicines 
(Pharmaceutical SME A), as well as one new bio - pharmaceutical company 
(Taiwan Liposome Company). All of the companies which transferred 
biotechnologies supported by the National Science and Technology Program 
for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals considered that the National 
Program positively encouraged them to cooperate with academics and 
positively increased their capabilities of innovation. However, besides 
SunTen Phototech which has not expressed its difficulties, the other two 
companies expressed that after they transferred the biotechnologies they 
found it very hard to continuously innovate the bio - pharmaceutical 
products due to the regulations. As described by the director of R&D of 
Taiwan Liposome Company (Intcomph3), the company transferred 
biotechnologies from the National Program for the innovation of new bio - 
pharmaceuticals, yet the regulatory body, the Bureau of Pharmaceutical 
                                                 
20
 See the Official website of SunTen Phototech: 
http://www.stpt.com.tw/eng/rd_pdc748.php. 
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Affairs under the Department of Health, which implemented the Law, was 
quite conservative to issue the company license for clinical trials. 
Furthermore, the president of R&D of another new company of Chinese 
herbal medicines (Intcomph4) expressed almost the same experience. The 
company transferred the biotechnologies funded by the National Program 
for the innovation of new herbaceous medicines. Yet, because the Bureau of 
Pharmaceutical Affairs was conservative to issue the company license for 
clinical trials, the clinical trials of the company were slowed down. 
 
6.3.1.2 The knowledge accumulation and the academic community  
  
The roles of universities dramatically changed after 2000. Before that 
universities were not allowed to directly interact with pharmaceutical firms. 
Yet, after 2000, universities were encouraged by the policies, such as the 
Mid-term Plans of the four ministries and the National Programs, to transfer 
biotechnologies to pharmaceutical companies as much as possible. Since the 
majority of local pharmaceutical SMEs were too small to do pharmaceutical 
related research by themselves, universities in fact burdened the 
responsibilities to do the majority of research, including the research of 
small molecule medicine, bio - pharmaceuticals and Chinese herbal 
medicines. The majority of research topics were chosen according to the 
research interests of individual scientists. However, with the promotion of 
the two pharmaceutical National Programs, the scientists with related 
research interests were gradually encouraged to establish networks with 
each other and to join research which emphasized the targets of the two 
National Programs.       
 
Besides universities, the public research organizations under the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and the Department of Health were also involved in the 
innovation of bio - pharmaceuticals and tended to play intermediary roles 
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between universities and pharmaceutical companies. All of these research 
organizations, including the Industrial Technology Research Institute, the 
Development Center of Biotechnology and the National Health Research 
Institute, tended to transform the basic research from the universities to 
become applied research, and quickly to transfer the applied research to the 
pharmaceutical companies. The roles of these research organizations will be 
further discussed in section 6.4.    
 
Even if the two National Programs have been directed to encourage 
academics within the universities to transfer biotechnologies to 
pharmaceutical companies as much as possible, not many academics were 
incentivized and the results of the majority of the research funded by the 
two National Programs remained in universities, rather than transferred to 
the pharmaceutical sector. As described by a professor of Chinese herbal 
medicines involved in the National Science and Technology Program for 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals (Intac3), the two National Programs 
incentivized some scientists to collaborate with each other and to join 
research projects which focused on the pharmaceutical research of the four 
selected diseases. Moreover, from his perspective the National Programs 
also aroused the entrepreneurships of some academics and increased the 
incentives of these academics to transfer their technologies to 
pharmaceutical companies. However, as described by the leader of the 
National Research Program for Genetic Medicine (Intex4), besides a small 
group of scientists, many scientists funded by the National Program were 
very reluctant to transfer their results to pharmaceutical companies. In other 
words, many academics were still not incentivized by the two National 
Programs to transfer the technology.       
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6.3.1.3 The roles of the government: the appropriateness of the National 
Programs and the Law  
 
In this section we discuss the roles of the Taiwanese government through 
analyzing the appropriateness of the National Programs and the Law. In the 
following paragraphs we will discuss the appropriateness of National 
Programs and the Law first, and the appropriateness of the two policies 
afterwards.           
 
The policy objectives and the policy instruments of the National Research 
Program for Genetic Medicine, as we are going to show below, were 
appropriate; yet, once being implemented, the National Program did not 
generate appropriate support to the pharmaceutical NSTIS. As we have 
described in Table 6.1 the policy objectives of the National Program were 
‘to integrate limited resources’, ‘to capitalize on the knowledge embodied in 
the human genome’, and ‘to act as an initiator for the local biomedical 
industry‘. The extent for the National Program to ‘integrate the limited 
resources’ will be discussed in section 6.4.2.4. However, the National 
Program which tended to ‘capitalize on the knowledge’ and ‘to act as an 
initiator for the local biomedical industry‘ in fact tended to support the 
knowledge accumulation in genetic research and to cluster the networks 
between academics and companies. As discussed in section 2.4.1, modern 
biotechnology is science - based and developed through interactions of 
actors in the network, i.e. scientists and companies. As the universities still 
did the majority of research and the local pharmaceutical SMEs lacked 
resources to fund their own innovations, the intended clustering of networks 
between the university and industry, in order to accelerate the technology 
diffusion from the universities to companies and to support the knowledge 
accumulation in the companies, was indeed appropriate for the Taiwanese 
pharmaceutical NSTIS. The policy instruments which funded both 
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universities and pharmaceutical companies to explore and accumulate 
knowledge of genetic therapies were also appropriate.  
 
Yet, the National Program was not effective. Because of the time-lags of the 
National Program, we are unable to observe the long-term effects of the 
National Program. However, some economic indicators, such as the number 
of papers publishes from the results of the projects funded by the Natioanl 
Program, are able to show short-term effects which are clearly caused by the 
National Program. These short- term effects are able to help us to observe 
the extent for 
the National 
Program to 
appropriately 
match the 
pharmaceutical 
NSTIS. Table 
6.2 shows the 
economic index 
of the National Program published by the National Science Council in terms 
of papers published, patent applied, patent obtained, technology transfer, 
talents educated and number of pharmaceutical companies. On the basis of 
the statistical data shown in Table 6.2, in each year from 2002 to 2007 the 
National Program only transferred 0 to 15 biotechnologies to the 
pharmaceutical sector. The number of companies which transferred 
biotechnologies funded by the National Program only shared 0 % to 4.6 % 
of the total of pharmaceutical companies. Under the condition that more 
than 95 % of pharmaceutical companies did not transfer biotechnologies 
funded by the National Program, it was hard for the National Program to 
claim that it was successful ‘to act as an initiator for the local biomedical 
industry‘. Furthermore, from 2002 to 2007 in each year the National 
Table 6.2: The performance of National Research Program for Genomic Medicine and 
numbers of pharmaceutical companies from 2002 to 2007 
  
Year  Papers 
published 
Patent 
applied 
Patent 
obtained 
Technology 
transfer 
Talents 
educated 
Number of 
pharmaceutical 
companies 
2002 86 3 3 0 299 425 
2003 222 21 7 2 376 429 
2004 354 48 9 5 419 414 
2005 531 11 6 1 338 419 
2006 216 7 10 10 600 328 
2007 402 14 11 15 340 321 
＊Sources: Science and technology Yearbook (2008), Biotechnology Industry in Taiwan (from 
2001 to 2009) 
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Program only obtained 3 - 11 patents. The extent for the National Program 
to ‘capitalize on the knowledge embodies in the human genome’ was in fact 
very limited. Nevertheless, besides the quantitative economic index, we also 
collected some qualitative data through our interviews with the leader of the 
National Program (Intex4) and the project manager in the Office of the 
National Program (Intad4). According to the interviewees the National 
Program did encourage some scientists to do outstanding genetic research 
and encouraged a small group of scientists and a small number of 
pharmaceutical companies to collaborate with each other through 
technology transfer. In another words, the National Program, to some extent, 
appropriately encouraged the knowledge exploitation of biotechnology in 
universities and encouraged some academics and pharmaceutical companies 
to cluster networks. Although in the short term the economic index didn’t 
show the appropriateness of the National Program, in the long term the 
National Program may be able to appropriately support the development of 
pharmaceutical NSTIS in the future. In summary, the policy objectives and 
policy instruments of the National Program were appropriate, yet after being 
implemented, at least in the short term, the National Program had very 
limited support to the pharmaceutical NSTIS. 
 
The policy objectives and policy instruments of the National Science and 
Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, as shown 
below, were also appropriate; yet, the National Program generated very 
limited appropriate support for the development of pharmaceutical NSTIS. 
As we have described in Table 6.1 the policy objectives of the National 
Program were to ‘gather all the allocated funding related to biotechnology 
and drug R&D’ of the three ministries and ‘to integrate the co-operation 
among industry, government, academics and the institutes’. The extent for 
the National Program to ‘gather all the allocated funding’ will be discussed 
in section 6.4.2.4. As the modern biotechnology was developed through 
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interactions of actors and both scientists and companies are important in the 
innovation of biotechnology, the National Program, which sought ‘to 
integrate the co-operation among industry, government, academics and the 
institutes’, in fact tended to cluster networks between different actors. The 
policy instruments of the National Program which funded both the 
academics and pharmaceutical companies in order to encourage interactions 
and the knowledge accumulation of bio - pharmaceuticals on both sides 
were also appropriate. However, on the basis of the quantitative economic 
index published in the Science and Technology Year Book (2008:348-362), 
from 2005 to 2007 the National Program has totally transferred 10 
biotechnologies to the pharmaceutical sector. The number of pharmaceutical 
companies which transferred biotechnologies funded by the National 
Program only weighted 4 % of the total number of pharmaceutical 
companies. Under the condition that more than 95 % of the pharmaceutical 
companies didn’t transfer technologies funded by the National Program, it 
was difficult for the National Program to claim that it successfully 
encouraged the cooperation between the academics and industry. Besides, 
we have collected the qualitative data through the interviews with the leader 
(Intex5), the officer of the National Program (Intad5), the pharmaceutical 
companies (Intcomph2, Intcomph3, Intcomph4) and the academic (Intac3) 
involved in the National Program. According to those interviewees, the 
National Program did encourage the collaboration between some academics 
and a small number of pharmaceutical companies. Even if in the short term 
the economic index didn’t show the appropriate effect, in the long term the 
National Program may be able to appropriately support the development of 
pharmaceutical NSTIS. In sum, the policy objectives and policy instruments 
of the National Program were appropriate, but the National Program 
generated limited appropriate effect on the pharmaceutical NSTIS, at least 
in the short term.  
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The policy objective and the policy instruments of the Law, as we are going 
to show below, were inappropriate and only the policy purpose and the 
policy instruments of the new clauses of the Law were appropriate; once all 
clauses of the Law being implemented, the Law didn’t generate appropriate 
support to the pharmaceutical NSTIS. The policy objective of the Law, as 
described in Table 6.1, which intended to ‘regulate the safeties of 
pharmaceutical affairs’ through penalties, in fact had no intention to support 
the knowledge accumulation, to cluster actors or to encourage the 
innovation of pharmaceutical products. As we have discussed in section 
5.2.1.3, the majority of the clauses of the Law legislated in  1970 in order to 
control the manufacturing and the quality of medicines. From 1970 to 2000, 
the policy objective and the policy instruments of the Law were not changed. 
Only after 2000 the new clauses of the Law were legislated to follow the 
general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan and to encourage local 
pharmaceutical companies to be involved in the innovation of new 
pharmaceuticals and new bio – pharmaceuticals. The policy purpose of the 
new clauses of the Law was appropriate, because the involvement of the 
pharmaceutical companies facilitated the knowledge diffusion of modern 
biotechnology in the pharmaceutical sector. Moreover, the policy 
instruments of the new clauses which licensed and protected the data 
exclusivity of the new pharmaceuticals and new bio - pharmaceuticals also 
encouraged the involvement of pharmaceutical companies in the innovation 
of modern biotechnology and were appropriate. Yet, once being 
implemented, according to the descriptions of the director of R&D of 
Taiwan Liposome Company and the president of R&D of Pharmaceutical 
SME A (Intcomph3, Intcomph4), the implementation body of the Law was 
conservative to issue the license for clinical trials and to some extent, 
discouraged the pharmaceutical companies to innovate new pharmaceuticals. 
In other words, even if the policy purpose and policy instruments of the new 
clauses of the Law were appropriate, once being implemented, the new 
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clauses didn’t appropriately support the development of the pharmaceutical 
NSTIS. We will further discuss the implementation of the Law in section 
6.4.3.3. 
 
While the two National Programs and the Law were promoted together, 
according to our interviews with the three pharmaceutical companies which 
transferred the biotechnologies from the project funded by the two National 
Programs, the limited appropriateness of the two National Programs was, to 
some extent, reduced by the promotion of the Law. After the promotion of 
the two policies, the Taiwanese government in fact had no obvious 
appropriate support to the development of pharmaceutical NSTIS. We will 
further discuss this issue in section 6.4. 
 
6.3.2 The agricultural sector  
 
6.3.2.1 The agricultural innovation system during this period 
 
The innovation system of seeds and livestock was gradually transformed 
during this period. The Agriculture Stations still played significant roles in 
the innovation of new seeds and new species of livestock. Traditional 
biotechnology of hybridization was adopted by these public research 
organizations to improve the genes of both seeds and livestock, and the 
modern biotechnology of genetic modification was only used to improve the 
genes of the seeds. Through the Farmers’ Association, the majority of the 
innovated seeds and the youngling of new livestock which were improved 
by the traditional biotechnology of hybridization were given to farmers for 
free. Nevertheless, the seeds improved by modern biotechnology of genetic 
modification were cultivated in field trials only and were not allowed to be 
disseminated outside the research organizations.   
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Private SMEs still played supplementary roles in the innovations of seeds 
and livestock. Even though the knowledge for the genetic modification of 
seeds has been plentifully accumulated in public research organizations and 
universities for many years, larger private seed companies, such as 
Knownyou21, insisted to use the traditional biotechnology of hybridization 
to improve the genes of the seeds. The main reason for this was the market. 
Since these private seed companies tended to export their seeds to foreign 
markets such as Japan and South East Asian countries, these companies 
tended to strictly keep their products as ‘no GM’ seeds (Intex6). In fact, it 
was the new agricultural SMEs set up after 2000 and the agricultural trade 
companies to invest in the innovation of GMO, especially in the non - edible 
GMO. For example, Taikong, an agricultural trade company, started to sell 
its first GM products in 200122.  
 
In the industries of food, pesticide and fertilizer, both the public company 
and the private companies adopted biotechnology in their products. Taiwan 
Sugar Corporation was still public and the largest company of food, 
pesticides and fertilizers. Modern biotechnology was used by the 
corporation to extract the functional ingredients from Chinese herbs and 
further process these herbal ingredients into herbal food23. The knowledge 
base of the herbal food was totally the same as the knowledge base of 
Chinese herbal medicines. Without doing strict clinical trials, the 
corporation only sold its herbal products as herbal food, rather than Chinese 
herbal medicines and supplied the domestic demands. Besides, the private 
                                                 
21
 See the Official website of Knownyou: 
http://www.knownyou.com/index.jsp?bodyinclude=aboutusbody6.jsp&knownyounews=kn
ownyounews2.jsp.  
22
 See the interview with the CEO of Taikong: 
http://www.biotaiwan.org.tw/download/structure4/%E5%8A%89%E7%BF%A0%E7%8E
%B2/%E5%B0%88%E8%A8%AA%E9%82%B0%E6%B8%AF%E7%A7%91%E6%8A%
80%E8%82%A1%E4%BB%BD%E6%9C%89%E9%99%90%E5%85%AC%E5%8F%B8(
200809).pdf 
23
 See the information of the products of Taiwan Sugar Corporation: 
http://www.taisugar.com.tw/chinese/ProductsInfo_index.aspx?n=10026  
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food companies also used biotechnology in the innovation of herbal food24. 
Moreover, the new companies of pesticides and fertilizers which were set up 
after 2000 continuously utilized biotechnologies in their products of bio - 
pesticides and bio - fertilizers (STRIC, 2006: 31). The majority of these 
firms targeted the domestic market. However, some of the firms gradually 
started to search for opportunities in the foreign markets, including Japan, 
EU, China and South East Asian countries (Intcomag5).  
 
While modern biotechnology, such as the technologies of genetic 
modification and extraction, gradually spilled over in the agricultural sector, 
the National Science and Technology Program for Bio agriculture also 
tended to facilitate agricultural companies to absorb biotechnology; yet, 
only part of the companies were eager to transfer biotechnologies from the 
National Program. For the companies of seeds and livestock, the National 
Program, which targeted the modern biotechnologies of genetic 
modification rather than traditional hybridization, did not get much support 
from larger companies. As described by the CEO of Agricultural SME B 
(Intcomag4), since the governments of Taiwan and South East Asian 
countries didn’t allow the trade of GM seeds, the company didn’t see the 
market. Therefore, the company had no incentives to transfer the 
biotechnology of GM and invest in the innovation of GM seeds. Indeed, it 
was the new agricultural companies or the agricultural trade companies 
which were willing to invest in the innovation of GMO to benefit most from 
the National Program. For example, Taikong was funded by the National 
Program to innovate GM ornamental fish (Intcomag6). In addition, for the 
companies of food, pesticides and fertilizers, all public and private 
companies which were willing to invest in the innovations of herbal food, 
bio - pesticides and bio - fertilizers were benefitted by the National Program. 
For example, an Agricultural public company A was funded by the National 
                                                 
24
 See the websites of Simpson: http://simpsonbioteche.so-buy.com/front/bin/home.phtml.  
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Program to cultivate gentians in Taiwan. Gentian was the herb which 
originally grew in China and was imported to Taiwan. Since gentian was 
frequently used by the Taiwanese companies of food and Chinese herbal 
medicines, the National Program hoped that the company would plant the 
herb in Taiwan and reduced the reliance on China (Intcomag2). Moreover, 
Advanced Green Biotechnology was also funded by the National Program 
to innovate the manufacturing process of bio - pesticides and bio - fertilizers 
(Intcomag5). 
 
We have interviewed three companies which transferred biotechnologies 
within the National Program, including one company of the innovation of 
GMO (Taikong), one public company of food, pesticides and fertilizers 
(Agricultural public company A), and one private company of bio - 
pesticides and bio - fertilizers (Advanced Green Biotechnology). All three 
companies expressed that even though they transferred biotechnologies 
funded by the National Program, they suffered great difficulties for 
commercialization because of the regulation policies for food safety. As 
described by the vice - president of R&D of Taikong (Intcomag6), the 
Taiwanese government had no regulations for non - edible GMO, and the 
international regulations were not applicable in Taiwan. The company was 
only able to sell its GM ornamental fish in the domestic market. Yet, 
because the company got no licenses in Taiwan, it was impossible to get 
licenses from the government of EU countries and Japan. The company was 
then totally excluded from the main international markets. Moreover, as 
described by the Director of R&D of the public company of food, pesticides 
and fertilizers (Intcomag2), even though the company was funded by the 
National Program and successfully cultivated gentian in Taiwan, the 
company was forbidden by the Council of Chinese Herbal Medicine under 
the Department of Health to sell its products. According to the perspective 
of the Council, the historical records of the herb were based on the ones 
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grown in China. The company was unable to demonstrate if the herbs 
cultivated in Taiwan had the same functions as the ones grown in China. 
Therefore, the sale of the gentian cultivated in Taiwan was forbidden. 
Furthermore, as expressed by the Assistant Manager of Advanced Green 
Biotechnology (Intcomag5), even though the company has transferred the 
biotechnologies of fermentation funded by the National Program to 
manufacture bio - pesticides and bio - fertilizers, the company was unable to 
get a license from the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and 
Quarantine to manufacture its products in Taiwan. According to the 
Management Act, the company should provide the data of toxicology to the 
Bureau. Since the company was unable to provide sufficient data, it got no 
license. The company finally gave up all the manufacturing activities in 
Taiwan and turned to manufacture in South East Asian countries. In sum, the 
agricultural companies which transferred biotechnology funded by the 
National Program in fact encountered various problems of 
commercialization because of different agricultural regulations. Instead of 
discussing the policy - making process of various agricultural regulation 
policies, we will discuss the case of the Management Act in-depth in section 
6.4. 
 
6.3.2.2 The knowledge accumulation and the academic community 
 
The universities gradually established a network with agricultural 
companies during 2000 to 2008. Before 2000 universities were not expected 
to directly interact with agricultural companies. However, after 2000 
universities were encouraged by policies, such as Mid-term Plan of the 
Council of Agriculture and the agricultural National Program, to transfer 
biotechnologies to private agricultural companies as much as possible. 
While the knowledge of modern biotechnology was quickly accumulated 
within universities, the research topics of the majority of research were 
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decided by the research interests of individual scientists. With the promotion 
of the National Program after 2000, the scientists in the universities were 
gradually encouraged to establish networks with each other and to join 
research projects.  
 
The Agriculture Stations continued accumulating the knowledge of modern 
agricultural biotechnology. However, the National Program gradually 
changed the roles of these public research organizations in the innovation 
system of seeds. Before the promotion of the National Program all the seeds 
and livestock innovated by the public research organizations were 
transferred to farmers for free. Yet, after the promotion of the National 
Program, as long as the Agriculture Stations joined in the projects funded by 
the National Program, the biotechnologies innovated by Agriculture Stations 
should be sold to private companies rather than transferred to farmers for 
free. In addition, farmers were gradually encouraged to buy the seeds and 
new species of livestock from private companies, such as the seeds of GM 
orchid. 
 
Even though the National Program encouraged academics to transfer their 
technologies to agricultural companies, many results of the research projects 
funded by the National Program were kept in the universities. As described 
by a professor of horticulture involved in the National Program (Intac2), the 
National Program indeed encouraged collaborative research projects across 
universities. Yet, from his perspective, the National Program was not very 
different from the research projects which purely encouraged academics to 
do fundamental bio - agricultural research. As also acknowledged by the 
leader of the National Program (Intex6), in practice, many results of the 
research projects funded by the National Program were still in universities 
rather than transferred to agricultural companies. 
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6.3.2.3 The roles of the government: the appropriateness of the National 
Program and the Management Act  
  
The roles of the Taiwanese government were judged by the appropriateness 
of the National Program and the Management Act. In the following 
paragraphs we discuss the appropriateness of the National Programs and the 
Management Act first, and then discuss the appropriateness of the two 
policies.   
 
The 
National 
Science 
and 
Technolog
y Program 
for Bio 
agriculture, 
as 
discussed below, had appropriate objectives and policy instruments, and 
after being implemented, the National Program, to some extent, generated 
appropriate support to the development of agricultural NSTIS. As we have 
described in Table 6.1, the policy objectives of the National Program were 
to ‘fully utilize all the existing R&D resources to develop cutting-edge 
agricultural biotechnology in the Asian-Pacific regions’, ‘to develop 
value-added agricultural products’ and ‘to direct academic / industrial 
interaction and cooperation’. The extent for the National Program to ‘fully 
utilize all existing R&D resources’ will be discussed in section 6.4. However, 
the National Program, which aimed to develop value - added agricultural 
products and to direct academic / industrial interaction and cooperation, in 
fact intended to encourage the innovation of agricultural products and to 
Table 6.3: The performance of National Science and Technology Program for Bio agriculture from 
2003 to 2007 
  
Year  Papers 
published 
Patent 
obtained 
Technology 
transfer 
Academic 
conferences 
Number of 
agricultural 
companies 
2003 246 5 2 10 63 
2004 413 4 11 7 57 
2005 202 9 29 15 73 
2006 286 9 18 30 -- 
2007 392 13 22 27 -- 
＊Sources: Science and technology Yearbook (2008), Biotechnology Industry in Taiwan (from 2001 to 
2009) 
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cluster the networks between actors. The interactions between actors, 
including scientists and agricultural companies, are important for the 
innovation of modern biotechnology. The agricultural sector was strongly 
guided by the public sector. Yet, the private agricultural companies played 
more and more important roles in the innovation and commercialization of 
agricultural biotechnology. Since the universities in Taiwan have 
accumulated rich knowledge of modern biotechnology and the majority of 
private agricultural companies were too small to do R&D by themselves, the 
policy objectives of the National Program which tended to cluster networks 
between universities and companies in order to accelerate the knowledge 
accumulation within the agricultural SMEs indeed appropriately matched 
the development of agricultural NSTIS in Taiwan. The policy instruments of 
the National Program which funded both the universities and agricultural 
companies were appropriate, because the policy instruments encouraged the 
knowledge accumulation of modern biotechnology of both of the actors. Yet, 
after being implemented, the National Program didn’t fully achieve its 
policy objectives. Table 6.3 shows the economic index of the National 
Program published by the National Science Council in terms of the numbers 
of papers published, patent obtained, technology transfer, academics 
conferences and the agricultural companies. As shown in the table from 
2003 to 2007, every year, the National Program transferred 7 to 29 
biotechnologies to agricultural companies. The number of agricultural firms 
which got technology transfers weighted as much as 3 to 40 % of the overall 
agricultural companies. Under the condition that in the particular years there 
were 40 % agricultural companies that transferred biotechnologies from the 
research projects funded by the National Program, the National Program, to 
some extent effective, ‘to direct academic/industrial interaction and 
cooperation’. There was no clear economic index to show the extent for the 
agricultural companies to ‘develop value - added agricultural products’. 
Therefore, we are unable to judge if the National Program achieved its 
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policy objective to ‘develop value-added agricultural products’ or not. 
However, besides the economic index, we also collected qualitative data 
through our interviews. According to our interviews with the leader of the 
National Program (Intex6), three agricultural companies (Intcomag2, 
Intcomag5, Intcomag6) and one academic (Intac3) involved in the National 
Program, all the interviewees explained that the National Program positively 
encouraged their coordination with each other. Therefore, in the long term, 
such cooperation between academics and industry may contribute to the 
agricultural NSTIS to develop value - added products. In short, after being 
implemented, the National Program did not perfectly realize its policy 
objectives, but to some extent, appropriately matched the development of 
agricultural NSTIS.    
 
The Management Act, as we are going to analyze below, didn’t process 
appropriate policy objectives and policy instruments and generate 
appropriate supports. As we have described in Table 6.1, the Management 
Act was to ‘strengthen the management of pesticides’ through the policy 
instruments of penalties and license. As we have described in section 5.3.1.3, 
the Management Act was legislated in 1972 to control the quality of 
chemical pesticide. At the time, there was no bio-pesticide. However, the 
Management Act was not adjusted for the development of bio-pesticide.       
The policy objective and policy instruments in fact had no intention to 
support the knowledge accumulation and diffusion of modern biotechnology 
in the agricultural sector. Once being implemented, according to the 
descriptions of our interviews with the Assistant manager of Advanced 
Green Biotechnology (Intcomag5), the Management Act in fact increased 
the barriers of cooperation between actors and discouraged the innovation of 
the bio - pesticides.   
 
While the National Program and the Management Act were promoted 
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together, on the basis of our interviews, the appropriateness of the National 
Program, which in general was appropriate to the dynamics of the 
agricultural sector, was to some extent reduced by the promotion of the 
Management Act. After the promotion of the two policies the Taiwanese 
government in fact had only limited appropriate support to the development 
of agricultural NSTIS.   
 
6.3.3 The medical device sector 
 
6.3.3.1 Knowledge base and the development of the sector    
 
Between 2000 and 2008 the local SMEs of Class I medical devices (such as 
swabs, surgery dressing and injection) still played important roles within the 
medical device sector. The main knowledge base of these companies was 
still the technologies of textile, plastic, machinery and ICT. Biotechnology 
was seldom adopted by these companies. The main business of these 
companies was manufacturing, and the majority of these companies’ 
products were exported to foreign markets. These firms usually competed 
with each other on a price - base. To reduce the cost of manufacturing, some 
companies of Class I medical devices, such as the companies of surgery 
gloves, have moved their factories to China (Industrial Technology Research 
Institute, 2007: 1-5).  
 
The companies with the fastest growth within the medical device sector 
were the local SMEs of Class II electronic medical devices. The main 
knowledge base of these firms was machinery and electronic engineering. 
The main business of the firms of Class II medical devices was 
manufacturing higher value - added equipments which were outsourced by 
MNCs. The main products included electronic blood pressure meters, 
electronic sugar meters, electronic wheelchairs and so on. The majority of 
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the products were exported to foreign markets. Besides manufacturing, parts 
of firms have developed more and more mature capabilities to sell the 
products by their own brands and do research in their companies. 
Nevertheless, the collaboration between firms was rare. The majority of 
Class II medical device companies competed severely with each other, not 
only in the domestic market, but also in the overseas markets. Moreover, to 
minimize the cost of manufacturing, lots of companies started to move the 
lower end manufacturing activities to China (Industrial Technology 
Research Institute, 2007: 1-5). Besides the companies of biochips (like Dr. 
Chip and Pharlanx) which integrated ICT and biotechnology together, the 
majority of the companies of Class II medical device didn’t adopt 
biotechnology in their products.  
 
While the companies of medical devices had only limited applications of 
biotechnology, there was no National Program to facilitate medical device 
companies to absorb biotechnology; and only the Law was promoted to 
regulate the safety of the medical devices. We have interviewed three local 
SMEs of Class II medical devices which have been involved in the 
promotion of the Law and its affiliated administrative rules. Only the 
Assistant vice - president of Medical Device SME A (Intcommd1) expressed 
that the Law did not increase any obstacles for the company’s business. The 
Directors of R&D of the other two medical device companies (Intcommd2, 
Intcommd3) have both explained that the Law has increased their obstacles 
for commercializing their products. As described by the Director of R&D of 
Medical Device SME B (Intcommd2), the Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs 
under the Department of Health checked the quality of every single 
electronic thermometer of the company. The affiliated administrative rules 
of the Law not only seriously delayed the timing for commercialization, but 
also heavily increased the costs of the company. A similar perspective was 
shared by the Director of R&D of Medical Device SME C (Intcommd3). 
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His opinion was that the Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs was quite 
conservative to issue licenses to the new products of Class II medical 
devices. Therefore, the company’s sales in the domestic market were 
seriously delayed.        
                        
6.3.3.2 The roles of universities and public research institutes  
 
The universities which focused on the basic research didn’t play significant 
roles in the innovation of Class I medical devices, but had more and more 
collaboration with the companies of Class II medical devices (Industrial 
Technology Research Institute, 2007: 4-7). Through technology transfer the 
knowledge of ICT and machinery accumulated in the universities was 
gradually spilled over to the medical device sector.  
 
Besides, the public research organizations also accelerated the technology 
transfer to Class II medical device companies. The roles of the Metal 
Industrial and Development Center were progressively changed. Before 
2001 the companies of Class II medical devices were only indirectly 
supported by the Center through the projects of supporting machinery 
companies. However, after 2001, the Center has recognized the importance 
of the development of Class II medical devices. The Center then set up a 
new branch in the Southern Taiwan Science Park and organized six SMEs to 
form a new R&D consortium to innovate man - made gums25. In addition, 
the Industrial Technology Research Institute under the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs continued supporting the R&D consortium of six biochip 
companies, the ‘Clinical Biochips Industrialization Consortium’26.              
 
                                                 
25
 See the Official website of Metal Industrial and Development Center: 
http://www.mirdc.org.tw/manual/History01.aspx?sty=01. And the news of the Center: 
http://www.mirdc.org.tw/news/News01_detail.aspx?Type=1&cond=1354&Source=1&sty=
02. 
26
 See the Official website of the Consortium: http://www.bel-series.org.tw/cbic/About/. 
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6.3.3.3 The role of the government and the appropriateness of the Law  
 
In this section the roles of the Taiwanese government are analyzed by the 
appropriateness the Law and its affiliated administrative rules. As we have 
described in section 6.3.1.3, the policy objective and policy instruments of 
the Law in fact had no intention to encourage the innovation of modern 
biotechnology and to cluster the network of actors. Even though the Law 
was amended to add new clauses to support the development of the 
pharmaceutical sector, the Law was not amended during 2000 to 2008 to 
match the development of the medical device sector. According to the 
interviews of the Director of R&D of Medical device SME A and SME B 
(Intcommd2 and Intcommd3), the Law and its affiliated administrative rules 
in fact discouraged some of the medical device companies to innovate new 
medical device products and commercialize these products. Therefore, for 
the medical device sector, the support of the Law remained inappropriate 
and thus did not have appropriate supports to the sector. 
 
6.4 The policy-making process of National Programs and regulation 
policies  
 
6.4.1 Introduction  
 
According to our discussion in section 6.2 and section 6.3, the policy 
objectives and the policy instruments of the National Programs and the 
regulation policies were not consistent with each other; and once being 
implemented together, the two policies did not point in the same direction, 
and they were very difficult to generate appropriate supports to the 
development of the three NSTIS. Since we assume that the policy-making 
process is the root which shapes the consistencies and appropriateness of the 
two policies, in this section, we will apply the conceptual framework 
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established in Chapter 3 for opening the black-box of the policy-making 
process of the two policies. However, before we do this, we will first 
identify the institutions and actors inside and outside the government which 
influence the policy-making process.  
 
Inside the Taiwanese government, from 2000 to 2008, the government was 
the divided government, and the actors inside the government included the 
elected politicians, the congressmen of the opposition party, and the 
administrators in the four ministries. While the position of the President was 
held by the Democratic Progressive Party, the majority of the Legislative 
Yuan (the congress) was controlled by the opposition party, Kuomintang. It 
was very difficult to get approvals in the congress for the policy proposals 
issued in the name of the President. Furthermore, within the executive 
branch, as we are going to show in the following sections, it was in fact the 
cabinet rather than the president to make the significant decisions of the 
biotechnology and related sectoral policies. Nevertheless, the horizontal 
coordination within the cabinet was difficult, and the vertical coordination 
between the elected politicians and administrators was also insufficient.  
 
Outside the government, each of the three biotechnology related NSTIS had 
different external stakeholders. The pharmaceutical sector had eight 
pharmaceutical associations27, and only one had MNCs as members while 
the other seven were composed of local SMEs. The scientists embedded in 
the pharmaceutical NSTIS included the academics working in the 
universities and doing the research of bio-pharmaceuticals and Chinese 
herbal medicines. The agricultural sector, until 2008, had no influential 
association operating on a national base, and the scientists in the agricultural 
                                                 
27
 including the International Research-based Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, 
Taipei Pharmaceutical Agents and Distributors’s Association, Taiwan Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer's Association, Chinese Association for Pharmaceutical Agents, National 
Pharmaceutical Chinese Association, Chinese Pharmaceutical Manufacture and 
Development Association, Taiwan Generic Pharmaceutical Association, and Taiwan 
Pharmaceutical Marketing and Management Association. 
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NSTIS included the ones working in the universities or in the public 
research organizations and doing the research of genetic modification and so 
on. Finally, the medical device sector had only one association, Taiwan 
Medical and Biotech Industry Association which was composed of local 
SMEs.  
 
In the following sections, we will discuss the policy-making process of the 
National Programs first and discuss which of the regulation policies 
afterwards. Since the institutional structure of the four ministries shown in 
Figure 6.2 is useful for us to understand the policy-making process, we will 
frequently refer to the Figure. Moreover, on the basis of our discussions in 
section 3.3, we divide the policy-making process of the two policies into 
four stages, agenda-setting, deciding, implementation and evaluation. The 
political institutions of the policy-making process of the two policies are 
shown in Figure 6.3, and the details of the policy-making process are 
discussed in the following sections.   
 
Figure 6.3: Policy-making process of the National Programs and regulation policies  
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6.4.2 The cases of the National Programs  
 
6.4.2.1 The stage of the agenda-setting  
 
6.4.2.1.1 Introduction of the stage  
 
The stage of agenda-setting of the three National Programs was the stage for 
the leaders of the National Programs to decide the agendas of the policy 
proposals of these National Programs. According to our discussion in 
section 3.3.2, the stage of agenda-setting is deeply influence by two 
independent variables, the horizontal inter-ministerial coordination and the 
involvement of external stakeholders. In this section, we will focus on the 
influence of the two independent variables on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of the three National Programs.  
 
The leaders of the three National Programs indeed were the most important 
elected politicians to decide the agendas of the National Programs, even 
though the agendas of the National Programs were first initiated on the 
ministerial level. As described by the Minister of the National Science 
Council (Intex2), it was the Minister of the Council to initiate the agendas of 
the three National Programs. The main purposes of the National Programs 
were to better integrate the R&D resources of the Mid-term Plans of the four 
ministries and to invest these resources in the research which had the 
potential to be transferred to the industries. According to the proposition of 
the Minister of the Council, each ministry should appropriate 15% budgets 
of its own Mid-term Plan to the National Programs. The National Science 
Council was responsible for coordinating the other three ministries to form 
the inter-ministerial consensus for the policy objectives and the policy 
instruments of the National Programs and to horizontally coordinate with 
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each other under the framework of the National Programs. As the policies 
under the Promotion Plan, the policy objectives of the National Programs 
should be vertically complementary or at least not contradict to the general 
policy objectives of the Promotion Plan. The proposition of the Minister of 
the National Science Council, as described by the Minister of the Council 
(Intex2), got the agreement of other Ministers. Moreover, since 
pharmaceuticals and agriculture were considered to be the two sectors with 
the highest potential for future growth, the inter-ministerial consensus was 
achieved that the resources of the National Programs should be invested in 
the bio-pharmaceutical and bio-agricultural research and the results of the 
research should be transferred to local pharmaceutical and agricultural 
SMEs. However, as expressed by the Minister of the Council (Intex2), the 
Ministers of the four ministries only decided the general directions for the 
National Programs. In practice, it was the leaders of each National Program 
to decide the detailed agendas of each National Program, including the 
concrete policy objectives, policy instruments, and the targets of each 
National Program. Each leader was nominated and delegated by the 
Minister of the Council to represent the Council to formulate 
inter-ministerial consensus and to select agendas. The leaders, according to 
the name lists published on the official websites of the three National 
Programs28 , were originally the senior scientists in universities, public 
research institutes and Academic Sinica. They played the role as the elected 
politicians and served in the National Programs on a part-time base. They 
held no formal positions within the government or the pharmaceutical or the 
agricultural sector. 
 
Although pharmaceuticals and agriculture were two distinct sectors, under 
the coordination of the National Science Council, the agendas of the three 
National Programs were set by almost the same process. Each of the two 
                                                 
28
 See the name lists for the leaders of the three National Programs.  
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pharmaceutical National Programs established a Steering Committee and a 
Consulting Committee. The agricultural National Program established a 
Steering Committee and a Project Committee. The two Committees in each 
of the National Programs had similar functions. As described by the leader 
of the National Research Program for Genetic Medicine (Intex4), the 
Steering Committee played the role to give the general advice to leaders, 
and the leaders should transform these general advice into concrete policy 
objectives and policy instruments. In addition, the Consulting Committee or 
the Project Committee played the roles to help leaders to review the detailed 
policy proposals and to give leaders advises for the details of these policy 
proposals. In principle, the leaders should follow these advises of the 
Consulting Committee or the Project Committee to make detailed agendas. 
The interactions between the leaders and the members in these two 
Committees in the stage of agenda-setting are described below.        
 
6.4.2.1.2 The agenda-setting of the two pharmaceutical National Programs   
 
The Steering Committee and the Consulting Committee of the National 
Research Program for Genetic Medicine were influential to the decisions of 
the leaders. The Steering Committee was chaired by the Minister of the 
National Science Council and recruited 19 members, including 9 
government officials, 7 academics and 3 pharmaceutical representatives. 
According to the name list published on the official website of the National 
Program29, the 9 government officials included the two vice-Ministers of the 
National Science Council, the vice-Minister of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the vice-Minister of the Department of Health. The 7 academics 
were the principals of the universities participated in the National Program, 
and the 3 pharmaceutical representatives included the CEOs of three new 
                                                 
29
 See the name list for the Steering Committees of the National Research Program for 
Genetic Medicine: http://nrpgm.sinica.edu.tw/members.php?team=3&#t.   
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bio-pharmaceutical companies. According to the description of the leader of 
the National Program (Intex4), the government officials and academics were 
recommended by the ministries and participating universities, and the 
pharmaceutical representatives were recommended by the leaders. The 3 
CEOs of the pharmaceutical companies were invited by the leaders because 
of the affiliation of their business or because of their long-standing 
connections with the National Program. For example, as explained by the 
leader (Intex4), the CEO of AbGenomics was invited because of the 
company’s outstanding performance in the development of new immune 
bio-pharmaceuticals. The CEO of Taigen (Intcomph1) also explained that 
she was invited because she was the ex-leader of the National Science and 
Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals. Moreover, the 
Consulting Committee of the National Program recruited 13 scientists who 
served in the universities or the research institutions in the United States. All 
the scientists were invited by the leaders. As explained by the leader 
(Intex4), the Consulting Committee was responsible for reviewing the 
detailed agendas of the National Program, such as the funding for the 
research projects. Since almost all the Taiwanese scientists doing genetic 
research applied for the research funding of the National Program, the 
leaders invited the American scientists who didn’t apply for any funding to 
neutrally review the research projects.   
 
The Steering Committee and the Consulting Committee of the National 
Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals 
were also influential to the decisions of the leaders. The Steering Committee 
of the National Program was also chaired by the Minister of the National 
Science Council and was composed of 14 members, including 7 government 
officials, 5 academics and 2 pharmaceutical representatives. The 7 
government officials included the vice-Ministers of the National Science 
Council, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Department of Health. 
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The 5 academics were recommended by universities and research 
institutions participated in the National Program. Only the 2 pharmaceutical 
representatives, as described by the CEO of Taigen (Intcomph1), were 
invited by the leaders of the National Program. The pharmaceutical 
representatives included the CEO of one new bio-pharmaceutical company, 
Taigen, and the CEO of one larger company of genetic medicines, Genovate. 
The main reason for the 2 pharmaceutical representatives to be invited was 
their long standing access to the National Program. The CEO of Taigen was 
the ex-leader of the National Program. According to statement on the 
official website of Genovate30 , the company was very experienced in 
applying for the funding from the government. Moreover, the Consulting 
Committee of the National Program recruited 35 members, including 31 
academics and 4 pharmaceutical representatives. The 31 academics were 
from the universities and research organizations participated in the National 
Program, and the 4 pharmaceutical representatives included a new 
bio-pharmaceutical company and 2 larger companies of generic medicines. 
All the members were invited by the leaders (Intcomph2). There was no 
company of Chinese herbal medicines involved in the two Committees.   
 
The Steering Committee and the Consulting Committee of each National 
Programs in fact played two key roles: forming the inter-ministerial 
consensus and involving the external stakeholders. Each of the key roles is 
discussed below. 
 
The two Committees played a key role in the formulation of the 
inter-ministerial consensus. The Steering Committees of the two National 
Programs were both chaired by the Minister of the National Science Council 
and involved the vice-Ministers of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
                                                 
30
 See the statement on the official website of Genovate: 
www.genovate-bio.com/chinese/index.htm. 
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Department of Health. The Steering Committees in fact secured the 
inter-ministerial consensus that the three ministries should make the policy 
objectives of the 15 % Mid-term Plans of the three ministries to be 
horizontally consistent with each other under the framework of the National 
Programs and be vertically consistent with the general policy objectives of 
the Promotion Plan. The Steering Committees also secured the 
inter-ministerial consensus for the appropriateness of the National Programs 
that the inter-ministerial resources should be invested in the 
bio-pharmaceutical research and the results of the research should be 
transferred to the pharmaceutical SMEs. However, there is no evidence 
showing that there was inter-ministerial consensus for the consistencies and 
appropriateness between the National Programs and the Law. Indeed, while 
the general advices were given by the Steering Committees to the leaders, 
the general advice already contained the inter-ministerial consensus. As 
long as the leaders followed general advise, they were able to make the 
concrete policy objectives and policy instruments of the National Program 
not only consistently coordinate the 15 % Mid-term Plans of the three 
ministries but also be appropriate to the development of pharmaceutical 
NSTIS through clustering the network between universities and local 
pharmaceutical companies. However, the members of the Consulting 
Committees of the two National Programs were all invited by the leaders 
who represented the National Science Council. In other words, the detailed 
agendas of the National Programs were dominantly decided by the National 
Science Council. No representative from the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and the Department of Health were involved, and there was indeed no 
inter-ministerial consensus formed for the detailed agendas of the National 
Programs, including the targets of the National Programs. Once the detailed 
agendas were implemented by different ministries, it showed that the 
originally intended effects of the two National Programs were very difficult 
to achieve. We will further discuss the issue in section 6.4.2.3. 
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The two Committees also played a key role in the involvement of external 
stakeholders, including academics and pharmaceutical companies. The 
interactions of the external stakeholders within each of the two Committees 
are introduced in the following paragraphs.   
 
In the Steering Committees of the two National Programs, the academic 
representatives were recommended by the academic institutions which 
participated in the National Programs, but the pharmaceutical 
representatives were recommended by the leaders rather than the 
pharmaceutical associations. Since all participating universities had their 
own representatives, the academic representatives were able to represent the 
general interests of universities in the National Programs. Yet, the 
pharmaceutical representatives, as individual companies, were unable to 
speak for the general interests of the pharmaceutical sector. Moreover, the 
Committee included much more academics than pharmaceutical 
representatives. As described by the CEO of Taigen (Intcomph1), the 
pharmaceutical representatives had no influence on the agendas of the two 
National Programs at all, and the decisions of the Steering Committees were 
entirely guided by the academics. The leader of the National Research 
Program for Genetic Medicine (Intex4) shared the same opinion. For 
example, he once decided to listen to the suggestions of the pharmaceutical 
representatives and announced that the mice used by the National Program 
should be purchased from pharmaceutical companies. Yet, because the 
universities insisted to produce mice by themselves in order to save their 
research funding, the leaders finally agreed with the universities and no 
longer purchased mice from pharmaceutical companies. While the Steering 
Committees were set up to give general advice to the leaders, these advises 
only revealed the general interests of academics. In fact, the interests of the 
pharmaceutical sector, no matter the interests of individual companies or the 
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general interests of the pharmaceutical sector, were easily diminished in the 
Steering Committees. The National Program intended to cluster the 
networks between the universities and pharmaceutical companies which 
were important for the development of modern biotechnology. Yet, the way 
for the National Programs to involve the interests of pharmaceutical sector 
was unable to help the elected politicians to understand the dynamics of 
pharmaceutical sector and to formulate the agendas which were able to 
appropriately encourage the majority of pharmaceutical companies to 
cluster the network with the universities and involve in the innovation of 
bio-pharmaceuticals. Although both academics and pharmaceutical 
representatives were able to present their interests to all the elected 
politicians and positively contributed to the consistencies of National 
Programs, the involvement of these external stakeholders was incapable of 
positively increasing the appropriateness of the agendas of the National 
Programs.  
 
Moreover, all the external stakeholders involved in Consulting Committees 
of the two National Programs were recommended by the leaders. The 
Consulting Committee of the National Research Program for Genetic 
Medicine included all American scientists. With limited understanding to 
the scientific community and pharmaceutical ecology of Taiwan, these 
scientists were difficult to help leaders to make the detailed policy proposals 
of the National Program to be appropriate to the pharmaceutical NSTIS in 
Taiwan. Furthermore, the Consulting Committee of the National Science 
and Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals included 
both local scientists and pharmaceutical representatives. However, just as 
the Steering Committee, the number of the local scientists was much more 
than pharmaceutical representatives. As the external stakeholders 
recommended by the leaders, both the academics and the pharmaceutical 
companies were unable to represent the general interests of the local 
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scientific community or the pharmaceutical sector and helped the leaders to 
understand the dynamics of the pharmaceutical sector. Since there were 
much more academics than pharmaceutical companies, these academics 
easily guided the detailed agendas, including the targets of the National 
Program, to incline to the partial interests within the local scientific 
community. Indeed, as described by the leaders of the National Research 
Program for Genetic Medicine (Intex4), the National Program decided to 
fund the generic research of cancers, infectious diseases and highly heritable 
diseases, because some Taiwanese scholars had relatively outstanding 
research in these diseases. The leaders of the National Science and 
Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals (Intex5) also 
decided to fund the research of new herbaceous pharmaceuticals, new 
chemical pharmaceuticals and new pharmaceutical protein intermediaries 
which aimed at the four selected diseases, because these diseases were 
common among Taiwanese citizens or because some Taiwanese scholars 
had more strength in doing related research for the diseases. In other words, 
the detailed targets were strongly guided according to the strength of 
particular groups of academics rather than pharmaceutical companies. 
Besides, the common diseases of the Taiwanese citizens, the targets selected 
by the strengths of the small group of scientists in fact were very difficult to 
incentivize pharmaceutical companies to cooperate with academics and 
involve in the innovation of bio-pharmaceuticals. Once the detailed agendas 
were implemented, the National Programs would neither appropriately 
match the general interests of the scientific community nor the 
pharmaceutical sector, but particular group of scientists only. We will further 
discuss the issue in section 6.4.2.3. 
 
Even though the general interests of the pharmaceutical sector were not 
suitably involved in the agendas of the National Programs, none of the eight 
pharmaceutical associations motivated their members to lobby the Ministers 
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or the leaders. As described by the CEO of Sunten (Intcomph2), from the 
perspectives of pharmaceutical companies, the two National Programs were 
just one of the possible channels for the pharmaceutical companies to be 
funded to transfer biotechnology. As long as the pharmaceutical companies 
were able to get R&D funding through other policies, such as the Mid-term 
Plan of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the pharmaceutical companies did 
not have incentives to lobby the elected politicians of the two National 
Programs.  
 
The leaders of each National Programs, as described by the leader of the 
National Research Program for Genetic Medicine (Intex4), decided the 
concrete policy objectives, the policy instruments and the details of targets 
of the National Programs according to the advises of the Steering 
Committee and the Consulting Committee of each National Program. With 
the inter-ministerial consensus and the mechanisms to involve the interests 
of the external stakeholders, the policy objectives of the two National 
Programs were vertically consistent with the general policy objectives of the 
Promotion Plan. This meant that the policy objectives and the policy 
instruments of the 15% Mid-term Plans of the three ministries were 
horizontally consistent under the general framework. Moreover, the policy 
objectives to encourage the bio-pharmaceutical research in the universities 
and the technology transfers from the universities to pharmaceutical local 
SMEs were also appropriate. However, because of the shortage of the 
inter-ministerial consensus and the absence of the suitable involvement of 
pharmaceutical companies in the detailed agendas, once being implemented, 
the two National Programs were not consistently implemented by different 
ministries and were very difficult to generate appropriate supports to the 
pharmaceutical NSTIS. We will further discuss the issue in Chapter 7.   
 
6.4.1.1.3 The agenda-setting of the agricultural National Program  
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The decisions of the leaders of the National Program were deeply influenced 
by the Steering Committee and the Project Committee. The Steering 
Committee was chaired by the Minister of the National Science Council and 
recruited 9 government officials, including vice-Ministers of the National 
Science Council, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Council of 
Agriculture. The Project Committee which reviewed the detailed agendas of 
the National Program was co-chaired by the vice-Minister of the National 
Science Council and the vice-Minister of the Council of Agriculture and was 
composed of 9 government officials, 3 academics and 3 agricultural 
representatives. The 9 government officials included the heads of the 
implementation bodies under the three ministries, such as the Director of the 
Bureau of Industrial Development under the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
The 3 academics were recommended by the National Science Council and 
included the heads of universities and the research organizations 
participating in the National Program. Moreover, the 3 agricultural 
representatives included the CEOs of one larger seed company and one 
company of aquaculture, and one ex-CEO of larger feeding company. The 
agricultural representatives were recommended by the Council of 
Agriculture because of the affiliation of their business with the National 
Program. As described by one of the agricultural representatives 
(Intcomag4), he was invited because of the company’s outstanding 
performance in the innovation of seeds. The other representative (Intcomag3) 
explained that he was invited because of his long-term international 
experiences in the agricultural sector. No companies of food, pesticide and 
fertilizers were recruited.   
 
The Steering Committee and the Project Committee played the roles to 
formulate horizontal inter-ministerial coordination and to involve external 
stakeholders. Since the structure and the purpose of the two Committees 
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were very similar to and only the composition of the two Committees was 
different from the ones of the two pharmaceutical National Programs, in the 
following paragraphs, we only focus on the differences of the two 
Committees.  
 
The two Committees played the significant role in forming inter-ministerial 
consensus. The Steering Committee was chaired by the Minister of the 
National Science Council and involved the vice-Ministers of the three 
participating ministries, i.e. the National Science Council, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and the Council of Agriculture. The Steering Committee 
not only secured the inter-ministerial consensus for the consistencies of the 
National Program but also secured the inter-ministerial consensus for the 
appropriateness of the National Programs. The inter-ministerial resources 
should be invested in the bio-agricultural research which had the potential to 
be developed to be the high value-added agricultural products. Through 
technology transfer, the universities and agricultural companies were 
encouraged to establish the network which was important of the 
development of modern biotechnology. Moreover, since the vice-Ministers 
of the National Science Council and the Council of Agriculture were also 
involved in the Project Committee, the inter-ministerial consensus formed in 
the Steering Committee was able to be further secured in the detailed 
agendas of the National Program, including the targeted products. As 
described by the leader of the National Program (Intex6), many targeted 
products selected by the National Program were decided through the mutual 
agreements between different ministries. The agricultural products which 
were export-oriented, such as orchids and groupers, were especially selected. 
However, besides the coordination of the Mid-term Plans, there was no 
sufficient inter-ministerial consensus formed for the regulation policies 
related to the National Program. As described by one of the agricultural 
representatives (Intcomag3), although the vice-Ministers of the National 
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Science Council and the Council of Agriculture have once tried to set up the 
regulations of GMO in the meetings of the Project Committee, there was no 
actual inter-ministerial consensus formed for the regulation of GMO. The 
vice-Ministers at best agreed to fund the research of non-edible GMO and 
allowed the trade of non-edible GMO in the domestic market without any 
regulation. Also there was no inter-ministerial consensus formed for the 
amendments of the Management Act. In other words, there was no 
inter-ministerial consensus for the consistencies and appropriateness 
between the National Program and other interrelated agricultural regulations. 
While the general advice and the advice for the detailed agendas of the 
National Programs were given by the Steering Committee and the Project 
Committee to the leaders, the advice was instrumental for the 
inter-ministerial consensus. As long as the leaders followed this advise, they 
were able to make the concrete policy objectives and policy instruments of 
the National Program not only consistently coordinated the 15 % Mid-term 
Plans of the three ministries but also appropriately match the development 
of agricultural NSTIS. In addition, once the detailed agendas of the National 
Program, such as the targets of the National Program, were implemented by 
different ministries, these details were able to be consistently implemented 
by each ministry. Yet, because there was no inter-ministerial consensus for 
the consistencies and appropriateness between the National Program and 
interrelated regulation policies, the implementation of the National Program 
was not consistent with other regulation policies; and once being 
implemented together, the appropriateness of the National Program and 
regulation policies were limited and did not support adequately the 
development of agricultural NSTIS.   
               
The two Committees also played a significant role in involving external 
stakeholders. Since the Steering Committee involved no external 
stakeholders, the external stakeholders were unable to influence the policy 
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objectives and policy instruments. However, it was the Project Committee 
which played the most important roles in involving the external stakeholders. 
The numbers of academics and agricultural representatives in the Project 
Committee were almost the same, and the two kinds of external 
stakeholders were usually able to achieve the consensus for the development 
of agricultural NSTIS. As described by one agricultural representative 
(Intcomag3), he usually achieved the consensus with academics easily. 
Since the consensus of both kinds of representatives were able to be 
presented to all elected politicians of the National Program, such as the 
leaders and the vice-Ministers of the three ministries, the involvement of 
these external stakeholders positively contributed to the consistencies of the 
agendas of the National Program. Nevertheless, both the academic and the 
agricultural representatives were recommended by the government officials 
as individual scientists and individual companies. As individuals 
recommended by the government, they were in fact unable to represent the 
general interests of the scientific community or the general interests of the 
agricultural sector. They were also unable to let the elected politicians fully 
understand the dynamics of the agricultural NSTIS and increased the 
appropriateness of the National Program.  They at best presented the 
partial interests within the scientific community and the agricultural sector 
to the elected politicians. For example, one of the agricultural 
representatives (Intcomag4) explained that he once suggested the 
vice-Ministers that the National Program should increase the funding for the 
research of seeds of fruits and vegetables. Such suggestion was involved in 
the detailed agendas of the policy proposal of the National Program.    
 
The leaders of the National Program, as described by one of the leaders 
(Intex6), followed the advice of the Steering Committee and the Project 
Committee and decided the concrete policy objectives, policy instruments 
and the details of policy proposals. Since the agendas of the National 
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Program were designed through the inter-ministerial consensus, the policy 
objectives of the National Program were vertically consistent with the 
general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan, and the National Program 
was able to make the policy objectives and the policy instruments of the 
15% Mid-term Plans of the three ministries horizontally consistent with 
each other. Moreover, the policy objectives which encouraged the 
bio-agricultural research within the universities and encouraged the 
technological diffusion from the universities to agricultural companies were 
also appropriate. In addition, since the inter-ministerial consensus for the 
detailed agendas of the National Program was achieved, the National 
Program was expected to be consistently and appropriately implemented by 
different ministries. Yet, because of the absence of the suitable involvement 
of external stakeholders, the representatives of the external stakeholders 
were unable to increase the appropriateness of the National Program. Once 
the details of the National Program were implemented, even though the 
general direction of the National Program was still appropriate, the 
appropriateness was unavoidably limited as the interests of particular groups 
of scientists and agricultural companies captured the National Program.   
 
6.4.2.1.4 Brief conclusion of the section 6.4.2.1.1 
 
The agendas of the two pharmaceutical National Programs and the 
agricultural National Program were set up by similar process. However, 
because of the different extents of the inter-ministerial consensus and the 
involvement of external stakeholders, the consistencies and appropriateness 
of the three National Programs were also different. The agricultural National 
Program which were made under higher inter-ministerial consensus for the 
policy objectives and detailed agendas was expected to have more 
appropriateness to the development of the agricultural NSTIS than the two 
pharmaceutical National Programs towards the pharmaceutical NSTIS.          
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6.4.2.2 The stage of deciding  
 
The stage of deciding of the National Programs was the stage for the 
congressmen of the opposition party, Kuomintang, to authorize the policy 
proposals of the National Programs to be formal policies. According to our 
discussion in section 3.2.1.1, the decision making stage in the Taiwanese 
polity is deeply influenced by two independent variables, the divided 
government and the involvement of external stakeholders. In this section, 
we would especially focus on the influence of the two independent variables 
on the consistencies and appropriateness of the three National Programs.  
 
The congressmen of the opposition party, according to a congressman of 
Kuomintang (Intleg1), had different policy preferences and priorities from 
the ruling party and had high incentives to change the contents of the 
National Programs; yet, there were three reasons which reduced the 
oversight of the congressmen. First, biotechnology was too technical to 
congressmen. Once the policy proposals of the National Programs were full 
of professional terms, congressmen were unable to understand, to monitor 
the policy proposals and to judge the consistencies and the appropriateness 
of these policy proposals. Second, the congress itself didn’t provide 
sufficient resources, including financial and human resources, to support the 
congressmen to understand the National Programs. The congressmen of the 
opposition party in fact needed to rely on the information given by the four 
ministries to review the policy proposals. According to our interviewee, the 
Ministers of the four ministries then used to give the congressmen 
insufficient information and easily escaped from the oversight of the 
congress. Third, the congressmen should face the pressures from their 
districts. The majority of voters of the opposition party supported economic 
development, and the development of biotechnology was considered to be 
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an important part of the economic development. With the pressure from the 
voters, the congressmen of the opposition party hesitated to change the 
policy contents and cut the budgets of the National Programs which aimed 
to support the growth of biotechnology and related sectors. One further 
congressman of Kuomintang (Intleg2) shared the same opinion that since 
his voters had limited opposition to the development of biotechnology, he 
had no incentives to cut but authorized the majority of the budgets of the 
National Programs. 
 
The external stakeholders, especially the pharmaceutical and agricultural 
companies, interacted with the congressmen of the opposition party through 
the participation of congressional public hearings. As described by the CEO 
of R&D of Taiwan Liposome Company (Intcomph3), the company once 
participated in the public hearings to explain the problems of the 
implementation of the Law of Pharmaceutical Affairs.  One of the 
agricultural representatives in the National Science and Technology 
Program for Bio agriculture also once participated in the public hearings to 
express the general interests of the agricultural companies (Intcomag3). 
According to his experiences, the public hearing was an effective 
mechanism to express the interests of the agricultural companies to the 
congressmen. However, both the individual companies and interests groups 
were involved in the public hearings. From our perspective, these 
companies and interest groups did not necessarily present the general 
interests of the pharmaceutical or the agricultural sector to the congressmen 
but in many cases the interests of particular companies and small groups of 
companies only. Therefore, the external stakeholders involved in the 
congressional public hearings were in most of the cases unable to help the 
congressmen to understand the dynamics of the modern biotechnology, 
pharmaceutical and the agricultural sectors in Taiwan and authorized the 
National Programs towards the direction which was appropriate to the 
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development of the two NSTIS.  
 
However, according to the experiences of the congressman of the opposition 
party (Intleg1), the involvement of the companies of pharmaceuticals or the 
agriculture was not influential to the judgment of the congressmen towards 
the National Programs. Therefore, the involvement of the companies had 
limited impacts on the deciding process of the National Programs. Since the 
policy proposals of the three National Programs were decided separately, we 
introduce the deciding process of each National Program below.  
   
The policy proposals of the National Research Program for Genetic 
Medicine were smoothly authorized by the congress; all policy objectives, 
the policy instruments and the details of the policy proposals remained 
while transformed to be formal policies. As described by the leader of the 
National Research Program for Genomic Medicine (Intex4), the 
congressmen of the opposition party only monitored the expenditure and the 
outputs of the National Program, such as the number of technology transfer. 
As long as the leaders successfully persuaded the congressmen that the 
development of the genetic research took long time, and it was normal that 
the National Program would not be able to produce obvious outputs in a 
short-term, the congressmen authorized all the budgets of the National 
Program. The congressman of Kuomintang (Intleg1) also stated that the 
National Program was too specialized for the congressmen. Since the 
congressmen of the opposition party had difficulties in judging the 
consistencies and appropriateness of the National Program, all the budgets 
of the National Program were approved. 
 
However, the policy proposals of the National Science and Technology 
Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals were highly criticized by 
the congressmen; even though the policy objectives remained the same, 
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details of the policy instruments were changed while being transformed into 
be formal policies. As described by the leader of the National Program 
(Intex5), the policy proposals of the National Program were seriously 
criticized by the congressmen because it was hard to see the National 
Program’s substantial contribution to the pharmaceutical sector in a short 
time. As shown in the Committee Record of the Legislative Yuan31, 20% of 
the budgets derived from the Mid-term Plan of the Department of Health 
were suspended, while the budgets derived from the Mid-term Plan of the 
National Science Council were all approved. Even though the policy 
objectives remained consistent and appropriate, the policy instruments were 
changed. Once the policy instruments of different ministries were 
implemented, it was expected that the National Science Council would still 
fund the basic bio-pharmaceutical research in the universities according to 
the original plan, but the Department of Health would have difficulties to 
fund the research of clinical trials because of unsatisfied budgets. Indeed, 
the congressmen broke the consistencies of the policy instruments of the 
National Program. It was then very difficult for different ministries to 
consistently implement the National Program. Moreover, since the 
ministries did not achieve a consensus for the National Program with the 
congressmen, the policy instruments were changed without the 
consideration of the appropriateness. The budgets of the Department of 
Health cut by the congressmen in fact reduce the efforts of the National 
Program which tended to establish the network between different actors.  
 
In contrast, the policy proposals of the National Science and Technology 
Program for Bio-Agriculture were smoothly authorized by the congressmen 
of the opposition party; neither the policy objectives and policy instruments 
nor the details of the policy proposals were changed while being 
                                                 
31
 See the Committee Record of Legislative Yuan: 
http://lci.ly.gov.tw/doc/communique%5Cfinal%5Cword%5C98%5C37%5CLCIDP_983701
_00047.doc.. 
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transformed into formal policies. As described by the leader of the National 
Program (Intex6), since many congressmen of the opposition party were 
elected by agricultural counties, these congressmen easily understood the 
importance of bio-agriculture. Some congressmen of the opposition party 
even suggested the leaders of the National Program to do more research 
related to their counties.  
      
While the three National Programs were decided by the congressmen of the 
opposition party, only the policy contents of one National Program, the 
National Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and 
Pharmaceuticals, was changed by the congressmen, and the contents of the 
other two National Programs remained the same. Once being changed, the 
formal policies of the National Science and Technology Program for 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals became difficult to be consistently 
implemented and appropriate to match the development of pharmaceutical 
NSTIS. It was the divided government which shaped the inconsistencies and 
inappropriateness of the National Program.  
 
6.4.2.3 The stage of the Implementation  
 
6.4.2.3.1 Introduction  
 
The stage of implementation of the three National Programs was the stage 
for the administrators to implement the policy contents and to realize the 
policy objectives of the National Programs. In order to coordinate the 
implementation of different implementation bodies under the National 
Programs, the National Science Council newly established and supervised 
the Office of each National Program. The administrators of each Office, 
according to the official websites of the three National Programs32, were led 
                                                 
32
 See the Office of the three National Programs.  
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by the leaders of each National Program. These Offices were especially 
established by the National Science Council to implement the National 
Programs and should represent the National Science Council to coordinate 
the implementation of the implementation bodies of other ministries. 
However, these Offices were horizontal to other implementation bodies 
without higher authority or more resources. As we have described in section 
3.3.3, the stage of implementation is deeply influenced by three independent 
variables: the vertical coordination, the horizontal inter-departmental 
coordination and the involvement of external stakeholders. All of these three 
variables would influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies. In this section, we especially focus on the influence of the three 
independent variables on the consistencies and appropriateness of the three 
National Programs. 
 
6.4.2.3.2 The implementation of the two pharmaceutical National Programs   
            
The Office of each pharmaceutical National Program played essential roles 
to coordinate the implementation bodies under the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the Department of Health. The Office of the National Research 
Program for Genetic Medicine was under the National Science Council and 
was responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Bureau of 
Industrial Development under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
National Health Research Institute under the Department of Health (see 
Figure 6.2). As also shown in Figure 6.2, the Office of the National Science 
and Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals was 
responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Department of 
Industrial Technology under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
National Health Research Institute under the Department of Health. 
However, both the two Offices encountered three problems of 
implementation that impinged upon inter-departmental coordination, 
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vertical coordination and the involvement of external stakeholders in the 
technology transfer.       
 
The two Offices encountered the problem for the horizontal 
inter-departmental coordination. Since the stage of agenda-setting, there was 
no inter-ministerial consensus formed for the detailed agendas of the two 
National Programs, such as the targets of the National Programs. As 
described by the leader of the National Research Program for Genetic 
Medicine (Intex4), it was very difficult to coordinate the implementation 
bodies of different ministries. For instance, the Bureau of Industrial 
Development under the Ministry of Economic Affairs was very reluctant to 
be involved in the National Program. From the perspective of the Bureau, 
the National Program which targeted the genetic research was very difficult 
to generate local pharmaceutical SMEs profits in a short term. Since the 
mission of the Bureau was to support local pharmaceutical SMEs to 
generate short-term profits, after several years of coordination, the Bureau 
decided to withdraw the majority of its funding from the National Program. 
The Office which had no higher authority than the Bureau in fact was 
unable to forbid the Bureau to withdraw the resources. Moreover, the Office 
of the National Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and 
Pharmaceuticals also encountered very similar problem for horizontal 
inter-ministerial coordination. As described by the leader of the National 
Program (Intex5), the Department of Industrial Technology under the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs was very reluctant to implement the National 
Program. The National Program which targeted the development of new 
pharmaceuticals took long time to generate profits; yet, the Department 
explained that its mission was to help the local pharmaceutical SMEs to 
create values in a short-term. Therefore, the Department tended to fund the 
innovation of Me-Too pharmaceuticals rather than the new pharmaceuticals. 
After four years collaboration, the Department also drew back the majority 
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of its resources from the National Program. 
 
In addition, the problem of vertical coordination of the two National 
Programs even increased the difficulties of implementation. As described by 
the officer of the Office of the National Science and Technology Program 
for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals (Intad5), once the Ministers of the 
three ministries delegated power to the implementation bodies, they no 
longer monitored the implementation of the two National Programs. In other 
words, the Ministers and the vice-Ministers involved in the Steering 
Committees of the two National Programs didn’t monitor the 
implementation of the National Programs. Even though the leaders, as 
elected politicians, were delegated by the Minister of the National Science 
Council to coordinate and to monitor the implementation of the National 
Programs from top-down, in practice, it was almost impossible for the 
leaders to improve the vertical coordination of the National Programs. As 
described by the leader of the National Research Program for Genetic 
Medicine (Intex4), the budgets of the National Program were contributed by 
different ministries, and the head of each implementation body was in fact 
the Minister of the ministry to which it belonged. The leaders who only 
represented the National Science Council were very difficult to supervise 
the implementation of the implementation bodies belonging to the other two 
ministries. The same opinion was shared by the leader of National Science 
and Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals (Intex5). 
He once asked the two research organizations under the Department of 
Industrial Technology, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to help 
universities to do fundamental biotechnological research, because their help 
would accelerate the development of new pharmaceuticals. Yet, the 
suggestion was rejected by the Department of Industrial Technology, the 
boss of the two research organizations. In other words, even though the 
leaders of the two National Programs discovered that the implementation of 
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the National Programs was distorted and was hard to realize the policy 
objectives of the National Programs, the leaders were unable to improve the 
vertical coordination and amend the distortion.  
 
Moreover, the two National Programs also encountered great difficulties in 
involving external stakeholders in the technology transfer. As we have 
described in section 6.4.2.1.2, the detailed agendas of the two National 
Programs, such as the targeted diseases and products, were strongly guided 
by the partial interests among the scientific community, and the general 
interests of the pharmaceutical sector were largely excluded from these 
detailed agendas which were later authorized as formal policies. When these 
formal policies were implemented, as described by an academic involved in 
the National Program (Intac3), he was eager to transfer his innovation to 
pharmaceutical companies. Yet, as described by the officer of National 
Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals 
(Intad5), the majority of pharmaceutical companies were quite indifferent to 
the transfer of the biotechnologies from the universities funded by the 
National Program. The larger pharmaceutical companies which have not yet 
intended to invest in the innovation of new pharmaceuticals were not 
incentivized to transfer biotechnologies from universities funded by the 
National Programs. Only a small number of new bio- pharmaceutical 
companies and the companies of Chinese herbal medicines were more 
willing to transfer biotechnologies funded by the National Programs. As 
described by one new bio-pharmaceutical company (Intcomph3) and two 
companies of Chinese herbal medicines (Intcomph2, Intcomph4), they 
expected to discover the new components of new pharmaceuticals in an 
early stage. They transferred biotechnologies from the universities funded 
by the National Program because the targets of the National Programs 
coincidentally fit their business. However, in many cases, as described by 
the officer of the National Program (Intad5), many biotechnologies could 
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not be licensed out.                              
             
After the implementation bodies implemented the policies of the two 
National Programs, the two National Programs, as we have described in 
section 6.3.1.3, didn’t achieve their policy objectives. At least in the short 
term, the two National Programs have very limited appropriate supports to 
the development of pharmaceutical NSTIS. The horizontal 
inter-departmental coordination, the vertical coordination, and the 
involvement of external stakeholders are the main reasons to explain the 
implementation failure of the two pharmaceutical National Programs.            
 
6.4.2.3.3 The implementation of the agricultural National Program  
       
The Office of the National Science and Technology Program for Bio 
agriculture played essential roles to coordinate the implementation bodies 
under the Ministry of Economic Affairs (the Bureau of Industrial 
Development) and the Council of Agriculture (Technology Department) (see 
Figure 6.2). Nevertheless, the Office encountered similar problems as for 
coordination and involvement of external stakeholders. Since the context of 
the implementation of the National Programs was very similar to the two 
pharmaceutical National Programs, this section only focuses on the 
differences of the agricultural National Program.    
 
First, the Office encountered the problem of horizontal inter-departmental 
coordination. As described by the leader of the National Program (Intex6), 
the implementation bodies under different ministries were very difficult to 
coordinate with each other. In the stage of agenda-setting, the three 
ministries have achieved the inter-ministerial consensus for the detailed 
agendas of the National Program and decided to coordinate the R&D 
funding derived from the 15% Mid-term Plans of the three ministries to 
 219
fund the targeted bio-agricultural research and agricultural products. 
Therefore, in the stage of implementation, the implementation bodies under 
different ministries had no problem to horizontally cooperate with each 
other in funding the innovation of bio-agricultural products. However, since 
there was no inter-ministerial consensus formed for the agricultural 
regulation in the stage of agenda-setting, the Bureau of Industrial 
Development and the Technology Department always competed for the 
leadership of regulations of the agricultural sector. For example, the Bureau 
of Industrial Development executed the ‘Factory Rules’ to regulate pesticide 
factories, and the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and 
Quarantine of the Technology Department also executed ‘Agro-pesticides 
Management Act’ to regulate the same factories. While the Bureau of 
Industrial Development considered some of the factories not to be the 
pesticide factories and should only get one license from the Bureau, the 
Technology Department insisted that all factories related to pesticide should 
get the second license from the Department. Even though the 
inter-departmental competition already delayed the technology transfer, 
especially the technology transfer to the companies of bio-pesticides, the 
two bodies were still very difficult to coordinate with each other.  
 
The Office also encountered the problem of the vertical coordination. As 
described by the leader of the National Program (Intex6), the Minister and 
the vice-Ministers of the three ministries had severe difficulties in 
monitoring the details for the implementation of the National Program. As 
long as the implementation bodies were able to persuade that the 
implementation was proper, the Minister and the vice-Ministers simply 
believed the agencies and no longer supervised the implementation. Even 
when the leaders discovered the direction of implementation was distorted 
and far from the policy objectives, the leaders who only represented the 
National Science Council was unable to fixed the distortion of the 
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implementation of the implementation bodies of the other two ministries 
from top-down. 
 
The Office also encountered problems to involve the external stakeholders 
in the technology transfer. As described by the leader of the National 
Program (Intex6), the larger agricultural companies were very indifferent to 
transfer biotechnologies from the National Program, and it was the new 
small companies which were more willing to transfer the biotechnologies. In 
fact, none of the agricultural representatives transferred biotechnologies 
funded by the National Program. As described by one of the agricultural 
representatives (Intcomag4), as he already knew that the government was 
unable to solve the regulation problem of GMO, he hesitated to transfer 
biotechnologies of GM. The new agricultural company of bio-pesticide and 
agricultural trade company (Intcomag5, Intcomag6) transferred 
biotechnologies from the universities funded by the National Program 
because the targets of the National Program, as expressed by the Assistant 
Manager and the Vice president R&D of the two companies, coincidently 
fitted to their business of bio-pesticide and GMO ornamental fish. However, 
as described by the leader of the National Program (Intex6), the National 
Program finally transferred the majority of technologies to small companies.  
 
After being implemented, as we described in section 6.3.2.3, the National 
Program did not fully achieve its objectives. The inter–ministerial resources 
have been consistently invested in the targeted bio-agricultural research and 
products and have encouraged some academics and small agricultural 
companies to establish networks through technology transfer. Yet, because 
of the three problems of implementation, the policy had only limited 
participation and mobilization. 
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6.4.2.3.4 A brief conclusion of the section 
 
After being implemented, the agricultural National Program was more 
effective than the two pharmaceutical National Programs. The agricultural 
National Program which had higher extent of horizontal inter-departmental 
coordination in the stage of implementation offered more appropriate 
supports to the agricultural NSTIS than the two pharmaceutical NSTIS to 
the pharmaceutical NSTIS.         
                                  
6.4.2.4 The stage of the evaluation   
   
The stage of evaluation, according to our discussion in section 3.3.5, is the 
stage to examine and to access the effect of the three National Programs on 
the pharmaceutical or agricultural NSTIS. As we have assumed in section 
3.3.5, if the evaluation of the three National Programs has been done 
properly and truly reflected the response of the external stakeholders, the 
National Program would contribute to the consistencies and appropriateness 
of new agendas of the National Programs in the new cycle of the 
policy-making process. However, the National Programs were not evaluated 
under the ideal conditions.  
 
The evaluations of the National Programs which were done by the Office of 
each National Program only showed the quantitative data of the economic 
index of each National Program without further assessments. The evaluation 
only displayed the numbers of papers published, postgraduate students 
trained, patents produced, technology transfers and spring-offs33. There was 
no external evaluation mechanism. Furthermore, the policy effect of the 
three National Programs on the development of NSTIS was totally ignored. 
As we have described in section 6.2., one of the main purposes of the 
                                                 
33
 See the rules of evaluation of National Science Council  
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National Programs was to better integrate the R&D resources of the four 
ministries. However, as discussed in section 6.4.2.3.2 and section 6.4.2.3.3, 
only the agricultural National Program has integrated the resources of 
different ministries in the stage of implementation, and the two 
pharmaceutical National Programs didn’t because the implementation 
bodies of the Ministry of Economic Affairs withdrew the majority of their 
resources from the two National Programs. Moreover, as shown in section 
6.3.1.3 and section 6.3.2.3, the two pharmaceutical National Programs were 
not effective, and only the agricultural National Program better achieved 
their goals on the agricultural NSTIS. However, the different levels of 
effects of the three National Programs on different sectors were never 
discussed by the evaluation reports of the National Programs.   
 
Because of the un-proper mechanism of the evaluation, the Taiwanese 
government as a whole in fact learned very little from the experiences of the 
National Programs. Thus, the same problems that appeared in the first cycle 
of policy-making process may be repeated. Moreover, the policy of the 
National Programs may never really achieve the policy objectives to a 
meaningful extent.  
 
6.4.3 Regulation policies  
 
6.4.2.1 The stage of agenda-setting  
 
The stage of the agenda-setting of the Law and the Management Act was the 
stage for the Ministers and the high level management of the regulatory 
bodies to decide the agendas of these two policies. As we have described in 
section 3.3.1, the stage of agenda-setting is deeply influenced by two 
independent variables: the horizontal inter-ministerial coordination and the 
involvement of external stakeholders. In this section, we will discuss the 
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nature of the two independent variables and their influence on the 
consistencies and the appropriateness of two regulation policies.    
 
6.4.3.1.1 The agenda-setting of the Law of Pharmaceutical Affairs  
 
The Director-General and the high level managers of the Bureau of 
Pharmaceutical Affairs under the Department of Health (see Figure 6.2) 
were the most essential elected politicians to decide the agendas of the Law. 
As described by one of the high level managers of the Food and Drug 
Administration (the new name of the Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs) 
(Intad8). Although the Minister of the Department of Health was 
institutionally the highest level of elected politicians to set up the agendas of 
the bills of the Law and the affiliated administrative rules, in the majority of 
cases, the Minister only gave the general managerial direction to the Bureau 
and fully delegated the Director-General and other high level management 
of the Bureau to decide the detailed agendas of the bills and the 
administrative rules. While the bills should be approved by the Minister 
before sending to the Legislative Yuan for further legislation, the 
administrative rules should only be decided by the Director-General of the 
Bureau.  
 
All the agendas of the Law were set up without inter-ministerial consensus. 
As described by the Minister of the Department of Health (Intex3), the 
Minister of the Department set up the Platform for Communication between 
the Department and the Ministry of Economic Affairs in order to form the 
inter-ministerial consensus for the agendas of the policy objectives and the 
policy instruments of the Law and its affiliated administrative rules. Yet, 
according to the description of a high level manager of the Food and Drug 
Administration (Intad8), there was in fact no general concrete 
inter-ministerial consensus formed through the Platform. Besides the 
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Platform, as we have described in section 6.4.2.1.2, the agenda-setting 
process of the National Programs did neither lead to sufficient consistency 
between the Law and the National Programs nor the appropriateness of the 
Law. Indeed, while the Minister of the Department of Health gave the 
general directions for the agendas of the Law, these general directions were 
given without inter-ministerial consensus. As described by the Minister 
(Intex3), he has once requested the Bureau to set up the agendas of the Law 
and its affiliated administrative rules not only to control the safeties of 
medicines but also to appropriately match the development of 
pharmaceutical NSTIS, such as using the regulation of the Law to 
encourage the pharmaceutical companies to involve in the innovation of 
new pharmaceuticals and new bio-pharmaceuticals and cluster network with 
academics through technology transfer. This general direction was in fact 
vertically consistent with the general policy objectives of the Promotion 
Plan and horizontally consistent with other interrelated policies which aimed 
to support the growth of the pharmaceutical sector, including the National 
Programs. However, because of the shortage of inter-ministerial consensus, 
the Bureau was not informed to consider the policies of other ministries 
while it set up the agendas of the Law and the affiliated administrative rules. 
We will further discuss the issue in section 6.4.3.3.    
 
It was indeed the involvement of external stakeholders which deeply 
influenced the Bureau in the selection of the agendas of the Law and its 
affiliated administrative rules. Since the involvement of the pharmaceutical 
associations and which of the medical device companies were very different, 
in the following paragraphs, we introduce the involvement of 
pharmaceutical associations first and introduce the involvement of the 
medical device companies afterwards.       
   
The pharmaceutical associations were heavily involved in the 
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agenda-setting process of the bills of the Law. During 2000 to 2008, the 
Law was extensively amended in order to add new clauses for 
pharmaceutical data exclusivity to encourage the innovation of new 
medicines through the policy instruments of protection. To initiate the 
agendas for the amendments of the Law, the Bureau invited the 
representatives recommended by 6 pharmaceutical associations, i.e. 5 
pharmaceutical associations composed of local SMEs and 1 pharmaceutical 
association composed of MNCs (Bureau, 2005). From the perspective of the 
MNCs, the protection for the pharmaceutical data exclusivity should be as 
long as possible. Since the government of the United States allowed 5 years 
protection and the governments of EU countries allowed 7 years protection, 
the representative of MNCs asked the Taiwanese government to give 
pharmaceutical data 7 years protection. However, from the perspective of 
local SMEs, the protection for pharmaceutical data should be as short as 
possible. The representatives of local SMEs strongly opposed the 7 years 
protection because the high protection would seriously delay their 
manufacturing activities of genetic medicines or the innovation of Me-too 
medicines. In fact, it was very difficult for the representative of MNCs and 
the representatives of SMEs to achieve a consensus. Therefore, the Bureau 
decided to compromise the interests of both MNCs and SMEs and set up the 
agendas that the Taiwanese government would give pharmaceutical data 5 
years protection. Yet, MNCs were quite unsatisfied about such agendas. 
They turned to lobby the government of the United States to stress the 
Minister of the Department of Health. The government of the United States 
informed the Minister, if the Taiwanese government expected to sign the 
FTA with the United States, the Taiwanese government must accept the 7 
years protection. After several years of negotiation, the Minister finally 
released the bill that the Taiwanese government would give 5 years 
protection to the pharmaceutical data of new medicines as the balance 
between the local SMEs and MNCs. Besides, the Taiwanese government 
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also gave 3 years protection to the data of Me-too medicines in order to 
response to the government of the United States and the interests of MNCs 
(Yang, 2004). In other words, while the bill was released by the Minister, 
the policy purpose which intended to encourage both MNCs and SMEs to 
innovate new pharmaceuticals was appropriate. The policy instrument of 
protection which was decided with the full knowledge of the pharmaceutical 
ecology and balanced the different interests of MNCs and SMEs in order o 
support the general interests of the pharmaceutical sector was also 
appropriate but relatively inclined to the interests of MNCs. We will further 
discuss the bill in the next section. 
 
The pharmaceutical associations were also heavily involved in the 
agenda-setting process of the affiliated administrative rules of the Law 
which decided the details of the policy instruments of the Law, such as the 
detailed process of license. As described by the high level manager of the 
Food and Drug Administration (Intad8), in order to smoothly implement the 
administrative rules, the Bureau tended to involve the interests of the 
pharmaceutical associations since the stage of agenda-setting. For example, 
as pointed out by the manager of Bayer Taiwan (Intcomph5), through the 
association of the MNCs, the company suggested the Bureau to reduce the 
administrative procedures for importing new patented pharmaceuticals. 
Such suggestion was adopted by the Bureau. To expand the market in EU, in 
2007, Taiwan Pharmaceutical Manufactures’ Association suggested the 
Bureau to adopt EU standard, the ‘Pharmaceutical Inspection Cooperation 
Scheme’ (PIC/S), as part of the administrative rules of ‘Good Manufacturing 
Practice’. The Bureau also adopted the suggestion of the Association and 
involved PIC/S in the agendas for the amendments of ‘Good Manufacturing 
Practice’ (MOEA News, 2007).  
 
However, compared with the intensive involvement of pharmaceutical 
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association, the medical device companies were quite indifferent to the 
agenda-setting of the Law. No clause of the Law which was related to 
medical devices has been significantly amended during 2000 to 2008. While 
the policy purpose and the policy instruments of pharmaceutical clauses of 
the Law were extensively amended to positively support the development of 
the pharmaceutical sector, the policy purpose of the clauses relating to 
medical devices remained to merely control the safeties of medical devices 
and did not intend to positively support the development of medical device 
sector through all kinds of policy instruments. However, the only 
association of the medical device sector hardly activated its members to 
lobby the high level management of the Bureau or the Minister of the 
Department of Health. As described by the Director of the R&D Division of 
Medical Device SME B (Intcommd2), the companies of medical devices 
competed with each other severely not only in the domestic but also in the 
foreign markets. It was very difficult for the companies of medical devices 
to consolidate with each other and lobby the elected politicians.   
 
While the agendas of the Law and affiliated administrative rules were set up, 
the purpose and instruments of these new agendas, according to the 
discussions above, was appropriate to the development of pharmaceutical 
NSTIS but inconsistent with other interrelated policies. In fact, these 
agendas were set up without inter-ministerial consensus and extensive 
involvement of pharmaceutical associations. Without sufficient 
inter-ministerial consensus, only the policy purpose of the new clauses 
loosely followed the general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan, while 
the policy instruments of the bills of the Law were not horizontally 
complementary to other interrelated policies. Moreover, because of lacking 
inter-ministerial consensus for the appropriateness of the Law, once being 
implemented, the effect of the Law may not be complementary with other 
interrelated policies, such as the National Programs. In addition, since both 
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the interests of the pharmaceutical MNCs and SMEs were involved in the 
agenda-setting process, they were able to represent the general interests of 
the pharmaceutical sector to the Bureau. Through the involvement of the 
pharmaceutical associations the policy goals and instruments of the Law 
became more appropriate, as all the agendas tended to encourage the 
innovation of new pharmaceuticals were decided with fully knowledge of 
the general interests of the pharmaceutical sector. Therefore, the new 
agendas were able to match the knowledge dynamics of the pharmaceutical 
sector, and the policy purpose was expected to be achieved. However, since 
the pharmaceutical associations were only able to be involved in the 
agenda-setting of the Law rather than the National Programs, the 
involvement of the pharmaceutical associations was not able to contribute to 
the consistencies between the Law and the National Programs. Furthermore, 
the medical device companies which were not involved in the 
agenda-setting of the Law were unable to contribute to the consistencies and 
appropriateness of the Law. 
   
6.4.3.1.2 The agenda-setting of the Agro-pesticides Management Act   
 
The Director-General and other high level managers of the Bureau of 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection under the Council of Agriculture (see 
Figure 6.2) were the most important elected politicians to decide the 
agendas for the bills of the Management Act. As described by one of the 
high level managers of the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
and Quarantine and the Agriculture (Intad6), the Minister of the Council of 
Agriculture only gave the general directions to the Bureau, and it was the 
high level managers of the Bureau to decide all the agendas of the 
Management Act. As we have described in section 6.4.2.2, there was no 
inter-ministerial consensus formed as to what should be the most 
appropriate objectives and instruments of the Management Act and as to the 
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consistencies of the policy objectives and the policy instruments between 
the Management Act and the National Program. Rather, it was indeed the 
involvement of external stakeholders that mainly influenced the selection of 
the agendas of the Act.  
  
The Bureau held regular public hearings to involve the interests of 
agricultural companies, especially the pesticide companies. However, the 
companies participated in these public hearings were not recommended by 
the agricultural associations but were involved as individual companies. As 
individual companies, they were in fact unable to represent the general 
interests of agricultural sector. As described by the high level manager of the 
Bureau (Intad6), since some companies suggested that the Management Act 
which adopted the policy instruments to regulate the manufacturing 
machines of bio-pesticides in detail seriously reduced the flexibility of these 
companies, the Bureau accepted the suggestions and then set up the agendas 
for the amendments of the policy instruments of the Management Act to 
delete the detailed regulations for the manufacturing machines.   
 
Next to the pesticide companies, the congressmen of the opposition party 
also played significant roles in the agenda-setting process of the 
Management Act. Yet, the congressmen merely pushed the Bureau to amend 
policy instruments of the Management Act to stricter control the safeties of 
the pesticides rather than to appropriately encourage the innovation of 
bio-pesticide. As described by the high level manager of the Bureau (Intad6), 
since the poisonous pesticide was frequently misused for commit suicide, in 
2007, under the suggestion of the congressmen, the Bureau initiated the new 
agendas for the amendments of the Management Act and revealed the new 
policy instruments that only the farmers were qualified to buy the poisonous 
pesticides.  
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While the new agendas of the policy instruments of the Management Act 
were selected by the Bureau, these new agendas strengthened the policy 
objective of the Management Act which tended to control the food safeties. 
These agendas were selected without inter-ministerial consensus and with 
unsuitable involvement of external stakeholders. Because of lacking 
inter-ministerial consensus, the policy objective of the Management Act 
which was solely decided by the Council of Agriculture was not vertically 
consistent with the general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan, the 
policy objective and the policy instruments of the Management Act which 
didn’t tend to encourage the innovation of bio-pesticide was in fact 
inappropriate to the development of agricultural sector and horizontally 
inconsistent with other interrelated policies, such as the National Program 
which tended to encourage the innovation of bio-agricultural products. 
Furthermore, without the suitable involvement, the participation of the 
pesticide companies in the public hearing was very difficult to positively 
increase to the consistencies between the Management Act and the National 
Program, as well as the appropriateness of the Management Act.                   
 
6.4.3.2 The stage of deciding  
 
The stage of deciding of regulation policies was the stage for the 
congressmen of the opposition party to legislate the bills to be laws and to 
monitor the decisions of administrative rules. Since we have assumed in 
section 3.3.1 that the stage of deciding is deeply influence by two 
independent variables, the divided government and the involvement of 
external stakeholders, in this section, we emphasizethe influence of the two 
independent variables on the consistencies and appropriateness of the Law 
and the Management Act.    
 
The congressmen of the opposition party played important roles in the 
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legislation of Law and monitoring the decisions of affiliated administrative 
rules of the Law. For the bills of pharmaceutical data exclusivity, the 
congressmen changed the bills before legislation. As we have described in 
section 6.4.3.1, while the Minister of the Department of Health decided the 
policy instrument of data exclusivity, the bill of the policy instrument of 
protection relatively inclined to the interests of the MNCs. The 
pharmaceutical associations of local SMEs which were unsatisfied about the 
bill turned to lobby the congressmen of the opposition party, and the MNCs 
also lobbied the congressmen in order to secure their interests. According to 
the meeting record of the Legislative Yuan34, the congressmen tended to 
further balance the interests of MNCs and local SMEs. While the new 
formally legislated clauses still gave 5 years protection to the data of new 
medicines, the 3 years protection for the data of Me-too medicines was 
deleted. Moreover, for the administrative rules, as described by the high 
level manager of the Food and Drug Administration (Intad8), the 
administrative rules should only be authorized by the Bureau, and the 
congressmen hardly reviewed the details of these administrative rules. For 
instance, the pharmaceutical PIC/S standards should only be approved by 
the Bureau.  
 
The congressmen of the opposition party also played important roles in the 
legislation of the Management Act. As described by the high level manager 
of the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine 
(Intad6), since it was the congressmen who suggested to amend the policy 
instrument of the Management Act and to strictly control the status of the 
buyers of the poisonous pesticide, the congressmen of the opposition party 
smoothly legislated the bill to be law.  
  
                                                 
34
 See the meeting record of the Legislative Yuan: 
http://lis.ly.gov.tw/ttscgi/lgimg?@940604;0271;0292 
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While the congressmen of the opposition party legislated the bills of the 
Law and the Management Act to be laws, according to the discussions 
above, the policy purpose and the policy instruments of the new clauses of 
the Law remained appropriate and consistent with the general policy 
objectives of the Promotion Plan and with policy objectives of other 
interrelated policies, such as the National Programs; the policy objectives 
and the policy instruments of the Management Act remained inappropriate 
and inconsistent with the National Program. In the case of the Law, even 
though the congressmen of the opposition party were unable to form the 
consensus with the Minister of the Department of Health, it was the same 
blocks of interest groups which lobbied both the executive and the 
legislative branches bridged the policy preferences of the two branches. 
Because the bills of the Law was legislated with the full knowledge of the 
dynamics of the pharmaceutical sector, once the bills were legislated to be 
laws, the new clauses of the Law were able to further appropriately match 
the pharmaceutical NSTIS. In the case of the Management Act, since the 
policy preference of the congressmen of the opposition party was involved 
in the agendas of the Management Act, the congressmen consistently 
authorized the bills to be laws. Yet, even if the executive branch and the 
legislative branch have established high consensus, this consensus was 
established upon without the suitable involvement of the external 
stakeholders (especially the agricultural companies of pesticide) and without 
the clear understanding on the dynamics of modern biotechnology and the 
agricultural sector. The consensus was in fact unable to positively increase 
the appropriateness of the agricultural sector. We will further discuss the 
roles of the congressmen in the divided government in Chapter 7.    
         
6.4.3.3 The stage of implementation  
 
The stage of implementation of the Law and the Management Act was the 
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stage for the administrators of the regulatory bodies to implement the 
clauses of the laws and administrative rules. The implementation body of 
the Law was the Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs, and the implementation 
body of the Management Act was the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection and Quarantine. Since we assume in section 3.3.3 that the stage 
of implementation is deeply influenced by three independent variables, the 
vertical coordination, the horizontal inter-departmental coordination and the 
involvement of external stakeholders, in this section, we will focus on the 
influence of these three variables on the consistencies and appropriateness 
of the Law and the Management Act. In the following paragraphs, we 
introduce the implementation of the Law and its affiliated administrative 
rules first and introduce the implementation of the Management Act 
afterwards.    
 
The Bureau of the Pharmaceutical Affairs had no horizontal 
inter-departmental coordination in the implementation of policy instruments 
of the Law and the administrative rules. According to the description of the 
high level manager of the Bureau (Intad8), the Bureau understood that many 
pharmaceutical companies which got R&D funding through the two 
pharmaceutical National Programs or the Mid-term Plan of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs to transfer biotechnologies frequently failed to get 
licenses from the Bureau for further clinical trials. Yet, besides dealing with 
such issues case by case, the Bureau had not further plan to establish new 
institutions to coordinate with other interrelated departments or to revise its 
regulations. 
 
The problem of the vertical coordination even deepened the difficulties of 
the implementation of the Law and the affiliated administrative rules. Once 
the Minister of the Department of Health gave the general direction to the 
Bureau, according to the description of the high level manager of the Bureau, 
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the Minister of the Department of Health seldom supervised the 
implementation of the Law and administrative rules. The general direction 
given by the Minister was to coordinate the Law under the framework of the 
Promotion Plan and make policy purpose and the policy instruments of the 
new clauses not only consistent with the general policy objectives and other 
interrelated policies but also positively support the development of the 
pharmaceutical sector. However, the implementation directed by the Bureau 
was towards the direction which was neither consistent nor appropriate. For 
example, according to the experiences of Taiwan Liposome Company and 
Pharmaceutical SME A (Intcomph3 and Intcomph4), even if the new clauses 
of reviewing the licenses of new medicines were legislated, the Bureau were 
very conservative to license the companies to do clinical trials. Yet, even 
though the implementation was distorted, the Minister was unable to fix the 
distortion from top-down immediately.    
       
The companies of pharmaceuticals and medical devices were involved in 
the stage of implementation as individual companies. For the 
pharmaceutical companies, according to the descriptions of the 
pharmaceutical companies we have interviewed (Intcomph3, Intcomph4, 
Intcomph5), even though some of them have participated in the stage of 
agenda-setting through the pharmaceutical associations, they were involved 
in the stage of implementation as individual companies. Unless these 
individual companies were able to persuade the pharmaceutical associations 
to take actions, they were difficult to get positive response from the Bureau. 
Moreover, for the medical device companies, the companies were only able 
to involve in the stage of implementation through suggesting the 
administrators of the Bureau individually. Yet, they frequently got rejections. 
For example, Medical Device SME C (Intcommd3) has once suggested the 
Bureau to increase the staffs to review the licenses of the medical devices. 
Such suggestion was rejected by the Bureau.  
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The Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine which 
implemented the policy instruments of the Management Act also established 
no horizontal inter-departmental coordination with other interrelated 
implementation bodies. According to the description of the high level 
manager of the Bureau (Intad6), the high level management of the Bureau 
has discovered that lots of the agricultural companies of bio-pesticides 
which were funded by the National Program to transfer single ingredients 
for fermentation were not able to get the license of manufacturing bio- 
pesticides. The reason was that these companies of bio-pesticides were 
unable to provide the Bureau sufficient documents of toxicology. From the 
Bureau’s perspective, if the research organizations or the universities 
provided the documents of toxicology to the companies while they 
transferred biotechnologies, the companies should be easier to get the 
licenses. Yet, besides communicating with the research organizations under 
the Council of Agriculture., the Bureau had no plan to coordinate with the 
implementation bodies of other ministries, such as the implementation 
bodies of the National Science Council or the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  
 
The problem for vertical coordination increased the difficulties for the 
implementation of the Management Act. As we have described in section 
6.4.3.1.2, the vertical coordination between the Minister of the Council of 
Agriculture and the Bureau was in fact very limited. The policy objective of 
the Management Act was not coordinated under the framework of the 
Promotion Plan, and there was no inter-ministerial consensus to coordinate 
the policy objectives and the policy instruments of the Management Act to 
be horizontally consistent with other policies, like the National Program. 
Once being implemented, the implementation of the Management Act was 
towards the direction which was neither vertically consistent with the 
general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan nor horizontally consistent 
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with the National Program. Furthermore, there was no inter-ministerial 
consensus for the appropriateness of the Management Act. After being 
implemented, the Management Act was difficult to appropriately match the 
development of agricultural sector.  
 
Moreover, the agricultural companies were only able to be involved in the 
implementation of the Management Act as individual companies. As 
described by the Assistant Manager of Advanced Green Biotechnology 
(Intcomag5), there was no association formed by the companies of 
bio-pesticides. As individual companies, the interests of these companies 
were difficult to be accepted by the Bureau. The pint of view was shared by 
the high level management (Intad6). For example, some companies once 
suggested the Bureau to set up the agendas to initiate a new law especially 
to regulate the bio-pesticide. Such suggestion was rejected by the Bureau. In 
short, as individual companies, the companies of pesticides were unable to 
represent the general interests of the agricultural sector to the Bureau and 
increase the Bureau’s understanding to the dynamics of the agricultural 
sector. Therefore, these companies were unable to increase the 
appropriateness of the Management Act. In addition, since these companies 
only explained their situations to the Bureau, they were not able to 
contribute to the consistencies between the Management Act and the 
National Program.  
 
To sum up, the policy objectives of the Law and the Management Act were 
inconsistent and inappropriate, because they hampered the establishment of 
the network between different actors; and only the purpose of the new 
clauses of the Law was vertically consistent with the Promotion Plan and 
horizontally consistent with other interrelated policies. However, once being 
implemented, as we have discussed in section 6.3.1.3 and section 6.3.2.3, 
both policies were not complementary with the National Program. The two 
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policies were in fact difficult to appropriately match the development of the 
three biotechnology related NSTIS. The vertical coordination, horizontal 
coordination and involvement of external stakeholders, were the key 
variables which shaped the stage.    
 
6.4.4 Brief conclusion of section 6.4  
 
As we have already shown in Figure 6.3, the political institutions of the two 
policies changed from stage to stage. The change of the political institutions 
will be further discussed in Chapter 7 while we compare the political 
institutions with our conceptual framework shown in Figure 3.1. In addition, 
on the basis of our analysis above, the consistencies and appropriateness of 
the two policies also change through the stages. Indeed, the two policies 
were decided by totally different processes. Since the actors involved in the 
National Programs had very limited connections to those involved in the 
regulation policies, it is not only that the policy objectives of the two 
policies were not consistent with each other, but once being implemented, 
the policies also were not entirely complementary. In addition the two 
policies towards the three biotechnology NSTIS differed. 
  
Through analyzing the policy-making process of the National Programs and 
the regulation policies, we clearly recognize the reasons why the policy 
objectives and the policy instruments of the two policies were not consistent 
with each other, as well as the reasons why the two policies together were 
unable to generate appropriate supports. As we have discussed in section 6.3, 
the two policies generated limited appropriate supports to the biotechnology 
related NSTIS in Taiwan. Since the stage of agenda-setting, the elected 
politicians didn’t coordinate the agendas of the two policies, and the 
involvement of external stakeholders was not able to positively contribute to 
the appropriateness and consistencies of the two policies. While the 
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congressmen decided the two policies, the congressmen of the opposition 
party were unable to positively coordinate the two policies to be consistent 
and appropriate. Moreover, in the stage of implementation, even though 
some of the administrators of implementation bodies noticed the 
inconsistencies and inappropriateness of the two policies, they were unable 
to implement the two policies towards the direction which was consistent 
and appropriate. As long as there was no mechanism to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the two policies, the Taiwanese government as a whole 
was very difficult to improve the variables which influenced the 
consistencies and appropriateness of the two policies. We will further 
discuss the dynamics of policy-making process in Chapter 7.                
 
6.5 Conclusion   
 
In this Chapter, using the empirical cases of Taiwan, we not only discuss the 
consistencies and the appropriateness of the National Programs but also 
explore the dynamics of the policy-making process. In Chapter 3, we only 
set up a single conceptual framework all RTDI policies. Yet, through 
analyzing the empirical cases, we discover that indeed there are many 
processes of policy-making within one political system; furthermore, one 
political system produces different policies towards different NSTIS 
because of the different interactions between different actors. The 
conceptual framework and the empirical discoveries are the main topic of 
Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 Analysis of the research questions, the conceptual 
framework and the empirical cases 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide in-depth analysis for our research 
questions and the conceptual framework through discussing the empirical 
cases of Taiwan. As we have described in Chapter 3, our four research 
questions and the conceptual framework are established upon four 
independent variables and two dependent variables, the consistencies and 
the appropriateness of RTDI policies. In addition, in Chapter 6 we have 
described in detail the policy - making process of the National Programs and 
the regulation policies (focusing on the Law and the Management Act), 
through the lens of our conceptual framework. However, as we have 
mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 6, we set up one conceptual 
framework for the policy - making process of all RTDI policies within one 
political system, but as shown by the empirical cases, there were indeed 
many policy - making processes within one political system. The analysis 
for the variety and the multiplicity of the cases and the stages are the core of 
this chapter and we will not only answer the research questions, but also 
further develop the conceptual framework on the basis of the empirical 
cases.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 reflects the four research 
questions. On the basis of the empirical cases we will analyze the influence 
of the four independent variables on the consistencies and appropriateness 
of the RTDI policies. Section 7.3 re-explores the conceptual framework by 
the empirical cases. In Chapter 3, as we have shown in Figure 3.1, we have 
divided the RTDI policy - making process into four stages and we assume 
each stage is influenced by different independent variables. Nevertheless, on 
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the basis of the empirical cases, in this section we will add the new analysis 
in our conceptual framework and deepen the understanding towards the 
RTDI policy - making process. The contribution and the limitation of the 
conceptual framework will be also discussed in the section. Section 7.4 is 
the conclusion of the chapter.       
 
7.2 The analysis of the research questions and the empirical cases    
 
7.2.1 The influence of the divided government on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies  
 
Our first research question established in section 3.2.1.1 asks: how does a 
divided government under the presidential polity influence the 
consistencies and appropriateness of the RTDI policies? The divided 
government, according to the definition of Elgie (2001:3), refers to the 
situation that ‘the president’s party fails to control a majority in at least one 
house of the legislature. As we describe in section 3.2.1, the literature of 
comparative politics extensively contributes to our first research question. 
As described by Smith et al (2006), the congress which is controlled by the 
opposition party most often has different policy priorities and preferences 
from the president’s ones. Samuels (2007) also speculates that under the 
divided government the president’s policies are very difficult to get 
approvals of the congress and once the dead - lock between the president 
and the congress happens, the presidential polity provides no institutional 
solution to solve the problems of the dead - lock. Moreover, according to the 
descriptions of Weatherford (1994), Cox and McCubbins (2000) and 
Pfiffner (1994), under the situation of the divided government the 
consistencies of policies are very difficult to be maintained because the 
congressmen of the opposition party are likely to break the consistencies of 
these policies through the legislative process. The only way for the president 
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to maintain the consistencies of the policies, from the perspectives of these 
scholars, is to employ his / her leadership to persuade the congressmen to 
authorize the policy proposals released in the name of the president. 
However, since no existing literature provides sufficient linkage between the 
divided government and the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies, on the basis of the existing literature, in section 3.2.1.1, we have 
assumed that a divided government is very difficult to make consistent and 
appropriate RTDI policies. The congressmen of the opposition party who 
possess different policy priorities and preferences from the president’s ones 
may break the consistencies of the RTDI policies. Moreover, as long as the 
congressmen of the opposition party are likely to have difficulties to form a 
consensus for the appropriateness of the RTDI policies with the president, 
the divided government as a whole is very difficult to make appropriate 
RTDI policies to support the development of the NSTIS. Nevertheless, our 
assumptions made in section 3.2.1.1 are not fully demonstrated by the 
empirical cases of the National Programs and the regulation policies 
discussed in section 6.4.  
 
Both cases, the National Programs and regulation policies, show that the 
divided government is capable to make consistent and appropriate RTDI 
policies. In fact, in the case of the National Programs, the congressmen of 
the opposition party only changed a part of the contents of the National 
Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals 
and broke the consistencies and the appropriateness of the National Program. 
For the other two National Programs, as we have described in section 
6.4.2.2, once the elected politicians have decided the policy proposals of the 
two National Programs to be consistent and appropriate, the congressmen of 
the opposition party approved the policy proposals and didn’t change the 
consistencies and appropriateness of the two National Programs. In addition, 
in the case of the regulation policies the congressmen of the opposition 
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party authorized the bills of the new clauses of the Law with only one 
change, and indeed the change, as we have described in section 6.4.3.2, 
made the new clauses of the Law to be more appropriate to the development 
of the pharmaceutical NSTIS. The congressmen even authorized the bills of 
the new clauses of the Management Act without change. Yet, the new 
clauses of the Management Act authorized by the congressmen, as we 
describe in section 6.4.3.2, were inappropriate to the development of 
agricultural NSTIS. In fact, according to the empirical cases of the National 
Programs and the regulation policies, we consider that the congressmen of 
the opposition party under the divided government did influence the 
consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. Yet, the congressmen, 
in the majority of cases, only had slight influence (such as one of the 
National Program and the Law) or no influence (two of the National 
Programs and the Management Act). In addition, even if the congressmen 
made some changes to the RTDI policies, the changes made by the 
congressmen are either positive (such as the Law) or negative (such as 
National Science and Technology Program for Biotechnology and 
Pharmaceuticals) to the consistencies and appropriateness of the RTDI 
policies. The influence of the congressmen on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies is actually very complex. On the basis of 
the discussions about the two empirical cases we recognize that there are 
three factors which effect on the influence of the congressmen of the 
opposition party on the consistencies and appropriateness of the RTDI 
policies. Each of the factors is introduced below.         
 
First of all, the congressmen have limited knowledge about the contents of 
RTDI policies, and their oversight to the proposals of RTDI policies is 
reduced because of the shortage of knowledge. As we have described in 
section 6.4.2.2, in the case of the National Programs, the congressmen of the 
opposition party had different policy priorities and preferences from the 
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president’s ones and had incentives to change the contents of policy 
proposals of the National Programs. This is consistent with the literature on 
divided government. However, as it is shown in section 6.4.2.2, it was the 
limitation of knowledge which reduced the insights and leverage of the 
congressmen. As long as the policy proposals of the National Programs 
were full of professional terms of biotechnology, it was very difficult for the 
congressmen to monitor and criticize the policy proposals. Besides, the 
congress itself didn’t provide sufficient support to the knowledge of the 
congressmen. Even as the congressmen of the opposition party had high 
incentive to change the policy proposals provided in the name of the 
president, they were unable to change the contents of policy proposals as 
much as they tended to. In other words, as we observe from the case of the 
National Programs, even though the congressmen of the opposition party do 
have incentives to change the policy proposals of RTDI policies, because of 
the shortage of knowledge, the congressmen are only able to make few 
changes before they approve the RTDI policy proposals.   
 
Second, the extent to which the elected politicians can persuade and form 
the consensus with the congressmen deeply influenced the judgments of the 
congressmen towards the consistencies and appropriateness of the RTDI 
policy proposals. While the existing literature, such as Weatherford (1994), 
Cox and McCubbins (2000) and Pfiffner (1994), describe that it is the 
president who needs to employ his/her leadership to persuade the 
congressmen of the opposition party in order to get approvals of policies, we 
find that it is in fact the elected politicians, rather than the president, who 
need to form the consensus with the congress. As we have shown in section 
6.4.2.2, there were two National Programs directed towards the 
pharmaceutical sector, but the congressmen had quite a different judgment 
from the policy proposals of the two National Programs. The congressmen 
smoothly authorized the policy proposals of the National Research Program 
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for Genetic Medicine and maintained the consistencies and appropriateness 
of the National Program, because the leaders successfully persuaded the 
congressmen that the development of generic research took long time. Yet, 
the congressmen suspended a part of the budgets of the National Science 
and Technology Program for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals and broke 
the consistencies and appropriateness of the National Program, because the 
leaders of the National Program were unable to successfully persuade the 
congress. Moreover, in the case of the Management Act, as we have 
described in section 6.4.3.1.2, it was also the high level managers of the 
Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine, as elected 
politicians, to form the consensus with the congressmen. As long as the 
policy priorities and preference of the congressmen were included in the 
bills in the stage of agenda - setting, in the stage of deciding, the 
congressmen authorized the bills to be laws without changes. Yet, as we 
have described in section 6.4.3.1.2, even if the new clauses of the 
Management Act were legislated, these new clauses merely strengthened the 
policy objective of the Management Act which was neither consistent with 
other interrelated policies, such as the National Program, nor appropriate to 
the development of agricultural NSTIS. Indeed, the congressmen didn’t play 
the role to check for the consistencies and appropriateness across policies. 
The two pharmaceutical National Programs and the Management Act show 
three different processes for the divided government to shape the 
consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. In the case of the 
National Research Program for Genetic Medicine, the elected politicians 
achieved the consensus with the congressmen which was based on the 
understanding towards the consistencies and appropriateness of the National 
Program, and the divided government made the National Program to be 
consistent and appropriate; on the contrary, even if the elected politicians 
formed the consensus with the congressmen in the case of the Management 
Act, since the consensus was not established upon the understanding 
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towards the consistencies and appropriateness, the divided government 
didn’t make the Management Act to be consistent and appropriate. In 
addition, in the case of the National Science and Technology Program for 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, even though the elected politicians 
made the National Program to be consistent and appropriate, since there was 
no consensus formed for the National Program, the congressmen broke the 
consistencies and appropriateness of the National Program. In sum, from the 
empirical cases we find that it is the interactions between the elected 
politicians and the congressmen which influence the judgments of the 
congressmen towards the RTDI policies. Furthermore, only under the 
condition that the consensus between the elected politicians and the 
congressmen is established upon the understanding of the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies, the divided government is able to make 
consistent and appropriate RTDI policies.      
 
Third, the pressures from the voters and the involvement of external 
stakeholders facilitate the formation of the consensus between the 
congressmen and the elected politicians. In the case of the National 
Programs, as we have shown in section 6.4.2.2, voters preferred to support 
the development of biotechnology. The preference of the voters was similar 
to the policy preference of the president and the elected politicians who 
tended to promote policies, such as the National Programs, to support the 
development of biotechnology and related sectors. Therefore, the 
congressmen of the opposition party tended to approve the policy proposals 
of the National Programs. In addition, the congressmen formed different 
levels of consensus with the elected politicians to satisfy their voter’s 
preferences. The congressmen had much stronger consensus with the elected 
politicians towards the agricultural National Program than the two 
pharmaceutical National Programs, because many congressmen of the 
opposition party were elected by agricultural counties. Therefore, all the 
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budgets of the agricultural National Program were smoothly authorized and 
parts of the budgets of one of the two pharmaceutical National Programs 
were suspended. Moreover, in the case of the Law, as we have described in 
section 6.4.3.2, even though the congressmen of the opposition party didn’t 
achieve the consensus with the Minister of the Department of Health for the 
consistencies and the appropriateness of the Law, it was the involvement of 
the same groups of pharmaceutical associations to shape the consensus 
between the congressmen and the ministers. Since the pharmaceutical 
associations presented their policy preference to both the Minister and the 
congressmen, the policy preference of the Minister and the one of the 
congressmen of the opposition party were shaped to be similar to each other. 
While the congressmen of the opposition party authorized the bills of the 
new clauses of the Law to be laws, they only slightly changed the details of 
the bills, such as deleting the 3 year protection of the data exclusivity of 
Me-Too medicines. Since the policy purpose and the policy instruments of 
the new clauses were not changed, the congressmen in fact didn’t change 
the vertical and horizontal consistencies of the Law. In addition, since the 
congressmen further balanced the interests of the local SMEs and MNCs, 
they in fact changed the new clauses of the Law to be more appropriate to 
the development of pharmaceutical NSTIS. In short, based on our 
discussion about the National Programs and the Law, we find that the 
pressure from the voters and the involvement of external stakeholders are 
able to shape policy preferences of the congressmen of the opposition party 
and the elected politicians to be similar to each other and facilitate the 
executive and legislative branches to form a consensus for the policy 
objectives and the policy instruments of RTDI policies. 
   
On the basis of our empirical cases of the three National Programs and the 
regulation policies, we identify that the divided government is able to make 
RTDI policies to be consistent and appropriate. We agree with some existing 
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literature of comparative politics, such as Samuels (2007), Weatherford 
(1994), Cox and McCubbins (2000) and Pfiffner (1994), and extend the 
contributions of the literature to the field of RTDI policies. Under the 
divided government the congressmen of the opposition party have different 
policy priorities and preferences of RTDI policies which are different from 
the ones of the president. In some cases, the congressmen do have 
incentives to change the contents of RTDI policies. Yet, as we have found in 
the empirical case of the National Programs, because of the specialties of 
these policies the oversight of the congressmen was reduced by the shortage 
of knowledge. In addition, we don’t agree with some literature of 
comparative politics, such as Weatherford (1994), which considers the 
employment of the president’s leadership to be the only method to persuade 
the congressmen to authorize the policy proposals. On the basis of our 
empirical findings we recognize that in the field of RTDI policies, the two 
branches of the divided government are able to achieve consensus through 
the interactions between the elected politicians and the congressmen and 
through the involvement of the policy preferences of the voters and the 
external stakeholders.  
 
In sum, we recognize that our assumption that the divided government is 
very difficult to make consistent and appropriate RTDI policies is too 
simplified. The oversight of the congressmen under the divided government 
is able to be reduced by the shortage of knowledge, and the persuasion of 
elected politicians and the involvement of voters’ and the external 
stakeholders’ preferences are able to facilitate the establishment of 
consensus between the two branches. Therefore, we conclude that as long as 
the elected politicians and the congressmen of the divided government are 
able to establish a consensus upon the understanding towards the 
consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies, the divided government 
is able to make consistent and appropriate RTDI policies. The consensus 
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between the two branches is different from sector to sector because of the 
different preferences of voters and the involvement of external stakeholders. 
 
7.2.2 The influence of the horizontal coordination on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies 
 
In section 3.2.1.2 we have established our second research question: how 
does the horizontal coordination between actors influence the 
consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies? The actors refer to 
both the elected politicians on the ministerial level and the administrators on 
the agency level. Our second research question, as described in section 
3.2.1.2, is established upon the literature of public management. On the 
ministerial level, according to the description of Laver and Shepsle (1996), 
the departmental egoism of elected politicians, especially the ministers, is 
very difficult to avoid. Even though Six et al (2006) have described that the 
collaborative organizational relationships are the precondition to make 
policies consistent with each other, from the perspective of Braun (2008), in 
the field of RTDI policies, unless the benefit of coordination is higher than 
costs, the self - interested ministers have no incentive to achieve the inter - 
ministerial consensus for coordination. Moreover, on the agency level, as 
described by Elmore (1997), Six et al (2002) and Lindblom and Woodhouse 
(1993), it is very hard for administrators to achieve the consensus to 
horizontally coordinate with each other. In the field of RTDI policies, as 
described by Biegelbauer (2003), RTDI policies are complex and usually 
decided and implemented by multiple ministries. Therefore, the 
coordination is important. Yet, unless the administrators gain benefits or at 
least secure their benefits through coordination, as depicted by Braun (2008), 
they have no incentives for horizontal coordination. Indeed, on the basis of 
the existing literature we assume that if ministers are difficult to horizontally 
coordinate with each other, it is very difficult for the cabinet to make 
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vertically and horizontally consistent RTDI policies which appropriately 
match the development of NSTIS. We assume if ministers have difficulties 
to form inter - ministerial consensus, the general policy objectives are 
difficult to be formed and the RTDI policies promoted by different 
ministries would be difficult to be horizontally complementary to each other. 
Moreover, since the cabinet as a whole would have difficulties to form a 
unified judgment for the appropriateness of RTDI policies, the cabinet 
would have difficulties to promote a set of RTDI policies to match the 
development of a particular NSTIS. In addition, we assume if administrators 
have difficulties to horizontally coordinate with each other, RTDI policies 
will be implemented towards the directions which are neither vertically 
consistent with the general policy objectives of the whole government, nor 
horizontally consistent with the implementation of other interrelated policies. 
Once being implemented, the RTDI policies are very difficult to generate 
appropriate support to the development of a particular NSTIS. In fact, what 
we have assumed in section 3.2.1.2 is confirmed by the cases of National 
Programs and regulation policies.  
 
The cases of the National Programs and regulation policies show that 
horizontal coordination deeply influences the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. In the case of National Programs, as we 
have described in section 6.4.2.1, the policy objectives and the policy 
instruments of the three National Programs were decided through the inter - 
ministerial consensus between ministers and were consistent and 
appropriate. Yet, all the three National Programs suffered the problem of 
poor horizontal inter - departmental coordination and were implemented 
towards the direction which was not consistent and was difficult to generate 
sufficient appropriate support to the pharmaceutical and agricultural NSTIS. 
Furthermore, in the case of regulation policies, as we have described in 
section 6.4.3.1, the policy objectives and the policy instruments of the Law 
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and the Management Act were set up without horizontal inter - ministerial 
consensus and were neither consistent with the National Programs, nor 
appropriate. Even though the policy purpose and policy instruments of the 
new clauses of the Law loosely followed the general policy objectives of the 
Promotion Plan and tended to generate appropriate support to the 
pharmaceutical NSTIS, without inter - ministerial consensus, the new 
clauses of the Law were not horizontally complementary with other 
interrelated policies, such as the National Programs. In addition, because 
there was no horizontal inter - departmental coordination, both the Law and 
the Management Act were implemented towards the direction which was 
not vertically consistent with the general policy objectives of the Promotion 
Plan and not horizontally consistent with other implementation bodies. After 
being implemented, the regulation policies were difficult to generate 
appropriateness on the development of pharmaceutical and agricultural 
NSTIS.  
 
In summary, based on the two empirical cases we are able to confirm that 
the horizontal coordination does influence the consistencies and the 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. However, we further recognize that the 
horizontal coordination on the ministerial level and the horizontal 
coordination on the agency level have different influences on the RTDI 
policies. The influences of the horizontal coordination on each of the two 
levels are discussed below.   
              
The horizontal inter - ministerial coordination has the influence on the 
consistencies and the appropriateness of the policy objectives and the policy 
instruments of RTDI policies. In the case of the National Programs, the 
policy objectives and the policy instruments of the National Programs were 
decided through inter - ministerial consensus. As we have described in 
section 6.4.2.1, the resources of the National Programs were contributed by 
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different ministries. Although the National Science Council played the role 
to coordinate other ministries to form the inter - ministerial consensus for 
the policy objectives and the policy instruments of the National Programs, 
in fact, none of the Ministers of the four ministries lost interests or lost their 
authorities because of the participation of the National Programs. The 
Steering Committees of the three National Programs which gave the general 
advices for the policy objectives and the policy instruments to the leaders 
were chaired by the Minister of the National Science Council but involved 
the vice - ministers of other ministries. Therefore all the ministries 
participating in the National Programs shared the authority to decide the 
policy objectives and policy instruments of the National Programs. 
Moreover, in the agricultural National Program, the Project Committee was 
co - chaired by the vice-Minister of the National Science Council and the 
vice-Minister of the Council of Agriculture. In other words, not only the 
policy objectives and the policy instruments, but the detailed agendas of the 
National Program were decided through inter - ministerial consensus. 
Indeed, inter - ministerial consensus of the National Programs was achieved 
under the institution in which no minister lost resources or lost the authority. 
Because the ministers achieved inter - ministerial consensus, as we have 
described in section 6.4.2.1, the policy objectives and policy instruments of 
the National Programs were consistent and appropriate. However, in the 
case of the regulation policies, the policy objectives and policy instruments 
of the Law and the Management Act were not decided through the inter - 
ministerial consensus. As we have described in section 6.2, the Department 
of Health was the single ministry to execute the Law and the affiliated 
administrative rules, and the Council of Agriculture was the single ministry 
to execute the Management Act. If the Minister of the Department of Health 
or the Minister of the Council of Agriculture coordinated with other 
ministers for the promotion of the Law or the Management Act, they may 
lose their authority to be the single ministry to execute the Law or the 
 252
Management Act. Under the condition that there was no benefit, such as 
increasing resources and authority for the horizontal coordination, we are 
not surprised that the two Ministers had no incentives to form inter - 
ministerial consensus for the Law and the Management Act. As we have 
shown in section 6.4.3.1, because of lacking inter - ministerial consensus, 
even if the policy purpose of the new clauses of the Law loosely followed 
the general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan, the policy objectives 
remained vertically inconsistent with the general policy objectives of the 
Promotion Plan and the policy objective and the policy instruments of the 
Law were not horizontally consistent with the two pharmaceutical National 
Programs. In addition, since the agendas of the Management Act were 
decided without inter - ministerial consensus, the policy objective and 
policy instruments of the Management Act were not vertically consistent 
with the general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan, were not 
horizontally complementary with the agricultural National Program and 
were unable to generate appropriate support to the development of 
agricultural NSTIS.  
 
On the basis of the empirical cases of the National Programs and regulation 
policies, we agree and further extend the perspectives of the existing 
literature of public management. In the field of RTDI policies, as described 
by Laver and Shepsle (1996), the departmental egoism of ministers exists 
and is the most important underlying factor which makes the horizontal inter 
- ministerial coordination difficult. Even though the inter - ministerial 
coordination deeply influences the consistencies and appropriateness of the 
policy objectives and policy instruments of RTDI policies, just as described 
by Braun (2008), unless the ministers are able to perceive the benefits of 
coordination they have no incentive to decide the policy objectives and 
policy instruments of RTDI policies to be consistent and appropriate 
through inter - ministerial coordination.  
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Furthermore, the administrators’ horizontal inter - departmental coordination 
influences the consistencies and the appropriateness of the implementation 
of RTDI policies. In fact, the National Programs were implemented without 
horizontal inter - departmental coordination. As we have shown in section 
6.4.2.3, all three National Programs encountered the problem of horizontal 
inter - departmental coordination. In the cases of the two pharmaceutical 
National Programs, since the implementation bodies of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs didn’t consider their mission were fully respected by the 
National Programs and they were unable to gain obvious benefits through 
the participation of the National Programs, from our perspective, it is not 
surprising that the two implementation bodies were reluctant to be involved 
in the National Programs. Moreover, in the agricultural National Program, 
the implementation body of the Council of Agriculture and the 
implementation body of the Ministry of Economic Affairs had no problem 
to horizontally coordinate with each other in funding the bio - agricultural 
research because the missions of the two implementation bodies were 
similar to each other. Yet, the implementation bodies were very difficult to 
horizontally coordinate with each other to execute the agricultural 
regulations under the framework of the National Program. The Bureau of 
the Industrial Development was the single body to execute the ‘Factory 
Rules’, and the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and 
Quarantine under the Technology Department was the only body to execute 
the Management Act. There was in fact no perceived benefit to incentivize 
the two implementation bodies to coordinate with each other. As a result, the 
direction of implementation of the National Programs was neither vertically 
consistent with the general policy objectives of the Promotion Plan, nor 
horizontally consistent with the implementation of other implementation 
bodies. After being implemented, the National Programs were difficult to 
generate appropriate support to the development of pharmaceutical and the 
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agricultural NSTIS. Moreover, in the case of the regulation policies, the 
Law and the Management Act were also implemented without horizontal 
inter - departmental coordination. As we have described in section 6.4.3.3, 
the Bureau of Pharmaceutical Affairs was the only implementation body of 
the Law and the affiliated administrative rules, and the Bureau of Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine was the only implementation 
body of the Management Act. According to our discussions above these two 
Bureaus indeed had no incentives to implement the Law and the 
Management Act through inter - departmental coordination, which may 
reduce their authority in the implementation of these regulation policies. As 
a result, the implementation of the Law and the Management Act was 
towards the direction which was not vertically consistent with the general 
policy objectives of the Promotion Plan, not horizontally consistent with the 
National Programs, and not to generate appropriate support to the 
pharmaceutical and the agricultural NSTIS.    
 
On the basis of the empirical cases of the National Programs and regulation 
policies we agree and extend several points of the existing literature of 
public management. We assent to Elmore (1997) and Lindblom and 
Woodhouse (1993) that the administrators have their own departmental 
egoism, and further explain that in the field of RTDI policies the 
departmental egoism of the administrators is one of the most important 
reasons which make the horizontal inter - departmental coordination 
difficult. We also agree with Braun (2008) that unless the departmental 
routines of administrators are fully respected and administrators are able to 
at least secure their benefits in the coordination, they have no incentives to 
horizontally coordinate with each other to implement RTDI policies.  
                       
In sum, according to empirical analysis of the National Programs and the 
regulation policies, we recognize that the horizontal coordination, including 
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the horizontal coordination between the elected politicians and the 
coordination between the administrators, deeply influences the consistencies 
and appropriateness of RTDI policies – in both directions. Our conclusion 
not only confirms the opinions of Six et al (2006) that the collaborative 
organizational relationship is the precondition to make consistent policies, 
but also extends the perspectives of the existing literature of public 
management, such as Laver and Shepsle (1996), Elmore (1997), that in the 
field of RTDI policies the departmental egoism exists on both the ministerial 
level and the agency level and is one of the fundamental factors which make 
the horizontal coordination difficult. Moreover, the horizontal coordination 
on the ministerial level and on the agency level of actors has different 
influence on the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. While 
the horizontal inter - ministerial coordination influences the consistencies 
and appropriateness of the policy objectives and policy instruments of RTDI 
policies, the horizontal inter - departmental coordination influences the 
consistencies of implementation and the extent for the RTDI policies to 
generate appropriate support to the development of NSTIS.  
 
7.2.3 The influence of the vertical coordination on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies.  
 
As we have described in section 3.2.1.2 our third research question is: how 
does the vertical coordination between the elected politicians and the 
administrators influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies? The scholars of public management have rich analyses for the 
vertical coordination within the government. As described by the Hogwood 
and Gunn (1997), administrators are very difficult to ‘perfectly’ implement 
the policies decided by the elected politicians. As also described by 
Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993), because of the limited time elected 
politicians have they are not able to supervise the implementation of the 
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majority of policies. Elmore (1997) also describes that even if the elected 
politicians have major changes in the policies, unless the elected politicians 
give sufficient incentives for the administrators to adjust and to implement 
these changes, the new policies would be implemented by old routines and 
suffer implementation failure.  On the basis of the existing literature of 
public management, we assume that if the vertical coordination between the 
elected politicians and administrators is very difficult to achieve, even if the 
elected politicians have decided the policy objectives and policy instruments 
of every RTDI policy to be vertically consistent with the general policy 
objectives of the whole government and horizontally consistent with other 
interrelated policies. In addition, even though the elected politicians have 
decided that policy objectives and policy instruments appropriate, the 
implementation may be difficult to generate appropriate support to the 
development of NSTIS. Our empirical descriptions of the National 
Programs and regulation policies in section 6.4 confirm our assumptions of 
the vertical coordination established in section 3.2.1.2.  
 
Both the National Programs and the regulation policies encountered the 
difficulties of vertical coordination which deeply influence the consistencies 
and appropriateness of the two policies. In the case of the National 
Programs, as we have described in section 6.4.2.3.1, the elected politicians, 
including the ministers and the leaders, have coordinated the policy 
objectives and the policy instruments of the National Programs to be 
consistent and appropriate. Yet, because of the problem of vertical 
coordination, even though the implementation bodies of different ministries 
didn’t consistently implement the National Programs, none of the elected 
politicians were able to amend the distortion. During implementation, the 
National Programs didn’t generate sufficient appropriate support for the 
development of pharmaceutical and agricultural NSTIS. Moreover, in the 
case of the regulation policies, both the Law and the Management Act were 
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implemented without vertical coordination. Even though the implementation 
of policies was far from the general directions given by the Minister of the 
Department of Health and the Minister of the Council of Agriculture, none 
of the Ministers fixed the distorted implementation of the two policies. After 
being implemented, the regulation policies did not generate the intended 
appropriateness on the development of the pharmaceutical and agricultural 
NSTIS. Indeed, according to the two empirical cases we recognize that the 
vertical coordination actually influences the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. Furthermore, as we have described in 
section 3.2.1.2, there are two possible factors which explain the difficulties 
of vertical coordination: the limitation of the elected politicians and the 
organizational inertia of the administrators. Since both factors are further 
demonstrated by the two empirical cases, we discuss each of the factors 
below.       
     
First, the limitation of elected politicians to monitor the implementation is 
one of the factors which make the vertical coordination difficult. As 
described by Lindblom and Hoodhouse (1993), compared with the vast 
scope of the administrative activities, elected politicians only have limited 
time and energy to supervise the implementation of policies. In fact, both 
cases of the National Programs and the regulation policies demonstrated this. 
In the cases of the two pharmaceutical National Programs, as we have 
described in section 6.4.2.3, once the Minister and the vice - Ministers of the 
three ministries delegated power to the implementation bodies, they no 
longer monitored the implementation. The agricultural National Program 
was also implemented in the context that the minister and the vice-ministers 
simply believed the implementation bodies even if the implementation was 
distorted. Moreover, in the cases of the Law and the Management Act, once 
the Ministers delegated the regulatory bodies to set up the agendas and to 
implement these regulation policies, they no longer monitor the agendas and 
 258
the implementation. From our perspective, both the National Programs and 
the regulation policies were just a small part of the policies which were 
promoted by Ministers and vice - Ministers. In practice, each of the 
Ministers and vice - Ministers had too many policies to monitor and it was 
almost impossible for them to monitor the implementation of every single 
policy promoted under the ministry. Therefore, on the basis of the empirical 
cases of the National Programs and regulation policies, we agree with 
Lindblom and Hoodhouse (1993) that the limitations of the elected 
politicians, especially the ministers, to supervise the implementation is one 
of the fundamental problems which derives the difficulties of vertical 
coordination. However, according to the empirical case of the National 
Programs, we also find that the improvement of institutions is one of the 
possible ways to overcome the limitation of Ministers and therefore to 
improve the vertical coordination. As we have shown in section 6.4.2.3, in 
the case of all the three National Programs, the leaders of the National 
Programs, as elected politicians, have discovered that the implementation of 
the National Programs was distorted. Yet, since the leaders were only 
nominated by the Minister of the National Science Council and only 
represented the Council, they were unable to supervise the implementation 
of the implementation bodies of other ministries from top - down and had 
difficulties to fix the distortion of the implementation of the National 
Programs. From our perspective, it was the institutional design which 
hampered the improvement of vertical coordination. If the leaders were 
nominated by the Ministers of the three ministries, rather than the Minister 
of the National Science Council, the leaders should be able to improve the 
vertical coordination and maintain the consistencies and the appropriateness 
of the implementation of the National Programs. Therefore, we recognize 
that the limitation of the ministers to supervise implementation is one of the 
possible reasons which make the vertical coordination difficult, but we also 
consider that the improvement of institutions is one of the possible ways to 
 259
improve the vertical coordination. 
 
Second, organizational inertia is another factor which derives the problem of 
vertical coordination. As we have defined in section 3.2.1.2 the 
organizational inertia refers to the situation that administrators get used to 
the administrative routines too much and avoid to accept new changes. As 
described by Elmore (1997), the elected politicians who introduce major 
changes in policies should give sufficient incentives for the administrators to 
implement these changes or the new policies would frequently suffer 
implementation failure. The perspective of Elmore is further demonstrated 
by the empirical cases of the National Programs. Indeed, the National 
Programs, as we have described in section 6.2, were the new policies which 
were on the top of the 15 % Mid-term Plans of the four ministries 
considered to be the old policies. The National Programs, as the new 
policies, were initiated in order to integrate the 15 % of the Mid-term Plans. 
Yet, the elected politicians, especially the Minister and vice-Ministers, 
didn’t give the administrators sufficient incentives to adopt the new changes. 
The National Programs were then implemented by the old administrative 
routines of the Mid-term Plans which were implemented according to the 
priorities of each ministry, rather than the inter - ministerial consensus. The 
National Programs suffered implementation failure and didn’t generate 
sufficient appropriate support to the development of pharmaceutical and 
agricultural NSTIS.  
 
In sum, according to the empirical cases of the National Programs and the 
regulation policies, we consider that the vertical coordination between the 
elected politicians and the administrators has deep influence on the 
consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. We agree with 
Hogwood and Gunn (1997) and extend their points that in the field of RTDI 
policies, ‘perfectly’ implementation of policies is indeed very difficult. 
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Moreover, we further recognize two factors which influence the vertical 
coordination of RTDI policies. Firstly, we agree with Lindblom and 
Woodhouse (1993) and extend their perspectives that in the field of RTDI 
policies, the limitation of the elected politicians, especially the elected 
politicians at ministerial level, is one of the reasons for the difficulties of 
vertical coordination. However, we also recognize that the improvement of 
institutions may be one of the possible methods to improve the limitations 
of the ministers and improve the vertical coordination. In addition, we agree 
with Elmore (1997) and further stretch his perspectives that in the field of 
RTDI policies organizational inertia is another reason of the problems of 
vertical coordination and implementation failure. In sum, we conclude that 
the vertical coordination does influence the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies, especially the extent for the RTDI policies 
to be consistently and appropriately implemented. The improvements of the 
institutions for the supervision of the elected politicians and the 
organizational inertia of administrators are the key elements to improve the 
vertical coordination.  
 
7.2.4 The influence of the involvement of external stakeholders on the 
consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies  
 
As we have asked in section 3.2.2 our fourth research question is: how does 
the involvement of external stakeholders influence the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies? The external stakeholders include 
interest groups and academics. As we have described in section 3.2.2, our 
fourth research question is established upon the research of interest groups 
and scientists. The interest groups, as described by Chubb (1983), Feldmann 
(2002) and Scott and Cornelius (2004), participate in the policy - making 
process out of self - interests. According to the descriptions of Hrebenar and 
Scott (1982) and Scott (1997), the capabilities of interest groups to influence 
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policies are different because of the unequal resources they hold. May et al 
(2005) and Steinmo and Watts (1995) also explain that the presidential 
polity yields interest groups enormous power because it allows them to 
effect on policies through lobbying the congress. As also described by Inzelt 
(2008) and Mogee (1988), the involvement of interest groups has both 
positive and negative impacts on the RTDI policies. Moreover, the 
academics, according to the descriptions of Tournon (1993), also participate 
in the policy - making process out of self - interests, and as described by 
Schooler (1971), the capabilities of academics to influence the policies are 
different because of their scientific field, their degree of specialization and 
so on. Rich (2005) also depicts that the presidential polity gives experts 
higher influences because the experts are able to influence policies from 
both sides, the president and the congress. According to the descriptions of 
Pollitt (2006) and Barker and Peters (1993), there are both positive and 
negative impacts of academics on the policies. Indeed, on the basis of the 
existing literature, in section 3.2.2, we assume that only the suitable 
involvements of external stakeholders, including interest groups and 
academics, have positive impacts on the consistencies and appropriateness 
of RTDI policies. The suitable involvement of external stakeholders, 
according to our definition in section 3.2.2, refers to the situation that the 
involved external stakeholders are able to present the general interests of the 
whole industry or the whole scientific community to the government and 
help the government to promote consistent and appropriate RTDI policies. If 
the interest groups or the academics are able to present the general interests 
of the whole industry or the whole scientific community to all actors inside 
the government, they would ensure that the RTDI policies are decided with 
full knowledge of the conditions of the industry and scientific community 
and the likelihood of the RTDI policies may increase. Therefore, the 
involvement of external stakeholders would positively contribute to the 
consistencies and appropriateness of the RTDI policies. What we have 
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assumed in section 3.2.2 is in general further demonstrated by the empirical 
cases of the National Programs and the regulation policies.  
 
Both the National Programs and the regulation policies show that only a 
suitable involvement of external stakeholders is able to positively contribute 
to the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. In the case of the 
National Programs, as we have described in the section 6.4.2, only the 
general interests of the academics were suitably involved in the agendas of 
the two pharmaceutical National Programs, while the general interests of the 
pharmaceutical sector were not. Once being implemented, the majority of 
pharmaceutical companies were quite indifferent to the National Programs, 
and the two National Programs indeed generated very limited appropriate 
support to the pharmaceutical NSTIS. In the case of agriculture, the general 
interests of the agricultural academics and the agricultural companies were 
not suitably involved in the agricultural National Program, and thus they 
were unable to positively contribute to the consistencies and the 
appropriateness of the National Program. After being implemented, the 
agricultural National Program didn’t generate sufficient appropriate support 
to the development of agricultural NSTIS.  
 
Moreover, in the case of the Law, as long as the general interests of the 
pharmaceutical sector were suitably involved in the agendas of the Law, 
they positively contribute to the appropriateness of the new clauses of the 
Law. Nevertheless, since the agricultural companies, especially the 
companies of pesticides, were unable to suitably present their general 
interests to the actors inside the government, they were very difficult to help 
the government to make the Management Act consistent with the National 
Program and appropriate to match the development of agricultural NSTIS. 
Indeed, according to the empirical cases, we consider that the extent for the 
general interests of external stakeholders to be involved in the policy - 
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making process of RTDI policies influences the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. However, we find that there are four 
points that are able to extensively deepen the analysis of the influence of the 
involvement of external stakeholders on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies.  
 
First of all, the organization of political system deeply influences the 
capabilities of external stakeholders to effect on the consistencies and the 
appropriateness of the RTDI policies. Various authors in the existing 
literature, such as Steinmo and Watts (1995), May et al (2005) and Rich 
(2005), have noticed that the organization of the political system is one of 
the factors which determine the capabilities of interest groups and the 
academics to influence policies. From their perspective, the presidential 
polity shapes the organization of the political system and gives the external 
stakeholders opportunity to influence policies through lobbying the 
congressmen. Such perspective is demonstrated by the case of the Law. As 
we have shown in section 6.4.3.1.2 and section 6.4.3.2, the pharmaceutical 
associations influenced the contents of the Law through lobbying both the 
elected politicians and the congressmen of the opposition party. However, 
the case of the National Programs shows that the presidential polity is not 
the only factor which shapes the organization of the political system. The 
political institution also shapes the organization of the political system and 
gives some external stakeholders more access than others. As we have 
shown in section 6.4.2.1, the influence of the academic representatives and 
the pharmaceutical or the agricultural representatives on the agendas of the 
National Programs was much higher than any other external stakeholders. 
The institutions of Steering Committees and the Consulting or the Project 
Committees gave these external stakeholders special status to influence the 
agendas of the National Programs. In other words, it was the political 
institution which shaped the capabilities of these external stakeholders to 
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influence the National Programs. According to the empirical cases of the 
National Programs and the Law, we recognize that it is not only the 
presidential polity, but the political institutions which shape the 
organizations of the political system and the influence of the external 
stakeholders on the contents of RTDI policies, as well as the consistencies 
and appropriateness of RTDI policies. 
 
Second, the external stakeholders of the same sector have different 
participation in the different stages of the RTDI policy - making process, 
and in each stage, they have different influence on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. While the existing literature, such as 
Inzelt (2008), Mogee (1988), Pollitt (2006), Tournon (1993) and Barker and 
Peters (1993), discuss the positive and negative influences of the external 
stakeholders on the RTDI policies, these authors haven’t discussed that the 
positive and negative influence of the external stakeholders is continuously 
changing through the policy - making process. Indeed, as we have noticed in 
the empirical cases, not only the external stakeholders in the same sector 
had different modes of participation in the different stages of the RTDI 
policy - making process, but the impact of external stakeholders, either 
positive or negative, changes during the policy - making process. As we 
have shown in the cases of the two pharmaceutical National Programs in 
section 6.4.2.1.2, in the stage of agenda-setting, the academic 
representatives, as external stakeholders, have presented the general 
interests of the whole scientific community to all elected politicians and 
positively contributed to the consistencies and appropriateness of the 
National Programs. Yet, these academic representatives had no involvement 
in the stages of deciding and implementation and had no positive influence 
on the contents of the National Programs in the two stages. Moreover, in the 
case of the Law, the pharmaceutical associations were involved in the stages 
of agenda-setting and deciding, positively represented the general interests 
 265
of the pharmaceutical sector to both the elected politicians and the 
congressmen, and positively contributed to the appropriateness of the policy 
objectives and instruments of the new clauses of the Law. However, the 
pharmaceutical associations had no involvement in the stage of 
implementation. While the new clauses of the Law were implemented 
towards the direction which was not appropriate to the development of the 
pharmaceutical NSTIS, the pharmaceutical associations didn’t present the 
general interests of the pharmaceutical sector to the administrators. After 
being implemented, the new clauses of the Law were very difficult to 
generate appropriate support to the pharmaceutical sector. In short, 
according to the cases of the National Programs and the Law we recognize 
that the influence of the external stakeholders changes from stage to stage 
because of their different modes of involvement in the different stages of 
RTDI policies. The more the external stakeholders are able to suitably 
involve in the different stages of the RTDI policy - making process, the 
more the involvement of the external stakeholders is able to have positive 
influence on the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies.   
 
Third, the external stakeholders of the same sector have different modes of 
participation in the different policies. While the existing literature, such as 
Chubb (1983), Feldmann (2002) and Scott and Cornelius (2004), depicts 
that the interest groups participate in the policy - making process out of self 
- interests, they don’t discuss the reasons why the same sector has different 
participation in different policies. In fact, as we have shown through the 
cases of the two pharmaceutical National Programs and the Law, the 
pharmaceutical associations were quite indifferent to the National Programs 
but were very active in the policy - making process of the Law and its 
affiliated administrative rules. Moreover, the agricultural representatives 
who were active in the policy - making process of the National Program 
didn’t participate in the policy - making of the Management Act. From our 
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point of view it is the different levels of awareness which influence the 
different participation of the same sector. The pharmaceutical associations 
didn’t participate in the policy - making process of the National Programs 
because they didn’t consider the importance of the National Programs; the 
agricultural representatives didn’t participate in the policy - making process 
of the Management Act because they didn’t recognize the interests of the 
Management Act. Yet, what are the underlying factors which influence the 
different levels of awareness of the companies of the same sector? We need 
more research in the future to fulfil the gap.       
    
Fourth, the same policy has different involvements of external stakeholders 
from different sectors. While the existing literature, such as Goldstein 
(1999), Schooler (1971), Ricci (1993), Sabatier (1993) and Chubb (1983), 
discusses the involvement of external stakeholders in the policies, they 
usually focus on the interactions between the particular groups and the 
actors inside the government. Yet, the existing literature seldom discusses 
that the same policy which is promoted to different sectors may have 
different involvement of external stakeholders. As shown in the case of the 
Law, although the Law was promoted to both the pharmaceutical and the 
medical device sectors, the pharmaceutical associations were quite active in 
the policy - making process of the Law, while the medical device sector was 
quite indifferent to the Law. As a result, the Law was shaped to be more and 
more appropriate to the development of pharmaceutical sector, but remained 
un - appropriate to the medical device sector. From our point of view the 
same policy may have different appropriateness on the different sectors 
because of the different involvement of external stakeholders.           
  
On the basis of the empirical cases we consider that the involvement of the 
external stakeholders does influence the consistencies and the 
appropriateness of RTDI policies, and only a suitable involvement of 
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external stakeholders has positive influence on the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. We agree with and extend the 
perspectives of the existing literature of interest groups and academics by 
four points. We find that in the field of RTDI policies, the capabilities of 
external stakeholders are deeply influenced by the organizations of political 
system which is shaped by both the polity and political institutions. We also 
find that the impacts of external stakeholders change in the different stages 
of policy - making process, and the external stakeholders who have positive 
influence on one stage do not necessarily have positive influence in another. 
In addition, the external stakeholders of the same sector have different 
participation in the different RTDI policies, and the same policy has 
different involvements of external stakeholders from different sectors. In 
sum, we consider that the suitable involvement of external stakeholders does 
influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies, and the 
suitable involvement of external stakeholders is influenced by the 
organization of the political system, the modes of the participations of 
external stakeholders which are different because of the different sectors, 
different policies, different stages.          
 
7.3 The analysis of the conceptual framework and the empirical cases 
 
In this section, we reconfirm and sharpen the conceptual framework by the 
analysis of our empirical cases. As we have shown in Figure 3.1 we have 
divided the RTDI policy - making process into four stages: agenda - setting, 
deciding, implementation and evaluation. In each stage we assume there are 
particular key actors who play the key roles in the stage, and each stage is 
influenced by particular independent variables. For example, we assume the 
key actors in the stage of agenda-setting are elected politicians and external 
stakeholders, and the stage is influenced by two independent variables, the 
horizontal inter - ministerial coordination and the involvement of external 
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stakeholders. However, as we have displayed in Figure 6.3, the dynamics of 
the policy - making process extend the analysis of the conceptual 
framework.  
 
As shown in Figure 6.3 the policy - making process of the two policies is 
different, and the political institutions of the two policies change during the 
policy - making process. In the case of the National Programs, in the stage 
of agenda-setting, the National Science Council was the coordinator of other 
ministries, the academic representatives and the pharmaceutical or the 
agricultural representatives. In the stage of deciding, the Legislative Yuan 
played the central roles to authorize the policy proposals of the four 
ministries, and the academics and pharmaceutical or agricultural companies 
had limited influence on the congressmen. In the stage of implementation, 
the National Science Council was the coordinator of other ministries and 
interacted only with individual academics and pharmaceutical and 
agricultural companies. Moreover, in the case of the regulation policies, 
since the stage of agenda-setting, there was no coordinator of the Law and 
the Management Act. The Department of Health only interacted with the 
pharmaceutical associations; and the Council of Agriculture only interacted 
with individual agricultural companies. In the stage of deciding, it was the 
Legislative Yuan to play the central role to interact with the Department of 
Health, the Council of Agriculture and the pharmaceutical associations, and 
the agricultural companies played no roles in the stage. In the stage of 
implementation, the Department of Health only interacted with individual 
pharmaceutical companies, and the Council of Agriculture only interacted 
with individual agricultural companies.  
 
The policy - making process of the two policies shown in Figure 6.3 
sharpens our conceptual framework by two points. First of all, the actors 
involved in the different stages are not clearly distinguished. As shown in 
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Figure 3.1 we assume the congressmen of the opposition party only involve 
in the stage of deciding. Yet, Figure 6.3 shows that in the case of the 
Management Act the congressmen not only involved in the stage of deciding 
but also in the stage of agenda-setting. Second, the conceptual framework 
only assumes that the interactions between the actors inside the government 
and the external stakeholders would influence the consistencies and 
appropriateness of RTDI policies; yet, in Figure 6.3, it is shown in the 
empirical cases that not only the networks between the actors inside and 
outside the government, but the networks between the actors inside the 
government deeply influence the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies. In short, what is happening in the reality is much more complex 
than the conceptual framework.  
 
However, the empirical cases also demonstrate the value of the conceptual 
framework by two points. Firstly, as we have described in section 3.1, one 
of the theoretical blocks of the conceptual framework is the literature of 
comparative politics and the governance. The conceptual framework 
assumes that the government is the core of the political system and is 
embedded in the network of governance. The two empirical cases further 
confirm the assumptions of the conceptual framework. As shown in Figure 
6.3, both the two cases show that the Taiwanese government is embedded in 
the network of governance which is composed of government and non - 
governmental actors, such as academics, companies and associations. The 
two policies were made through the interactions between the actors inside 
the government and actors outside the government. Inside the government, 
the political institutions change in the different stages of the policy - making 
process of the two policies, because the government itself is the core of a 
dynamic political system. Outside the government, the interactions between 
the government and non - governmental actors shape the RTDI policy - 
making process Second, the conceptual framework assumes that the RTDI 
 270
policy - making process is under the context of NSTIS and the policy - 
making process influences the development of NSTIS. The assumption is 
reconfirmed by the empirical cases of the two policies. As shown in Figure 
6.3, the Taiwanese government interacted with the external stakeholders 
outside the government and embedded in the network of governance in three 
biotechnology related NSTIS. The interactions, as we have mentioned in 
section 7.2.4, deeply influenced the consistencies and appropriateness of the 
two policies which further influenced the development of the three NSTIS.  
 
In summary, the conceptual framework established in Chapter 3 outlines the 
framework for the analysis of the RTDI policy - making process and its 
impact on the content of policies. Although the conceptual framework itself, 
as a literature driven simplification to understand complex realities, does 
not – indeed cannot – perfectly reveal the dynamics and complexity of 
policy - making process, it helped us to identify the key actors, the different 
stages of the RTDI policy - making process, as well as the variables inside 
and outside the government which are able to influence the RTDI policy - 
making process. 
                                     
7.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter linked the conceptual framework and the empirical cases 
together. It not only analyzed the influence of each of the four independent 
variables on the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies but also 
discussed the contributions of the conceptual framework to the empirical 
literature. Through opening the black - box of the RTDI policy – making 
process, we understand the influence of the four variables on the 
consistencies and appropriateness of the contents of RTDI policies and the 
influence of the contents of RTDI policies on the development of NSTIS. 
The key findings of this thesis, the main contributions of the thesis, and the 
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suggestions for the future research are discussed in the next chapter, Chapter 
8.        
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the key findings and the main 
contributions of the thesis, as well as suggestions for future research. The 
theme of the thesis, as we have described in Chapter 1, is to link three 
variables together: the RTDI policy - making process—the contents of RTDI 
policies—the appropriateness of RTDI policies on the development of 
configuration of the three innovation systems. The theme of the thesis is 
shown again in the dialogic box below.  
 
 
All the chapters of the thesis are structured around the theme of the thesis.  
 
The configuration of the three innovation systems, as we have defined in 
Chapter 2, is conceptualized as the national, sectoral and technological 
innovation system (NSTIS). Moreover, in order to open the black - box of 
the RTDI policy - making process, in Chapter 3 we establish the conceptual 
framework and set up the four research questions around the four 
independent variables which are likely to influence the RTDI policy - 
making process, as well as the contents and the appropriateness of RTDI 
policies. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we then use the empirical experiences 
of the Taiwanese biotechnology and the three related sectors to demonstrate 
the concept of the NSTIS and on that basis, more importantly, to explore the 
conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making process and its 
importance for the policy content. While we discuss the value and detect the 
gaps of the conceptual framework in Chapter 7, in this chapter we review 
the key findings and describe the main contributions of the thesis, as well as 
the limitations of the thesis, which need to be further overcome by future 
 
RTDI policy-making 
process 
Contents of RTDI policies  Appropriateness of 
RTDI policies on the 
configuration of the 
three innovation 
systems 
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research. 
 
The chapter is structured as shown below. Section 8.2 summarizes the 
answers of the four research questions and the key findings of the whole 
thesis. Section 8.3 describes the main contributions of the thesis to the 
existing literature, i.e. the conceptual contributions and the empirical 
contributions. Section 8.4 detects the gaps of the thesis and gives 
suggestions for future research.  
 
8.2 Key findings of the thesis 
 
In this section we review the key findings of the thesis and the answers to 
the four research questions and identify the influence of each of the four 
independent variables on the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies, the two dependent variables. In addition, we also identify the 
findings from our conceptual framework which are able to contribute to our 
understanding towards the RTDI policy - making process. In the following 
paragraphs we will discuss the influence of each of the four independent 
variables first, and discuss the contribution of the conceptual framework 
afterwards.  
 
The divided government under the presidential polity, as we have discussed 
in section 7.2.1, influences the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI 
policies. In the field of RTDI policies the congressmen of the opposition 
party, under the divided government, have in fact limited oversight to the 
policy proposals of RTDI policies because of the shortage of knowledge. It 
is the persuasion of the elected politicians and the involvement of voters and 
external stakeholders to facilitate the establishment of the consensus 
between the elected politicians and the congressmen. Only under the 
condition that the consensus between the elected politicians and the 
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congressmen is achieved upon the understanding towards the consistencies 
and appropriateness, the divided government as a whole is able to make 
consistent and appropriate RTDI policies which match the development of 
NSTIS. However, since the level of consensus between the elected 
politicians and the congressmen differs across sectors, the divided 
government has different RTDI policies towards different sectors. 
 
The horizontal coordination also influences the consistencies and the 
appropriateness of RTDI policies. As we have described in section 7.2.2 it is 
the departmental egoism which makes the horizontal coordination on both 
the ministerial level and the agency level difficult. While the horizontal 
coordination on the ministerial level influence the consistencies and 
appropriateness of the policy objectives and policy instruments of RTDI 
policies, the horizontal coordination on the agency level influences the 
consistencies and appropriateness of the implementation of RTDI policies. 
The government as a whole is able to make consistent and appropriate RTDI 
policies under the condition that the departmental egoism on both the 
ministerial level and the agency level is overcome and the horizontal 
coordination on both levels is achieved.  
 
Moreover, as discussed in section 7.2.3 the vertical coordination between 
the elected politicians and the administrators also influences the 
consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. The limitation of the 
elected politicians to supervise the implementation of the administrators and 
the organizational inertia of the administrators are the two main reasons 
which make the vertical coordination difficult. The government, as a whole, 
is able to promote consistent and appropriate RTDI policies under the 
condition that consistent and appropriate policy objectives and the policy 
instruments of RTDI policies decided by the elected politicians are able to 
be fully implemented by the administrators. 
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In addition, the involvement of external stakeholders, including academics 
and interest groups, is another variable which influences the consistencies 
and appropriateness of RTDI policies. As we have recognized in section 
7.2.4 the involvement of external stakeholders in the RTDI policy - making 
process is dynamic. On one hand the external stakeholders of the same 
sector have different involvement in different RTDI policies, and on the 
other hand, same RTDI policy has different involvement of external 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the impact of the external stakeholders changes 
in the different stages of the RTDI policy - making process because of their 
different modes of involvement in the different stages. The stakeholders 
who have positive influence in the stage of agenda-setting do not necessarily 
have positive influence in the stage of implementation. Besides, the 
capabilities of external stakeholders to influence the RTDI policies are 
deeply influenced by the organizations of the political system. Indeed, it is 
the dynamic involvement of external stakeholders which shapes the RTDI 
policies of the same government different from sector to sector. We consider 
that only the suitable involvement of external stakeholders has positive 
contributions to the consistencies and appropriateness of RTDI policies. The 
government which is able to properly design the organization of the political 
system under the particular polity and to suitably involve the general interest 
of different external stakeholders through all the stages of the RTDI policy - 
making process is able to make consistent and appropriate RTDI policies to 
match the development of NSTIS. 
 
Our conceptual framework provides the concept to analyze the policy - 
making process of RTDI policies which is influenced by multiple variables 
and involves multiple actors. Although, as we have described in section 7.3, 
the conceptual framework does not fully reveal the dynamics of the policy - 
making process, it makes one of the first attempts to open the black - box of 
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the RTDI policy - making process and provides the framework to discover 
the network of governance which shapes the RTDI policy - making process, 
formulates the contents of RTDI policies, and influences the appropriateness 
of RTDI policies and their appropriateness on the development of NSTIS. In 
other words, the conceptual framework enables us to link the three variable 
of the thesis together: RTDI policy - making process---the contents of RTDI 
policies---the appropriateness of RTDI policies on the development of 
NSTIS.  
 
8.3 The main contributions of the thesis 
 
We set up two original and fundamental concepts in the thesis, the 
conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making process and the concept 
of NSTIS. Moreover, we not only linked the two concepts together, but also 
applied the two concepts for the analysis of the Taiwanese biotechnology 
and related sectoral policies. The conceptual contributions and the empirical 
contributions of the thesis are discussed in detail below. 
 
8.3.1 The conceptual contributions 
 
We set up the conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making process 
which opens the black-box of RTDI policy - making and the concept of 
NSTIS which defines the configuration of the three innovation systems. 
Through linking the two fundamental concepts together we actually initiate 
a new approach to understand and analyze the RTDI policies. There are 
three conceptual contributions of the two concepts established.  
 
Above all, we build up the fundamental bridge between political science and 
the approaches of innovation systems. On one hand, as we have described in 
section 2.3, the literature of comparative politics, such as Almond et al 
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(1996) and Hague and Harrop (2008), never links their research to the 
research of RTDI policies and the approaches of innovation systems. 
Although some political scientists in the sub-discipline of public 
administration, such as the scholars of network governance approach 
(Jansen, 1991), the scholars of the public management (Braun, 2008), and 
the scholars of interest group and scientists research (Inzelt, 2008; Landers 
and Schgal, 2004; Tournon, 1993), apply the different approaches of public 
administration to the analysis of RTDI policies, they do not systematically 
link their research to the approaches of innovation systems. On the other 
hand the scholars of innovation systems do not systematically involve the 
research of political science in the research of innovation systems. Yet, 
through the conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making process and 
the concept of NSTIS, we explore the linkage between the different sub - 
disciplines of political science and the approaches of innovation systems. 
We demonstrate that the research of political science is able to deepen the 
research of innovation systems.  
 
Second, we link the different strands of the political science together for the 
analysis of RTDI policies. The conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - 
making process reveals that the government is not a unified entity, but the 
core of the political system, which is composed of institutions and actors. 
The government is embedded in the network of governance. RTDI policies 
are produced and shaped through the dynamic interactions between different 
actors inside and outside the government. Through uncovering the 
black-box of the policy - making process we clearly identify the polity and 
politics underlying the RTDI policies. A RTDI policy may be promoted 
because of the political incentives, such as departmental egoism of elected 
politicians, the pressures from voters or the lobbying activities of interest 
groups. Our conclusion echoes Flanagan et al (2010) that the rationale of 
RTDI policies in reality is decided through the interactions of multiple 
 278
actors at multiple levels. However, we have further explained the different 
modes of interaction between different actors in different stages of RTDI 
policies.  
 
Furthermore, the new concept of NSTIS integrates the key concepts of the 
approaches of the three innovation systems and inspires the new perspective 
of the analysis of RTDI policies. We extend the nice picture of Makard and 
Truffer (2008) and further define the configuration of the three innovation 
systems as the national, sectoral and technological innovation systems 
(NSTIS). The concept of NSTIS inspires the new research for the dynamics 
of the knowledge base, the networks of actors, and the products of the 
configuration of the three innovation systems. Moreover, the concept of 
NSTIS also initiates the new perspective to understand the role of the 
governments and RTDI policies in the national development. As we have 
detected in section 2.2.1, the existing literature of the national innovation 
systems, such as Freeman (1987) and Nelson (1993), assumes that the role 
of the government in the national development is to promote RTDI policies 
to foster the development of the overall national innovation system. Yet, 
through the concept of the NSTIS, we understand that there are different 
NSTIS within the national border and the RTDI policies which concern the 
overall national development or fit one particular NSTIS do not necessarily 
fit the development of another. The new roles of the government are to 
sophisticatedly promote different RTDI policies which appropriately match 
the development of the different NSTIS. Instead of promoting one set of 
policies which fit the overall national innovation system, the new RTDI 
policies should be customized to deliberately match the different 
intersections of a particular sector and a particular technology within a 
particular national border. After being implemented, the RTDI policies 
should be evaluated by their appropriateness on the NSTIS rather than on 
the overall national innovation system. The government, under the context 
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of NSTIS, should thoroughly understand the uniqueness and the dynamics 
of a particular NSTIS before making policies. The establishment of 
consensus between the actors inside the government and between the 
government and external stakeholders is important to gain sufficient 
understanding towards the development of NSTIS. The RTDI policies 
copied from foreign countries or copied from another national sector and 
technology are very difficult to be effective and generate appropriate 
support. 
 
In summary, through the conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - making 
process and the concept of NSTIS, we tend to provide new perspectives to 
understand the RTDI policies. We judge the roles of the government and 
RTDI policies from the perspective of NSTIS and provide the conceptual 
framework which shows the process to make consistent and appropriate 
RTDI policies to foster the development of the particular NSTIS. The 
understanding of the four variables which influence the RTDI 
policy-making process and the development of NSTIS would indeed help us 
to improve the consistencies and appropriateness of future RTDI policies. 
For example, while making policies, both elected politicians and 
administrators should pay attention to the possible difficulties of horizontal 
coordination and avoid the problems of horizontal coordination beforehand. 
In order words, our new perspective may contribute to the analysis of RTDI 
policies in the future. 
 
8.3.2 The empirical contributions 
 
The thesis also has two contributions to the empirical literature, which are 
the empirical contributions to the research of biotechnology and to the 
empirical research of Taiwan. Each of the empirical contributions is 
introduced below.  
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First, we analyze the development of biotechnology through the concept of 
NSTIS. On one hand, we explore the dynamic intersection between 
biotechnology and different sectors and echo the literature, such as Brink et 
al (2004) and Senker et al (2004), that modern biotechnology is adopted by 
several sectors and developed with plural sectors. On the other hand, we 
echo the existing literature, such as Senker et al (2000) and Geseisk (2000), 
which supports the view that governments’ policies play important roles in 
shaping the development of biotechnology of the nation. However, we 
extend the analysis of existing literature. From the perspective of NSTIS, we 
consider that biotechnology policies need to be sensitive to the distinctive 
dynamics of different sectors. The biotechnology policies should be tailored 
from sector to sector because the policies that match the dynamics of one 
sector may not match another. Before the governments make the 
biotechnology policies, they should fully understand the dynamics of the 
different biotechnology related NSTIS of the country and coordinate 
policies to be consistent and appropriate through the policy - making 
process in order to match the development of a particular biotechnology 
related NSTIS. 
 
In addition, we explore the case of Taiwan through the lens of NSTIS and 
RTDI policy - making process. As we have described in section 2.4.2, 
although the existing literature, such as Dogson et al (2008) and Wong 
(2005), provides some initial discussion about the development of 
biotechnology and the biotechnology policies in Taiwan, it considers the 
biotechnology in Taiwan as one sector. Through the perspective of NSTIS, 
we explore the dynamics of biotechnology and related sectors in the country. 
Taiwan in fact develops biotechnology and related sectors in very unique 
ways. Moreover, through the conceptual framework of RTDI policy - 
making process, we open the black-box of policy - making process and 
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further analyze the influence of the policy - making process on the 
consistencies and appropriateness of biotechnology and related sectoral 
policies in Taiwan. The insights into the case of Taiwan may inspire the 
research of the biotechnology development in the country and other East 
Asian countries in the future. 
 
8.4 Suggestions for future research 
 
This thesis has both the conceptual and empirical contributions of the 
existing literature. However, through the research carried out we also 
recognize some limitations of this thesis which need to be addressed by 
future research. 
 
First of all, we only apply the conceptual framework of the RTDI policy - 
making process and the concept of NSTIS for the analysis of the Taiwanese 
biotechnology and related sectors and policies, and we adopt the qualitative 
method. In order to generalize the conceptual framework and the concept of 
NSTIS, we need more internationally comparative studies with broader 
methodologies to further explore the two closely related concepts.  
 
Second, we are only able to analyze the influence of the RTDI policy - 
making process on the appropriateness of RTDI policies. Empirically we are 
only able to observe the appropriateness of the two cases in the period from 
2000 to 2008. However, we are unable to analyze at this moment how the 
policy - making process of the two policies influences their effects and the 
effectiveness in the long-term. The influence of the RTDI policy - making 
process in the long-term needs research in the future to further explore it.  
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